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Abstract 
This thesis presents a number of examples where macroeconometric models are employed as 
useful tools for evaluation of contemporary policy problems. A range of approaches is 
proposed to shed light on how macromodels can actually contribute to the policy debate. In 
particular, the thesis emphasises how different models maybe augmented or modified and 
stresses tile need for care in the experimental design of policy simulations. 
Small stylised models of the UK economy are estimated in the first part of this thesis. They are 
used to assess the perf6rmance of simple monetary policy rules under the current inflation 
targeting monetary regime. In a monetary policy regime of inflation targeting, the appropriate 
target band-width can be assessed by calculating the variance of inflation in a macroeconomic 
model under alternative policy rules. A recent Bank of England study concludes from 
stochastic simulation of a small semi-structural model that a 'fairly substantial lump of 
inflation uncertainty' exists in the United Kingdom. In chapter 2 an extended and improved 
version of that model is developed while their estimates of inflation variability are revised 
downwards by deploying analytic techniques. In chapter 3a new small 'semi structural' 
dynamic model of the UK economy is estimated, with particular attention to the modelling of 
wages and prices. It is used to assess the performance of simple monetary policy rules, 
including 'inflation forecast targeting' and 'Taylor' rules, while taking into account different 
degrees of forward- lookingness in both inflation targeting horizon and wage bargaining. 
Computation of asymptotic inflation-output standard-error trade-offs is provided under various 
specifications and parametrisations of the model. I 
Large-scale country models have the convenience to make explicit a complete range of 
relationships among macroeconomic variables most of which, for obvious reasons, are 
neglected in smaller dynamic models. As a consequence, such quantitative framework offers 
an unique opportunity to evaluate not only the aggregate impact of exogenous shocks on the 
variables of interest, but also to identify the underlying economic mechanisms enabling the 
transmission of such shocks. In the second part of the thesis, I undertake simulations of the 
National Institute's Domestic Econometric Model (NIDEM) to analyse the characteristics of 
the UK monetary transmission mechanism. Chapter 4 emphasises that the impact of interest 
rate movements on real variables is strictly determined by both the monetary regime at. work 
and the underlying assumptions regarding consumption behaviour. 
Certainly, the steady integration of the members of the EMU and increasing awareness of the 
need for closer co-operation in monetary and fiscal policy have stimulated greater interest in 
modelling interdependencies between European countries and the impact and feedbacks from 
the rest of the world economy. Many of the key issues have now an international aspect, so it 
becomes more and more difficult to rely on single-country models to provide necessary 
analysis. International transmission mechanisms can therefore be better tackled with a multi- 
country model. The third and last part of this thesis focuses on cross-country asymmetric 
transmissions in response to a common monetary shock within EMU. In particular, in chapter 
5 an empirical analysis of the links between monetary and fiscal policy within EMU is 
presented. This is done through simulation of a neo-classical highly non-Ricardian multi- 
country model: the IMF's MULTIMOD Mark III (MM3). Chapter 6 provides further evidence 
about the effects of embracing a Monetary Union when underlying macroeconomic structures 
still differ across countries. By use of the same model-based quantitative framework, this 
chapter examines the role of nominal and real rigidities in European labour markets for the 
assessment of asymmetries in monetary transmission under various monetary regimes. 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
Writing about 'policy evaluation with macroeconometric models' certainly has an old fashion 
- almost romantic - flavour. It was before the mid 1970s that large macroeconometric models 
were still playing a central role in the policy debate. These models were used both for 
forecasting and policy simulation exercises, typically with short-run horizons of between 
eighteen months and two years. They shared a common underlying economic paradigm, 
namely a basic Keynesian income-aggregate demand framework with little or no role for 
supply-side factors. Their long-run properties and consistency with theory were rarely 
questioned. Because of their inherent similarities, it is not hard to believe that these 
macromodels failed at approximately the same time. Thus, by the early 1980s, policy-makers 
lost their confidence in the use of macromodelling for policy in general, probably also because 
expectations of what. models mighvachieve had been set too high, with unrealistic claims 
about their reliability and scope. ,-II--. 
There were broadly two reasons for the disenchantment with the demand-oriented 
macroeconometric models of the 1970s and their use for policy evaluation, design and 
optimisation. The first was their forecasting breakdowns in the face of supply-side shocks, 
that could not be made to fit into the existing analytical framework. The major failures came 
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after the first oil shock and the widespread expansionary fiscal policies at the beginning of the 
1970s, when macromodels could not explain associated stagflation phenomena, with rise (and 
persistence) of both inflation and unemployment. The inflationary mechanism in the models 
was based around a Phillips curve that was downward-sloping, even in the long run. Problems 
in finding a stable econometric relationship meant that wages were often treated as exogenous 
in both forecasting and policy analysis. The exchange rate was treated in much the same 
manner, because of the lack of data on a flexible exchange rate regime. In this way two of the 
main transmission mechanisms of shocks to inflation were essentially ignored and inflation 
was consistently underestimated in that period. The second reason of the mistrust was the 
perceived theoretical inadequacy of the models. Criticism of their lack of internal consistency 
and consequent quest for sensible microfoundations came especially from the 'new classical' 
school of economic thought, both the monetary variants associated with Lucas, Sargent, 
Wallace and Barro, and the real business cycle variant of Kydland, Prescott and others. 
Developments in econometric methods have also contributed to substantial improvements in 
macromodelling in the last two decades. Considerable use has been made of the dynamic 
specification known as tile error-correction model. The error-correction model has provided a 
convenient representation of the long-run implications of a dynamic model, where 
comparative static economic theory is more relevant, together with a more data-based 
specification of the process of short-run adjustments. 
As a result of such criticisms and- evolutions, a new paradigm has emerged in 
macroeconometric modelling. It allows for the co-existence of a neo-classical 'view of 
macroeconomic equilibrium with a new Keynesian view of short-to-medium-term adjustment. 
Accordingly, short-term fluctuations in output are largely led by changes in the components of 
aggregate demand, whereas the long-run properties of the model are determined by the broad 
predictions of the neo-classical model of growth. In this way, any med ium-to- long-term 
output response is primarily shaped by (exogenous) supply-side factors, through technical 
progress and population growth. This implies that, at least, in respect of the long-run 
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equilibrium, the level of real activity is independent of the price level and the steady-state 
inflation rate. Nonetheless, in the short run, adjustment costs and contractual arrangements 
prevents markets from clearing, inducing considerable output inertia and employment 
disequilibria. 
The core supply-side is nowadays pivotal in defining model properties, not only because the 
corresponding variables' dynamic responses determine the outcome for price inflation, but 
also because the long-run solution to these equations can be used to derive an expression for 
the equilibrium rate of unemployment (Joyce and Wren-Lewis, 1991; Turner, 1991; Wren- 
Lewis, 1997). In particular, if the implicit aggregate supply curve is vertical in the long run, 
wage and price equations can be combined to form an expression for the NAIRU, the non- 
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment. For this to exist, equations for average earnings 
and prices in the good markets should exhibit both static and dynamic homogeneity, that is 
money neutrality and superneutrality (Carlin and Soskice, 1990; Layard et aL, 1991). 
The other breakthrough in ma croeconomic modelling has certainly been the advent of the 
rational expectations hypothesis. In a model embedding anticipation of future endogenous 
variables, the long-run effects of exogenous shocks may also be important determinants of 
short-run behaviour and their influence has been incorporated into macroeconometric models 
in various ways. A common way of dealing with unobserved expectations variables was to 
assume that they are functions of the current and lagged values of a few observed variables, 
the simplest example being the adaptive expectations hypothesis. The unobserved 
expectations variables are then substituted out, giving a conventional backward-looking 
dynamic or distributed lag model. This confounds the description of economic behaviour 
given expectations. This way of representing expectations formation is subject to the Lucas 
critique (1976) according to which behavioural equations are unlikely to remain invariant 
across policy regimes and hence likely to give wrong estimates of the macroeconomic 
consequences of a change in policy regime. This critique has been questioned by arguing that 
model-based policy analysis often evaluates the consequences of changes in the settings of 
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policy instruments, rather than complete regime shifts. Nonetheless, macromodellers have 
eventually accepted 'the critique' by assuming that expectations are formed 'rationally'. In 
this manner, it is actually possible to keep the description of the formation of expectations 
separate from the model of economic behaviour given expectations. The rational expectations 
hypothesis assumes that expectations coincide with the conditional expectations of the 
variable in question, given 'all available information, which includes knowledge of the 
underlying economic systemAts foundation in optimising behaviour led to its incorporation 
into equilibrium business cycle models, while its advocacy as part of 'new classical' 
macroeconomics, and the hostility in the United States to the "policy ineffectiveness' 
propositions of that school of thought may explain why it was not, widely embraced in US 
mainstream models. Elsewhere the distinction between the theoretical stance of the model in 
which expectations variables appear and the theory of expectations 'which is adopted was 
more immediately appreciated. In the United Kingdom, for example, the rational expectations 
hypothesis had been incorporated into mainstream models by the mid-1980s. 
The practical solution of a model for the cndog6nous variables over a forecast period requires 
an internally consistent forward-looking solution sequence to, be calculated, whereby each 
period's expectations coincide with the model's ý forecasts for the future, period. With this 
implementation the approach is more accurately and perhaps less controversially termed 
'model-consistent', expectations. The computational cost of solving rational expectation 
models, is higher than that of backward-looking dynamic models. It is possible to derive an 
analytic expression for the solution of linear models, and consider its uniqueness and stability, 
usually referred to as a saddlepoint path (Blanchard and Kahn, 1980). Nonlinear models, on 
the other hand, are no longer solvable by using period-by-period numerical solution 
techniques appropriate for backward- looking models; what is required, at least conceptually, 
is iterating over the complete solution path (Juillardet aL, 1998). Furthermore, and in parallel 
to the requirement for initial conditions when solving conventional difference equations, there 
is also a need for terminal or transversality conditions that specify forecast values and 
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expectations for the forecast horizon. If the steady-state properties of the model are known, 
then' the terminal conditions may incorporate this information explicitly. In the IMF's 
MULTIMOD Mark III model, for example, each of the dynamic equations has a steady-state 
analogue equation, which is used, (collectively) to determine model-consistent terminal 
conditions. The steady-state and dynamic model are solved simultaneously, to derive first the 
terminal conditions for the forward looking variables, and second the dynamic baseline of the 
model (Laxton et aL, 1998). This has the added feature that the terminal conditions are not 
fixed, but are determined by the shocks applied in experiments. The advantage of this 
endogenous procedure is that it facilitates convergence and prevents huge jumps during the 
last periods, necessary to revert the model to its terminal values. A relatively long solution 
period may be required however, to ensure that the model has reached an approximate 
equilibrium. In the absence of such knowledge, or in a shorter solution period, terminal 
conditions are typically specified to approximate a saddlepoint path by requiring constant 
growth rates for the relevant variables. 
The rational expectations hypothesis adds a further dimension to model-based policy analysis. 
In estimating the consequences of a change in a policy instrument, the 'all available 
information' assumption described above allows a distinction between anticipated and 
unanticipated changes to be drawn. For example, if a shock is anticipated in a model with 
explicit future expectations, then it is possible to observe some response prior to its 
occurrence. And introducing the shock at an intermediate point of the solution period, while 
solving over the whole period, can allow for the dynamic effects of such anticipations. If on 
the other hand, a shock is unanticipated, no such prior response occurs and the immediate and 
subsequent responses can be estimated by introducing the shock at the beginning of the 
solution period. This is what is conventionally done in backward-looking models, where there 
is no point in delaying the introduction of a shock. 
The full information assumption may be inappropriate or unacceptable in some circumstances, 
and various hybrid ways of treating expectations have resulted. Empirical analysis of observed 
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expectations or forecasts does not always find them to be unbiased and efficient, as predicted 
by the rational expectations hypothesis (Brown and Maital, 1981). Moreover, the use of 
rational expectations techniques for policy analysis presumes severe information requirements 
on the private sector. Namely, they need to know not only the true underlying model, but they 
also need to know how to solve the model. This may not be wholly realistic but it might be 
taken as a simple 'as if assumption. The more serious objection to the consistent expectations 
solution is instead related to the very sudden and sharp response of forward-looking 'jump' 
variables to new information. Practically, it seems unlikely that the full implications of any 
announced policy change feed through into the forward-looking jump variable so quickly, 
completely and correctly. Since theory itself is not'at question, the implausibility of the large 
responses arises from the total belief that the policy will really occur at time T as announced. 
This is true only if we assume that policymakers enjoy credibility for precommitment to any 
announced policy change. In attempting-to capture a model of expectation formation which 
falls between the two undesirable extremes of reduced form adaptive expectations, on the one 
hand, and full model consistent expectations, on the other, various kinds of learning 
mechanisms have been developed in the literature, sometimes with respect to the model itself 
and sometimes with respect to its external environment. Although learning mechanisms are 
not yet a standard part of the model builders armoury, 'adaptive learning' approach has been 
used regularly at the London Business School (Garratt and Hall, 1992), while Westaway 
(1992) presents an implementation of 'rational learning' in a large-scale macromodel for 
policy credibility analysis. Intermediate cases between adaptive and rational expectations also 
include expectations based on small VAR models, perhaps designed to mimic some dynamic 
characteristics of the macroeconometric model. In these exercises the rational expectations 
assumption often continues to serve as a baseline, not only in the sense that many of the 
learning schemes are designed to converge on the full information scenario, but also as a 
comparator for the alternative solution trajectory, allowing the gains from the full credibility 
of policy to be evaluated, for example. 
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The common backward-looking treatment of expectations may have also contributed, in the 
past, to the neglect of asset stock equilibria, as a debt explosion in the remote future does not 
have any effect on short-term forecasts in an 'adaptive' world. 'The introduction of forward- 
looking behaviour, for exactly the opposite reason,, forced the intertemporal government 
budget constraint onto the policy modelling agenda. The debt explosion in many OECD 
countries in the 1980s also provoked similar reaction. Although the classic article by Christ 
(1968) drew attention to the importance of the government budget constraint and the 
implication of assuming different sources of deficit financing, in the absence of complete 
stock-flow accounting the debt stock position was often not monitored. Initial developments 
occurred in multi-country models, led by Paul Masson and colleagues at the IMF, and 
different ways of incorporating the constraint appear in several models featuring in the multi- 
country model comparison projects sponsored by the Brookings Institution (Bryant et al., 
1988,1993). The Maastricht Treaty's fiscal requirements were an additional reason for many 
European national-economy modellers to follow suit. 
The intertemporal government budget constraint, ensuring that policy remains sustainable, is 
represented as a stability condition for the debt/GDP ratio and/or deficit/GDP ratio. The ratio 
form reflects both the definition of a steady state in terms of constant real and nominal growth 
rates, and tile practical expression of the Maastricht targets. The period-by-period government 
budget constraint is silent on the question of which of the governmenfs income and 
expenditure variables should be adjusted in the face of a disequilibrium - it is an identity, not a 
behavioural equation. In practice, model-based analyses take tax revenues or the average tax 
rate to be tile relevant policy instrument. Equally, the solvency requirement does not specify 
tile time path of any necessary adjustment, but simply that an adjustment must occur, sooner 
or later. Again, in practice, adjustment is assumed to take place continuously, by specifying a 
policy rule or reaction function that describes how the instrument is altered period-by-period 
in response to deviations of the target variable from its desired value. Nevertheless different 
formulations appear in different models - tax levels or first differences, debt or deficit targets - 
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resulting in the suspicion that these differences contribute to observed differences in 
simulation results. Recent research (Mitchell et al., 2000) has established equivalences 
between-these rules, in respect of both their long-run equilibria and their disequilibrium 
dynamics, which will assist both the design of the rules and the interpretation of results. 
Shifts in policy making were certainly crucial in modifying macromodels' features. As a 
consequence, policy evaluation procedures have also advanced considerably. Traditional 
policy analysis with macroeconometric models consisted of 'what-if exercises, addressing the 
question, what would be the macroeconomic consequences if policy settings, treated as 
exogenous, were altered. A more recent tendency has been a move away from an exogeneity 
assumption towards an endogenization of policy or 'closing' of the model, using a variety of 
techniques ranging from simple feedback rules to full optimization. To some extent the 
challenge of VAR modellers, who from the beginning abandoned the endogenous/exogenous 
distinction, provoked this response, while other important stimuli were the changes in 
practical policy-making, both fiscal and monetary. 
Optimal control theory has provided an important foundation for . methodological 
developments in policy analysis, although it has seldom featured in practical policy-making, 
due to the difficulty of specifying a practical objective function. The basic theoretical result is 
that, if the objective function or loss function is a quadratic function of the deviation of 
outcomes from their target values and the model is linear, then the optimal (minimum 
expected loss) settings of policy instruments are given by linear feedback rules. These can be 
rather complicated, however, since all 'state' variables appear in the rule, and one question 
has concerned the trade-off between optimality and simplicity. Extensions to nonlinearity 
and/or forward-looking expectations have also studied simple linear rules in c omparison with 
full optimisation, noting that in this case the fully optimal policy cannot be represented as a 
feedback rule. Simple rules also feature in studies of policy credibility, since they make policy 
more transparent and easy to monitor. 
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This is certainly a more realistic view of monetary policy which, through the setting of official 
interest rates, is explicitly focused on the control of inflation in several OECD countries 
(including tile United Kingdom) or monetary aggregates otherwise. In this respect there is a 
growing literature assessing the statistical performance of different policy regimes through the 
application of appropriate analytic or numerical techniques to a macroeconomic model. An 
important precursor is the classic article by Taylor (1979), who estimates a two-equation 
model of the US economy with rational expectations, uses it to calculate optimal monetary 
policy rules to stabilise fluctuations in output and inflation, and hence defines and estimates a 
long-run trade-off between the variability of inflation and the variability of output. Much of 
the subsequent work has continued to use simple stylised models as the research vehicle. 
Recent examples based on a model comprising an aggregate demand equation and a price 
determination equation or 'Phillips curve' are Bean (1998) for the United Kingdom and 
Rudebusch and Svensson (1998) for the United States. Simple models admit analytic solution 
methods, whereas large-scale models require stochastic simulation methods, hence 
applications are less prolific. The two studies mentioned above are part of a voluminous and 
yet growing literature, whereas the work of Blake (1996) on the NIESR model of the UK 
economy and work on the US Federal Reserve Board's model summarised by Reifschneider et 
al. (1997) are more rare examples. 
Monetary policy rules may include both change and level formulations. The former sets the 
change in tile short-term nominal interest rate as a function of deviations of inflation from 
target and, possibly, output from potential output. The latter sets the level of the interest rate 
as a function of similar arguments; this includes the form known as the 'Taylor' rule, found to 
provide a reasonable approximation to actual policy-making (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1998, 
2000). A further development associated with the name of Svensson (1997a) is the inclusion 
of terms in the deviation of forecast future inflation from target, such forward-looking rules 
probably being closer to central bank practice. However, despite the growing interest in the 
design of monetary policy rules,, the prevailing view of macroeconomic equilibrium noted 
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above implies an important shift in the main focus of attention, namely from first moments to 
second moments, statistically speaking. Neither the small stylized models used in this research 
nor typical large-scale models admit a long-run trade-off between the level of output and 
inflation, and alternative monetary policy rules are evaluated in terms of the variances of 
outcomes, as in Taylor's original study. However, in the presence of non-linearities featuring 
the inflation-output nexus, monetary policy can still induce 'first-order effects', though 
mantaining the long-run natural rate hypothesis. By use of a small stylised model, Clark and 
Laxton (1997) show that any policy which is more effective in stabilising fluctuations in the 
business cycle, thereby reducing the variance of inflation, is also able to lower the mean level 
of unemployment in the economy. 
Summarising, the fall of first-generation large-scale macroeconometric models as a tool for 
policy analysis has not led to a wholesale rejection of the model-based approach to forecasting 
and analysis of the economy. It is undeniable that all models are, at best, only a rough 
approximation to the workings of a modem economy, despite attempts to make them more 
theory-consistent and the use of more sophisticated econometric techniques. However, 
abandoning completely a formal framework would amount to render policy fully dependent 
on the implicit models in the mind of policy makers. These implicit models are less 
transparent and less likely to be consistent over time. Moreover, they lend themselves with 
difficulty to empirical falsification, while they are more likely to be internally inconsistent. 
Downgrading the role of formal models in the policy process would leave a vacuum that is 
unlikely to be re-filled by an entirely subjective approach. A formal and quantified approach 
is thus an irreplaceable adjunct to the process of policy thought. For these reasons, the 
abovementioned developments in macromodelling can be seen as asine qua non to re-gain 
policy-makers' confidence iný models. To fully achieve such a target, models must be 
constructed in a way that is consistent with sound theoretical predictions. At the same time, 
their outcomes must be consistent with (and able to replicate) relevant historical episodes. 
Further, there are many different ways in which the information contained in econometric 
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models can be used for deciding on appropriate policy actions and assessing the likely effects 
on target variables. The judgemental part of the process must, then, be explicit to provide an 
acceptable treatment of tile inherent uncertainty. 
This thesis Presents a number of examples in which macroeconometric models are used for 
evaluation of contemporary policy problems. I employ different approaches to highlight how 
macromodels can actually help policy-makers to think about the economy. Using a range of 
models recognises the inherent uncertainty about the underlying economic structure and its 
sensitivity to structural changes. Moreover, small stylised models, large-scale country models 
and global models are likely to contribute to the policy debate only if collectively employed, 
as they possess complementary features which can enrich and rectify each others' 
conclusions. Smaller models, for instance, have the advantage to make the underlying 
paradigm more transparent. They can be solved as static models with calibrated parameters or 
in dynamic versions with econometrically estimated coefficients. Small stylised models of the 
UK economy are estimated in the first part of this thesis. They are used to assess the 
performance of simple monetary policy rules under the current monetary regime. In a 
monetary policy regime of inflation targeting, the objective is typically specified as a range of 
outcomes for future inflation. Since monetary policy affects inflation with a lag, current policy 
is set in relation to forecasts of future inflation; since forecasts are subject to error, point 
targets will almost always be missed, and an indication of the inherent uncertainty is given by 
a target band. The approach used in chapter 2 to the determination of an appropriate band 
width is to build a small stylised model of the economy and then use suitable analytical 
techniques to assess the variance of inflation under alternative policy reactions to shocks. An 
influential study recently published by the Bank of England (Haldane and Salmon, 1995) 
estimates a 'small semi-structural model' of the inflation process with backward-looking 
expectations, - and uses stochastic simulation techniques to calculate the variance of inflation 
under simple feedback rules for interest rates. The study's most striking conclusion is that 
there exists 'a fairly substantial lump of inflation uncertainty' in the United Kingdom. 
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Specifically, their results imply that there is 'on average, a no better than one in four 
probability of hitting a 1%-4% inflation target'. Chapter 2 shows that such previous findings 
are essentially driven by the assumptions and shortcomings embedded in the model used for 
their analysis. Incorporating an exchange-rate transmission channel and allowing for an 
explicit forward-looking treatment of expectations in both labour and foreign markets seems 
in fact a more sensible way of portraying agents' reaction to monetary regime shifts (Miller 
and Sutherland, 1990). At the same time, it permits to take into account two important 
transmission mechanisms generally closed off in other studies: exchange rate and expectations 
channels. Other relevant features are however still missing from the small stylised model used 
in chapter 2, for instance an explicitly forward-looking behaviour in price and wage 
determination and a more complete integration of steady-state properties and short-run 
dynamic adjustments. These extensions are considered in chapter 3 together with a wider 
range of policy rules, including 'inflation forecast targeting' 4 la Svensson (1997a, 1998b) and 
'Taylor' rules, while taking into-account the impact of different degrees of forward- 
lookingness in both inflation targeting horizon and wage bargaining on the effectiveness of 
monetary policy. Linearity and analytical tractability of the empirical model are, however, 
retained. In this way, the extension of Blanchard and Kahn's (1980) solution method for 
rational expectations models deployed in chapter 2 can be used here to calculate asymptotic 
variances of inflation and -output. Within the model, particular relevance is given to the 
determination of wages and prices, - reflecting the substantial developments in this area in the 
last decades. In this respect, careful attention is granted to both statistical and eco nomic 
issues, by recognising the need to go beyond single-equation modelling and the policy 
implications of the empirical study. 
The remainder of the thesis examines the transmission mechanism of monetary policy from 
different standpoints. Large-scale country models have the convenience to make explicit a 
complete range of relationships among macroeconomic variables most of which, for obvious 
reasons, are neglected in small stylised dynamic models. As a consequence, such quantitative 
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framework offers an unique opportunity to evaluate not only the aggregate impact of 
exogenous shocks on the variables of interest, but also to identify the underlying economic 
mechanisms enabling the transmission of such shocks. In the second part of the thesis, I use 
simulation of the National Institute's Domestic Econometric Model (NIDEM) to analyse the 
characteristics of the UK monetary transmission mechanism. In view of the UK's decision not 
to enter the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) at its commencement, there is an interest 
in assessing whether monetary policy would exert an analogous influence on the real economy 
under the current monetary arrangements and a fixed exchange rate. Furthermore, the chapter 
attempts to fill the gap between the traditional perspective, according to which monetary 
policy exerts its effects on spending components through its direct influence on the cost of 
capital (Taylor, 1995), and the more recent 'credit view', which argues that other 'accelerator' 
variables, such as cash flow, have the greatest impact on spending (Bernanke and Gertler, 
1995). To do this, I focus on consumers' expenditure, and in the light of the recent literature 
on life-cycle consumption, I re-estimate the corresponding equation in NiDEM. The inclusion 
of permanent human capital, as well as the explicit modelling of Ricardian non-neutralities, is 
likely to account for a weaker interest rate sensitivity of consumption and a higher sensitivity 
of consumption to changes in current disposable income and fiscal policy. In this respect, it is 
of relevance disentangling the total change in consumers' expenditure and real output into the 
individual contributions from several transmission channels. In particular, it appears crucial to 
assess the repercussion effects of monetary impulses on spending components through their 
scal policy and iscal st ctures impact on fiscal variables. Given the decentralisation of f, fi ru 
within EMU, evidence of a quantitatively important fiscal channel of monetary policy would 
weaken the argument for a symmetric response to a common change in tile policy rate. 
Certainly, the steady integration of the members of the EMU and increasing awareness of the 
need for closer co-operation in monetary and fiscal policy have stimulated greater interest in 
modelling interdependencies between European countries and the impact and feedbacks from 
the rest of the world economy. Many of the key issues have now an international aspect, so it 
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becomes more and more difficult to rely on single-country models to provide necessary 
analysis. International transmission mechanisms can therefore be better tackled with a multi- 
country model. The third and last part of this thesis concentrates on cross-country asymmetric 
transmissions in response to a common monetary shock within EMU. This is done through 
simulations of a neo-classical multi-country model: the IMF's MULTIMOD Mark III (MM3). 
In particular, chapter 5 presents an empirical analysis of the links between monetary and fiscal 
policy within EMU. In MM3 monetary policy has a quasi-fiscal dimension, since money both 
enters the government budget constraint and affects real wealth. Each European economy is 
characterised - even in steady state - by a different debt/money composition of deficit 
financing and assumed to sustain it by running a different primary surplus. This allows to 
assess cross-country effects of a common monetary policy in a non-Ricardian world, given 
heterogeneous national economies' budgetary positions. Moreover, the chapter tries to 
evaluate tile implications of enforcing an institutional arrangement such as the Stability and 
Growth Pact in equilibrium and during transition to the new steady state. Finally, the role of 
different degrees of efficiency in European credit markets in driving asymmetric responses is 
also assessed. 
The other important source of asymmetric monetary transmission can certainly be identified in 
the presence of different degrees of nominal and real rigidity in national labour markets. Such 
heterogeneity in the underlying structure of the economies is liable to determine the size and 
speed of country- spec if ic adjustments to a common monetary shock. By use of the same 
model-based quantitative framework, chapter 6 examines the role of nominal and real 
rigidities in European labour markets for an assessment of alternative monetary regimes. 
Meanwhile, it tries to answer a number of relevant questions. is the choice of which 
institutional monetary arrangement neutral with respect to cross-country real divergences? Do 
different extant economic conditions represent weigthy barriers to the process towards 
convergence? Can labour market flexibility correct for asymmetric policy responses thereby 
favouring convergence across European countries? Is labour market flexibility always good 
Introduction 15 
news? The choice of MULTIMOD Mark III as tool of analysis is here driven by its inherent 
assumption of asymmetry in the transmission mechanism between unemployment and 
inflation. In fact, MM3 embeds a non-linear Phillips curve, thought under the hypothesis of 
existence of a natural rate of unemployment. In the presence of convexity of the inflation- 
output trade-off, it is possible to show that monetary policy choices have real effects in the 
long run. Moreover, in an EMU context, the presumption of a convex Phillips curve implies 
that country-specific adjustments to a common monetary shock depend crucially on the 
relative initial position of the economy, and not only on the parameter estimates of its short- 
run inflation-output trade-off. 
-y - 
Part-One, 
Small Stylised Models 
Chapter Two 
Inflation Target Bands and the 
'Fairly Substantial Lump of 
Inflation Uncertainty' in the UK 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
During the 1990's, New Zealand, Canada, UK, Sweden and Australia have shifted to a new 
monetary policy regime, inflation targeting I. 
Main feature of this monetary regime is the existence of an explicit quantitative objective for 
future inflation. The ýxplicii inflation target is either in the form of an interval or a point 
target, where the center I of the interval or the point target currently varies across countries 
between 1.5 in New Zealand (since 1997 the target range is of 0-3 percent, whereas during 
the period 1990-1996 the target rangewas 0-2 percent), 2'percent in Canada and Sweden, 
1 Finland and Spain also announced inflation targets while still being members of the ERM. Israel has announced 
inflation targets while still maintaining an exchange rate band. Recently, Chile and the Czech Republic also 
joined the group of inflation-targeting countries. Indeed, Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999) claim the number of 
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and 2.5 percent in Australia and United Kingdom. The target refers to the CPI or a variant of 
this that excludes some transitory components. For instance, taxes and subsidies may be 
excluded (to eliminate short-run effects of fiscal policy) or mortgage costs and credit 
services, as in the case of the UK which targets RPIX (to eliminate contradictory short-run 
effects of monetary policy on the CPI). Alternatively, as it is the case for New Zealand 
which focuses on 'core inflation', a list of factors to be disregarded in the evaluation of 
monetary policy may be specified in advance. 
This profound shift in policy making has been accompanied by an equally impressive 
attention to monetary policy institutional arrangements, in both theoretical and empirical 
economic research (for recent reviews, see Eijffinger and de Haan, 1995; Obstfeld and 
Rogoff, 1996; Walsh, 1998). The most important finding in this context is that delegation of 
monetary policy to an independent central bank can eliminate the inflation bias of monetary 
policy. The inflation bias arises in equilibrium because the ex-ante optimal policy plan is not 
time-consistent: as private agents are aware of policy-maker's incentive to renege on his 
announced policy ex-post, their choices will embody -government's expected reaction, 
thereby making resulting policy suboptimal (Barro and Gordon, 1983). Rogoff (1985) was 
the first one to suggest that delegation to an independent conservative central bank reduces 
inflation bias, though increasing volatilities. Rogoff s sugestion seems then to carry out a 
trade-off between credibility and flexibility. Walsh (1995) points out that the inflation bias 
can be eliminated without distorting stabilisation policy through'a performance contract, 
which penalises central banker's remuneration in a linear fashion with respect to deviations 
of realised inflation from target. Svensson (1997a) shows that Walsh's optimal incentive 
structure can also be achieved through an inflation targeting which grants independence to 
central bank in the conduct of monetary policy but lets government choose the target. 
McCallum (1995) notes that this arrangement, does, not prevent, revisions of the inflation 
target after private decisions has been made. However, as shown in Herrendorf (1998), a 
countries' central banks with either an explicit monitoring range or an actual target for inflation to have risen to 
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legislated delegation arrangement can restrict the discretionary influence of government and 
make monetary policy more transparent. This allows the private sector to monitor closely the 
actions of the government 'and disciplines the government not to behave in a time- 
inconsistent way. In the end, inflation targeting reduces equilibrium inflation because it 
makes reputation more effective. 
Inflation targeting is not, however, the only mechanism which has been recognised by the 
literature as reputation-enahancing. International institutional arrangements like the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS) have also been 
understood as reducing the inflationary bias. The usual argument in their favour was that 
they provide additional credibility to monetary authorities of inflation-prone countries 
(Giavazzi and Giovannini, 1986; Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988). This credibility hypothesis 
sees the ERM as enabling member countries to 'borrow' reputation from the Bundesbank by 
credibly pegging their exchange rates to the Deutsche Mark. This commitment technology, 
however, collapsed under the burden of, German reunification. This is due to the 
asymmetrically functioning system which is inherent to the exchange rate targeting: whereas 
the anchoring country chooses independently its monetary-fiscal policy mix, pegging 
countries are forced to 'borrow' the consequences of such a policy mix, regardless its 
suitability with respect to domestic targets. Theoretically, money-growth targeting can also 
provide an internal anchor thereby helping in reducing inflation bias. If credible, a money- 
growth rule as in Friedman (1968) would remove the room for discretional monetary policy. 
This approach assumes, however, that the policy-maker has perfect control over his chosen 
policy intermediate target (via the policy instrument, i. e. the repo rate) and that this 
maintains a stable relation with prices, being price stability the final target of the policy. 
Both assumptions are tenuous. Central banks have great difficulties in attaining even their 
announced money target and the relation between the development of the money stock, 
variously defined, and prices, is notoriously fickle (Blinder, 1998; Svensson, 1999). Money- 
40 by 1998. 
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growth targeting is thus likely to be credibility-damaging rather than credibility-enhancing, 
as it proposes a prominent role for an essentially irrelevant indicator in both analysis and 
communication, whereas it keeps secret the decisive input for the conduct of monetary 
policy, i. e. inflation forecasts. 
Inflation targeting has certainly some practical advantages with respect to its more direct 
counterparts, i. e. exchange rate, money-growth or nominal GDP-growth targeting2, as 
repeatedly shown by Svensson (1997a, 1997b, 1998a, 1998b, 1999). The general advantage 
involves focusing monetary policy directly on achieving the goal of low and stable inflation. 
With a specified target, it provides an ex-post measurement of monetary policy performance, 
namely deviations of realised inflation from target. It also provides measurement of 
monetary policy credibility, in the form of discrepancies of inflation expectations from 
target. Both these measurements simplify evaluation of monetary policy, thereby increasing 
its transparency and accountability. By increasing accountability, 'inflation targeting may, in 
turn, serve as a potential commitment mechanism, reduce or eliminate any inflation bias and 
increase the likelihood of achieving and maintaining low and stable inflation, as well as 
anchoring and stabilising inflation expectations. 
Under this monetary arrangement, inflation-targeting central banks are in fact asked to issue 
regular reports explaining and motivating their policy to the general public. In New Zealand, 
for instance, the Reserve Bank Governor's performance will be evaluated by the Reserve 
Board of Directors and his job is potentially at risk if realised inflation is believed to have 
moved outside the band because the Governor chose an ex-ante inappropriate policy. In the 
UK, the Chancellor of Exchequer has announced the 'Open Letter System': if inflation 
deviates more than I percentage point from the 2.5 percent inflation target, the Governor of 
2 Rudebusch (2000) discusses the role of nominal income as a possible target variable for monetary policy'. Ile 
suggests that nominal income target rules perform poorly under model and data uncertainty. Explanation is found 
to be related to the evidence that inflation and real output respond to monetary policy changes with different lags. 
Instead, by construction, a nominal income target constrains monetary policy to react identically to fluctuations in 
each of its components. Further, Svensson (1997) and Ball (1999) show that in backward-looking models 
nominal income targeting may lead to dynamic instability. However, McCallum (1997) argues that this is not the 
case in models embedding rational expectations of inflation. 
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the Bank of England shall explain in an open letter why the divergence has occurred and 
what steps the Bank is taking to deal with it. The inflation-targeting central banks explain 
and motivate their policy in regular Inflation Reports. Three of them (Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand, Bank of England and Sveriges Riksbank) publish graphs of conditional inflation 
forecasts, such that outside observers can check whether the targeting rule is fulfilled. The 
Bank of England, in particular, since its first Report in February 1993, plots conditional 
inflation forecasts for a constant unchanged interest rate. Since November 1997, it also plots 
corresponding forecasts for output. Moreover, the Bank of England publishes the minutes of 
the meeting of its MPC within 6 weeks of each meeting, including voting records3. This 
assigns individual responsability to MPC members and certainly makes monitoring of 
monetary policy much easier than under any other monetary arrangement. 
In this respect, it could be useful to recall that the introduction of inflation targeting in 
countries like UK and Sweden occurred in autumn 1992 under rather dramatic 
circumstances4. The countries went through dramatic boom-bust experiences, serious 
banking and financial-sector crises and a sudden shift from a fixed exchange rate like the 
ERM to a new monetary policy regime with a floating exchange rate. Furthermore, this 
occured in a situation with very low credibility for monetary policy, with high and unstable 
inflation expectations, much above the annotinced inflation targets. Despite that, inflation- 
targeting countries have registered a remarkable track for inflation since the introduction of 
the new monetary arrangements, as shown in Figure 2.1 for the case of the UK and Sweden 
and estensively documented in Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999). This certainly supports the 
thesis which sees inflation targeting as an effective commitment technology which enhances 
reputation while inducing time-co'nsistent behaviou Ir on the part of the I policy-maker. 
"A problem with publishing MPC minutes is that the discussion could be inhibited and that crucial discussion 
might be moved outside that context. However, the minutes do not state what was said by whom and only 
presents summaries of the arguments, which should mitigate the first problem. The moral integrity of 
MPC 
members should work as a guarantee for the rest. 
4 The UK abandoned the ERM on 23 September 1992, - a day that is usually referred to as 'black Wednesday'. 
Similarly, Sweden left the ERM on November 1992 and announced the new inflation targeting regime on January 
1993. 
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Figure 2.1: Annual inflation for Sweden and the UK (percentage points) 
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As noticed above, in a monetary policy regime of inflation targeting the objective is typically 
specified as a range of outcomes for future inflation. Since monetary policy affects inflation 
with a lag, current policy is set in relation to forecasts of future inflation; since forecasts are 
subject to error, point targets will almost always be missed, and an indication of the inherent 
uncertainty is given by a target band. It may be expressed as a point target plus or minus a 
certain tolerance, or directly as a target range. How wide should the band be? Credibility 
considerations work in both directions, as Goodhart and Vifials (1994, p. 148) observe: 'the 
selection of band width involves a trade-off between the credibility-enhancing effects of 
choosing a quite demanding target and the credibility-damaging effects of failing to adhere 
to it'. The question of the number and nature of escape clauses and exemptions that are 
allowed in some inflation targeting countries is also related to the band-width question. 
An influential study for the United Kingdom recently published by the Bank of England 
(Haldane and Salmon, 1995) estimates a 'small semi-structural model' of the inflation 
process with backward-looking expectations and uses stochastic simulation techniques to 
estimate the variance of inflation under simple feedback rules for interest rates. The study's 
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most striking conclusion is that there exists 'a fairly substantial lump of inflation uncertainty' 
in the United Kingdom, quoting a phrase which is used three times in the original article and 
once more by Haldane (1995). Their results imply, for example, that there is 'on average, a 
no better than one in four probability of hitting a 1%-4% inflation target' (Haldane and 
Salmon, 1995, p. 180). 
Several issues arise in assessing the relevance of this conclusion to the new arrangements for 
the operation of monetary policy in the United Kingdom. These arrangements were 
completed oil 12 June 1997, when a target inflation rate of 2V2% was reasserted and the Bank 
of England was explicitly required to report publicly on its actions whenever inflation 
deviates from this target by more than one percentage point in either direction. On Haldane 
and Salmon's estimates, such a report will be required rather frequently, although the 
probability distribution surrounding the conditional projections of inflation in the Bank's 
quarterly Inflation Report suggests that this will be a less frequent requirement. This 
conclusion rests on estimates of the standard deviation of annual inflation which range from 
3 to 4V2percentage points depending on the feedback rule and assumptions about the residual 
covariance matrix. It is immediately apparent, however, that the model used by Haldane and 
Salmon has several shortcomings. First, from a statistical point of view, the wage and price 
equations are estimated in first-difference form, reminiscent of an earlier Bank study, of the 
demand for money (Hacche, 1974), which motivated the exposition by Hendry and Mizon 
(1978) of Sargan's 'common factor' analysis. Second, from an economic point of view, the 
(real) exchange rate is treated as exogenous, thus an important channel of interest rate 
transmission is closed off. Overall, various statistical and economic features of its 
specification result in a model that lacks the neutrality properties of the standard Dornbusch 
model whereby, for example, an exogenous reduction in the inflation target produces the 
same reduction in actual inflation, with a long-run reduction in the nominal interest rate 
again of the same amount, leaving the real rate of interest unchanged. 
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The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2 the Haldane-Salmon model and the 
stochastic simulation exercises based upon it are reviewed, indicating that several of their 
results can be anticipated once it is recognized that inflation responds only weakly to interest 
rate changes in this model. The model is essentially linear, and instead of stochastic 
simulation techniques, analytical methods could be employed. In Section 2.3 these are 
developed and applied to our revised and extended version of the model. Some small 
revisions are made to their estimated equations, while the extensions are the endogenization 
of the exchange rate and the adoption of an explicit forward-looking treatment of 
expectations. In general these changes reflect the specification of relevant parts of leading 
large-scale structural models of the UK economy. Together with a recalibration of the error 
covariance matrix to reflect the reduced magnitude of shocks experienced in the last decade 
of the sample, these changes achieve a fairly substantial reduction in inflation uncertainty. In 
our estimates the probability of hitting a 1%4% inflation target is increased from 'no better 
than one in four' to 0.87. Section 2.4 contains concluding comments. 
2.2 THE HALDANE-SALMON MODEL 
The model used by Haldane and Salmon (henceforth HS) is a modified IS/LM system. The 
simplified representation in equations (2.1)-(2.5) below reports the variables that appear on 
I- 
the two sides of each estimated linear equation. 
IS curve: Ay: Ay-1, A(m - P), A(m - p)-,, Agý Aq-1, Aq-2 ý Ay* 
LMcurve: A(m-p): A(M-P)-I, 
-2ýAA 
i, (m-p-0.79y+0.3OV)-j (2.2) 
Cost mark-up pricinj A AOL3 (2.3) 9: AP P-I, -2 9 
AW9 AW 19 Aýý2 9 AP'M 19 
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Wage bargaining: A(w-P : Aw (2.4) P) -1, -2, -3, -4 11 
(y (y - 57)-l 
Price-expectation formation: Ap: AP-I, 
-2 9 
AM-1 (2.5) 
All variables except the nominal short-term interest rate (i) are in logarithms, A is the first- 
difference operator, and lags (in quarters) are indicated by subscripts, autoregressive terms 
being collected together and listed first. 
The IS curve, equation (2.1), relates real output (y) to real money balances (m-p), real 
government expenditure (g), the real exchange rate (q) and real overseas output (y). It is 
unconventional in using real money balances rather than the real interest rate. The argument 
is that interest rate policy operates indirectly, first depressing real money holdings via the 
LM curve, rather than directly via the IS curve. As noted above, the real exchange rate is 
treated as exogenous, as are government expenditure and foreign output. Equation (2.2) is an 
LM curve which follows Breedon and Fisher (1993) by including an error correction term in 
which a cumulative interest rate variable (D) is used to capture the upward trend in velocity. 
Agents are assumed to make decisions over nominal money holdings (and nominal wages, 
see below) without full information about current inflation, hence expected inflation appears 
in this equation, also in the contemporaneous real money variable in the IS equation. 
Equations (2.3) and (2.4) comprise the wage-price system, described as a 'reduced-form. and 
simplified version' of a Layard-Nickell (1985) bargaining model. Prices, measured as the 
GDP deflator, are a constant mark-up on nominal wages (w) and exogenous import prices 
(pim). Nominal wage bargaining is based on expected inflation, - as noted above, and is 
subject to nominal inertia and the pressure of demand as measured by the deviation of output 
from trend (y - j7) , the residuals in a regression of y on a linear trend. 
Finally, equation 
(2.5) describes the' formation of price expectations, the fitted values from this equation 
providing the 'data' 'on expected inflation in equations (2.1), (2.2), and (2.4). These 
expectations are clearly not rational, as HS note: rather than a complete reduced-fonn 
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equation of the four-equation system, equation (2.5) contains only three of the predetermined 
variables of the model. 
Two econometric issues are immediately apparent. First, this expected inflation variable is a 
generated regressor in the sense of Pagan (1984), and while this presumably explains why 
HS estimate equation (2.2) by the instrumental variables (IV) method, it should be noted that 
this is not done in equation (2.1). Second, the method of ordinary least squares (OLS) is used 
to estimate tile remaining three 'semi-structural'equations (2.1), (2.3) and (2.4) despite the 
fact that they each include a current endogenous variable on the right-hand side. 
To answer the inflation target band-width question HS next augment the model with a 
monetary policy feedback rule and calculate the variance of inflation in various scenarios. 
Before reviewing these exercises, the suitability of the model for this purpose is assessed, in 
particular asking whether some of their results can already be predicted. 
The estimated wage-price system does not exhibit dynamic homogeneity, hence this model 
does not have the natural rate property. Of greater importance for the present purpose, 
however, is the strength of the output gap effect on inflation, since this is the final link in the 
transmission of interest rate changes via the IS curve. In the steady-state solution of the HS 
estimates of these two equations, assuming consistent expectations, the coefficient of the 
output gap in the price inflation equation is 0.12. This has the interpretation that holding 
output 5% below trend, which is the maximum deviation seen in the sample, occurring 
during the 1979781 recession, reduces the annual inflation rate by only 2.4 percentage points. 
Taking equation (2.5) into account makes this response yet smaller, since expectations are 
estimated to reflect less than the full extent of observed inflation, although this equation also 
adds a direct expectational channel for monetary policy. The impact of interest rates on 
output implied by the HS estimates of the IS/LM system is less easy to summarise, given the 
dynamic forms of these equations, although the effects do not appear to be large. The overall 
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impression of a very weak link between interest rates and inflation is confirmed in 
subsequent results, discussed below. 
Inflation targeting is studied by augmenting the model with an interest rate feedback rule, 
and HS consider the following two variants 
Ail (Ap, 
-, 
&PT (2.6) 
)_A T] (2.7) Ail =A 
[E, 
-, 
(Ap, 
+, p 
AT where P is the inflation target, set at 2Y2% per annum in their practical exercises. 
Equation (2.6) is a conventional backward-looking rule, adjusting interest rates in line with 
observed deviations of inflation from its target, whereas equation (2.7) is described as a 
forward-looking rule and responds to deviations of next period's expected inflation from the 
target. As HS note, this kind of 'rule is probably closer to central bank practice, and such 
'inflation forecast targeting' rules have subsequently been extensively analysed by Svensson 
(1997a, 1997b). In implementation, however, HS again eschew rational expectations and 
instead apply the backward- looking equation (2.5), except that in calculating the expectation 
of Ap,., otherwise based on information dated t-1, the central bank is assumed to know 
Am,, and so is given an information advantage. 
The performance of the rules is assessed by stochastic simulation. The six-equation system is 
subjected to repeated pseudo-random shocks with variances equal to the residual variances 
of the estimated equations, and the variabil ity of the resulting outcomes for inflation is 
reported. A band of one standard deviation on either side of the mean outcome has width 
ranging between 6 and 9 percentage points depending on the rule and on assumptions about 
the residual variances and covariances, leading to the conclusion quoted above that there 
exists 'a fairly substantial lump of inflation uncertainty'. No information is given about the 
residual variance of inflation, however, and we are not able to reproduce the HS estimates 
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from their data to calculate this ourselves, so the extent to which the feedback rules are an 
improvement over historical experience cannot be assessed. We note, however, that the 
results are relatively insensitive to the change in the feedback parameter that is reported, 
namely from X=0.25 to X=0.5. Further, when HS report outcomes under various 
extensions of the rules for a wider range of X-values, the results are again relatively 
insensitive to variations in X. (No information about the simulation standard errors of their 
estimates is provided, hence the significance or otherwise of the reported differences cannot 
be assessed. ) In general the insensitivity of inflation variability to the strength of the 
feedback onto interest rates would be expected in a backward-looking model in which the 
responsiveness of inflation, to changes in interest rates was small, since the overall reduction 
in inflation variance depends on the convolution of these two effects. 
A simple check of the properties of the HS model under feedback control is provided by a 
(deterministic) simulation of the effect of a reduction of 1% per annurn in the inflation target, 
as used for comparative purposes by Church et aL (1996,1997). They find that in the NIESR 
model of the UK economy, for example, this produces the same reduction in actual inflation, 
with a long-run reduction in the nominal interest rate also of the same amount, leaving the 
real rate of interest unchanged, as in a standard Dombusch model. Of course the NIESR 
model, like other UK macro models, treats the exchange rate as an endogenous variable, 
whereas this channel is ignored in the HS model. Here the equivalent simulation produces 
nonsensical results, with interest rates rising by more than 50 percentage points. 
In the next section we consider a revision of the HS model which incorporates an 
endogenous exchange rate and remedies other deficiencies noted above. This is then used to 
calculate the variance of inflation in a targeting regime. From a technical point of view we 
note that the HS model is essentially linear, hence such quantities can be calculated by 
analytic methods, and the use of stochastic simulation techniques is not necessary. 
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2.3 A REVISED AND EXTENDED MODEL 
We remain within the 'small stylised model' framework, and make the minimum necessary 
changes to the HS model, restricting ourselves to the same data set. As noted above, 
however, we are not able to reproduce the HS estimates, so the option of leaving some 
equations exactly as in their article is not available to us. Endogenising the exchange rate 
introduces an additional expectations variable, and such variables are treated as model- 
consistent or rational expectations throughout. 
The first four equations have the same role as in the original HS model, and are represented 
in the same summary form in equations (2.8)-(2.11) below. Each equation also contains one 
or two dummy variables to deal with outliers; full estimation results are presented in the 
appendix A of this chapter. 
Ay: A(m-p), Ag, Aq-1, Ay* 
'A(M - P) :A (M - P)-I, -2)'-I) 
(m -p- y)-,, trend 
An 
x- : 
AP-I, 
-2, -4 9 
AW-1 
9 AW-2 9 ApiM-1 9 ApiM-2 9 APni-3 9 
AP'M-4 9 
(y -'. T) 
AW: Alýý231AP9AP-13, (Y-. T) 
(2.8) 
(2.9) 
(2.10) 
(2.11) 
Equation (2.8) is estimated by IV, and some insignificant lagged variables have been deleted. 
Equation (2.9) now follows more closely the specification of the corresponding equation in 
the Treasury model of the UK economy (Chan et aL, 1995), in particular preferring a linear 
trend to the cumulated interest rate proxy for financial innovation. The revised price 
equation, (2.10), imposes dynamic homogeneity, which is a common property in UK macro- 
models, although they typically use a unit labour cost variable in place of nominal wages. 
The price mark-up also varies with the pressure of demand, again as in the Treasury model, 
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although here too a different measure is used. Finally the wage equation, (2.11), now also 
has dynamic homogeneity imposed. 
The exchange rate transmission channel is represented in this framework by including two 
additional equations, as follows: 
e,,, it (2.12) +(it -I 
AP'M' APM-I, 
-2 9 
AP9 A(P* - e). 
Equation (2.12) is the uncovered interest parity or open arbitrage condition, written in 
nominal terms, with i, * denoting the foreign interest rate. This is a standard specification in 
models of the UK economy and of the global economy. We do not estimate this equation but 
simply note that the implied restrictions typically cannot be rejected in estimation, as in Chan 
et aL (1995), for example. An implication of (2.12) is that the real exchange rate in the IS 
curve now becomes an endogenous variable, but the main effect on inflation comes through 
import prices, as described in equation (2.13). The real exchange rate in the HS data set is 
the nominal US/UK exchange rate adjusted by the ratio of foreign to domestic prices, and we 
use the same foreign price variable, p*, for simplicity, despite its mismatch in coverage with 
the import price deflator, pim. The specification of the equation follows the general pattern 
of the Treasury model, where trade prices are determined by world prices/costs in sterling 
and domestic prices. The equation is dynamically homogeneous, ensuring the dynamic 
homogeneity of the complete wage-price system. Together with the UIP condition this 
produces the result that, in steady state, any change in inflation in response to a shock is 
matched by an equivalent change in the nominal interest rate, leaving the real interest rate 
unchanged, as in the simulation experiments by Church et aL (1996,1997) described above. 
We consider an inflation-forecast-targeting policy rule as in equation (2.7), repeated and 
simplified for convenience as follows: 
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Ail= A (AP1+1 - Ap T)- (2.14) 
The resulting model, equations (2.8)-(2.14), contains rational expectations of two future- 
dated variables. It is linear in the variables of concern, once the first difference of the 
logarithm of the price level is equated to the inflation rate, for example, and so can be 
analyzed using the solution methods of Blanchard and Kahn (1980). For values of X 
sufficiently greater than zero the number of eigenvalues outside the unit circle (two) is equal 
to the number of 'non-predetermined' variables of the model, hence it is saddlepath stable. It 
can be expressed entirely in real terms, and so is consistent with a unique real equilibrium. 
Calculation of forecast variances rests on an extension of the Blanchard-Kahn method, as 
described in appendix B of the present chapter, which gives an expression for the steady- 
state variance (see also Blake, 1996). As explained in the appendix, our calculations do not 
require the use of stochastic simulation techniqueý. Results for forecast standard errors of 
inflation at various horizons, under inflation forecast targeting as in (2.14), are shown in 
Table 2.1. The upper panel is based on a covariance matrix of the underlying random shocks 
estimated as the residual covariance matrix over the complete HS sample period (1959q2- 
1993q4). It is clear from the estimation results in the Appendix, however, that the residuals 
of the price equation are heteroscedastic. The variability of inflation falls as the level of 
inflation falls, as suggested by Friedman (1977) and subsequently verified empirically in 
many different contexts, and also true here. Of greater relevance at the present time is then 
the lower panel of Table 2.1, based on the covariance matrix of the last ten years' residuals 
(1984ql-1993q4) and so excluding major inflationary episodes in the earlier part of the 
sample. 
5 The software package that was used to carry out algebraic calculations was Matlab. 
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Table 2.1 Forecast standard errors of inflation (percentage points per annum) 
Years ahead X=0.35 X 0.5 
Full-sample covariance, matrix 
2.38 '2.26 
2 2.69 2.65 
5 3.09 3.09 
Sub-sample covariance matrix 
1 0.93 0.86 
2 1.03 0.98 
5 1.14 1.12 
The most striking feature of the table, although this is not our main focus of attention, is the 
comparison between the two panels: the reduction in the variance of shocks to their more 
recent level more than halves the standard error of inflation. Secondly, the standard error of 
inflation increases as the forecast horizon increases, although more slowly than in 
conventional backward- looking models: implicitly the variance of forward expectations has 
an effect on that of current expectations that is anticipated. Thirdly, the variability of 
inflation is not very sensitive to the feedback parameter, %. Of course the actual trajectories 
of interest rates and inflation in response to shocks, particularly in respect of the initial jump 
and subsequent short-run adjustment, do vary as X varies, but the variance of such 
trajectories around their mean is less different. 
Comparing our results with the original HS results, we see that incorporating the exchange- 
rate transmission channel and an explicit forward-looking treatment of expectations reduces 
the estimated standard deviation of inflation to approximately 50 per cent of their figures. 
Calibrating the variances and covariances of random disturbances to the experience of only 
tile last decade of their sample achieves a further reduction of a little more than one-half. 
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Overall, in our modified version of this 'small semi-structural model' the standard error of 
inflation four to eight quarters ahead is less than one percentage point. If we focus on the 
two-year horizon, given the Bank's view that it takes two years for monetary policy to have 
its maximum effect on inflation, and use a normal approximation, then the results imply that, 
in place of the HS estimate of 'on average, a no better than one in four probability of hitting 
a 1%-4% inflation target', our estimate of this probability is 0.87. The lump of inflation 
uncertainty is thus substantially reduced. 
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2.4 CONCLUSIONS 
In contrast to Haldane and Salmon's argument for an inflation target band width 'at least as 
large as the three percentage points currently [1995] operating in the United Kingdom - and 
possibly much wider', we find that some simple extensions to their analysis yield the 
argument that a tolerance interval of plus or minus one percentage point can be achieved 
approximately two-thirds of the time. (This interval corresponds to the Chancellor's Mansion 
House statement if we ignore the difference between the GDP deflator, used in the above 
analysis, and the Retail Price Index excluding mortgage interest payments, which is his 
preferred target variable. ) An important contribution to this improvement comes from the 
recognition that the underlying variance or uncertainty of inflation has fallen as the level of 
inflation has fallen, and further reductions may already be appropriate as central bank 
credibility has increased, the sample period used by Haldane and Salmon (and ourselves) 
ending in 1993. Also contributing are our extensions to their model, endogenizing the 
exchange rate and treating expectations in an explicit forward-looking manner. These 
extensions are kept to a minimum, since our present purpose is to confront the 'substantial 
lump of inflation uncertainty' on its home ground of a small stylised model of the inflation 
process; this also allows us to deploy recently-developed analytic techniques for linear 
rational expectations models. Nevertheless these two extensions are commonplace in leading 
structural models of the UK economy, which also provide a more fully elaborated account of 
the various direct domestic channels of interest rate transmission. Other relevant features 
found in larger structural models but missing from the small stylised model are explicit 
forward-looking behaviour in price and wage determination, a consistent treatment of 
foreign prices and quantities, the interaction of fiscal and monetary policy, and a more 
complete integration of steady-state properties and short-run dynamic adjustment, typically 
through the use of error-correction models. Extending the analysis to a more fully specified 
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empirical model and a wider variety of policy rules is the aim of the next chapter. In that 
context, together with a wider range of policy rules, including 'inflation forecast targeting' A 
la Svensson (1997a, 1998b) and 'Taylor' rules, we will take into account the impact of 
different degrees of forward-lookingness in both inflation targeting horizon and wage 
bargaining on the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
Comparison of our estimate of inflation uncertainty with that implicit in the probability 
distribution published in the Bank of England's Inflation Report is complicated by the fact 
that the latter relates to a projection of (RPIX) inflation conditional on unchanged interest 
rates, and precise information on the Bank's view of the interactions between these variables 
is not available. In addition one faces the practical difficulty of reading quantitative 
information off a chart measuring 2cm x 3cm; nevertheless an approximate 90% conditional 
prediction interval for RPIX inflation two years ahead_ in the August 19971nflation Report is 
1%-5%. This is distributed asymmetrically around a central projection of 2.5%, and is 
comparable with our estimate, despite the above caveats, although its upper limit-increases 
substantially between one and two years ahead, whereas its lower limit stays approximately 
constant, which is more in line with our estimates. 
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APPENDIX A: The estimateS6 
6 The failure of any test at the 5% and 1% significance level is denoted by one and two asterisks, 
respectively. 
T-ratios are reported alongside the coefficient estimates, as indicated. In some cases, because of 
restrictions imposed on the parameters, the t-ratios are not available (denoted as 'n. a. '). 
Serial Correlation: A Lagrange multiplier test for up to 5-th order serial correlation. 
Heteroscedasticity: Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values. 
Normality: Jarque-Bera test for normality of the residuals, testing skewness and 
kurtosis of residuals. 
Functional Form: Ramsey's test using squares and cross products of fitted values. 
Table 2.2: IS equation Table 2.3: LM equation 
Dependent variable, Ay * Dependent variable, (Am-Ap) 
Period of estimation, 1959q2 - 1993q4 0 Period of estimation, 1959q2 - 1993q4 
Estimated by IV: Instrument used: fitted 0 Estimated by OLS 
values of LM equation (Am-Ap)f*" 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Constant -0.027 -2.543 
Constant 0.0017 1.233 (AM-AP)t., 0.0665 1.108 
(AM-AP), 0.0877 1.846 (AM-AP)1-2 0.1439 2.703 
Ag, 0.0077 0.127 it., -0.8611 -5.024 
Aq, 
_1 -0.0293 -1.802 
(M -P- Y)1-1 -0.0817 -3.328 
AY 0.5425 4.125 Trend -0.0007 -2.892 
D74q2 -0.0313 -4.667 D59q4' -0.1170 -12.58 
2=0.313 2= 0'. 656 
SEE = 0.0090 SEE= 0.0 116 
Serial Correlation: X2 (5) = 6.59 [0.253] Serial Correlation: X2 (5) = 5.33 [0.377] 
Heteroscedasticity: F(10,122)= 2.30 [0.017]* fleteroscedasticity: 17(12,119), ý= 1.68 [0.088] 
Normality: X2 (2) = 7.77 [0.021]* Normality: X2 (2) = 3.18 [0.204] 
Functional Form: F(16,116) = 1.57 [0.09] Functional Form: F(22,109) = 1.57 [0.068] 
0 Long-run solution: 
m- p= y- 10.54 i-0.0086 Trend 
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Table 2.4: Cost mark-up pricing equation Table 2.5: Wage-bargaining equation 
" Dependent variable: Ap 9 Dependent variable: Aw 
" Period of estimation: 1959q2 - 1993q4 0 Period of estimation: 1959q2 - 1993q4 
" Estimated by OLS, * Estimated by IV: Instrument used: Ap(-2) 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
API-I -0.1645 -1.936 
API-2 0.1433 1.779 
AP14 0.1090 1.632 
Awl-, 0.2490 4.031 
AWI-2 0.3114 4.722 
Apim, j 0.1362 n. a. 
ApiMI-2 0.0572 1.936 
APiMI-3 0.0807 2.798 
APiMI-4 0.0777 2.571 
(Y- 0.0485 2.282 
D73q2 -0.0375 -4.319 
D79q3 0.0077 1.539 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant 0.0082 5.474 
AWI-2 0.2864 n. a. 
An. 0.5770 3.092 -rF 
Apt., 0.1366 1.666 
(Y- Y) 1 0.0408 
1.680 
D74q3 0.0349 3.838 
D75ql 0.0464 7.739 
2= 0.693 R2=0.686 
SEE= 0.0083 SEE= 0.0084 
Serial Correlation: X2(5) = 5.88 [0.3181 Serial Correlation: j2(5) = 8.86 [0.1151 
Heteroseedasticity: F(23,103)=2.30 [0.0031** Heteroscedasticity: F(I 1,120)= 0.43 [0-9391 
Normality: X2 (2) = 0.46 [0.796] Normality: X2 (2) = 6.06 [0.048]* 
Functional Form: F(69,57) = 1.22 [0.225] Functional Form: F(17,114) = 1.34 [0-184] 
Wald test for linear restriction: 
F(1,127) = 6.55 [0.012]* 
Wald test for linear restriction: F(1,132) 
4.19 [0.043]* 
0 Dynamic steady state: 0 Dynamic steady state: 
Ap = 0.614 Aw + 0.386 Apim Aw = 0.011 + Ap 
Table 2.6: Import price equation 
" Dependent variable: Apim 
" Period of estimation: 1959q2 - 1993q4 
" Estimated bylV: Instrument used: Ap(-l) 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
Apim', 0.3198 4.284 
APiMI-2 0.0884 n. a. 
Apt U. 33 11 2.334 
(Ap*-Ae), 0.2607 6.584 
D86q487q4 0.0746 8.879 
-R 2= 0.472 
SEE = 0.0212 
Serial Correlation 
Heteroscedasticity 
Normality 
Functional Form 
X2(5) = 4.18 [0.524] 
F(10,123)= 1.85 [0.058] 
X2(2)= 23.6 [0.000]** 
F(I 8,115) 4.3 7 [0.000] 
Wald test for linear restriction: F(1,134) = 0.00 [0.99] 
9 Dynamic steady state: 
Apirn = 0.559 Ap + 0.441 (Ap*-Ae) 
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APPENDIX B: Computing asymptotic forecast variances in a linear RE model 
Following Blanchard and Kahn (1980), let us consider the solution of a linear difference 
model under rational expectations in order to derive, subsequently, its corresponding 
asymptotic state covariance matrix. In this context, we have to distinguish between 
predetermined and non-predetermined variables at time t. The former, say y,,,, are function of 
variables known at time t, that is of variables belonging to the information set at t, regardless 
the realisations of the variables belonging to the information set att+l. We can render this as 
follows: 
y,,, = y, +j =- E ()ýý+, I I, ). 
Non-predetermined variables, sayp,,.,, on the contrary, can be function of any variable in the 
information set at t+1, so that: 
pl, l = pe ,=E (pl, l I I, ). 1+ - 
only if the realisations of all variables in I,,, are equal to their expectations conditional onI,. In 
view of this distinction, we can therefore define the reduced form of a general linear model 
including rational agents' expectations as: 
Yt+i 
e 
]=(o[yl]+rut 
Pt+l Pt 
where y, 'is an (n x 1) vector of variables predetermined at t; p, As an- (m x 1) vector of 
variables non-predetermined at t; p, +, 
is the agents' expectations of Poi held at t; u, is the (s x 
1) vector of structural error terms which, of course, do not feed into the expectational 
variables; (D is the ((n+m) x (n+m)) matrix of reduced form coefficients, while IF is the 
((n+m) x s) reduced form matrix of coefficients, according to which error terms feed into 
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predetermined but not expectational variables. Finding a solution (y,, p, ) to this system 
amounts to finding a sequence of functions of variables in I, which satisfies the system itself 
for all possible realisations of these variables. If we transform (D into Jordan canonical form, 
we obtain: 
0= Q-lAQ 
where the eigenvalues of (D along the diagonal matrix A are ordered by increasing absolute 
value. A is further partitioned as: 
A =[Al ,01 0 A2 
so that all eigenvalues in A, are on or inside the unit circle, whilst all eigenvalues in A2 lie 
outside the unit circle. Q and Q" are partitioned accordingly: 
Qll Q12 
ýnxn) (ý x m) Q= Q21 Q22 
L(M x n) 
(m x m)] 
where 
Fl -= 
(Q 
II-Q 12Q BIQ 21 
YI 
I 
='(Q22 -Q21QII F2 TIQ12YI 
F1 -QTIQ12F2 
Q-1 
(nxn) (n x m) 
-F2Q21QII F2 
L 
(" n) (Mxm) J 
by applying the inversion rule for partitioned matrices. Blanchard and Kahn prove that: 
'If in =m, i. e. if the number of eigenvalues of(D [our symbol] outside the unit circle is equal to 
the number of non-predetermined variables, then a unique solution exists'. 
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This solution is forward-looking in the sense that the non-predetermined variables depend on 
the past only through its effect on the current predetermined variables but not on its effect on 
the non-predetermined themselves. Namely, the solution yields: 
Yl ýyo fort= 0 
(0 12 - (1)12 Q 2i2l Q 21 Y 1-1 + ru, for t>0 
P, =-Q-1 22Q2lYt for 
By keeping in mind that: 
Oll = FIAIQII -Q-lQl2F2A2Q21 11 
(012 = FIAIQ12 -Q-IQ12F2A2Q22 
we obtain: 
y, = FlAlfi-ly, -, +ru, 
which can be solved recursively, thereby yielding the general solution of a linear time- 
invariant discrete-time state system: 
-1 
t-I 
yt = FIAIFI yo + EFIAt, -j-'Fý1ruj. 
i=O 
It follows that: 
tF-lj -1 -1Q21FIýt-i-lF-1ruj Pt2'-(-Q22Q2, F, )AI I J=-, -Q22 II ýo 
+El 
'0( 
TjlýtFýlyo+Zt-l 
(-F2Q 
Q-1ýt-i-lF&uj -F2Q21QII i=O 21 11 1 
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By construction of A,, this system is stable or borderline stable 7. Therefore, as long as 
m=m, the asymptotic variance of the predetermined variables wil I be a finite positive semi- 
definite matrix, say Vy, derined as follows: 
Vy = lim E[ytyt]= 
(FlAt-J-'F-'ýrr'(FlAt-J-1 
K' 
j=O 
The asymptotic variance of the expectational values, say Vp, will hence be a finite positive 
semi-definite matrix too: 
I t-j-1 Vp = lim E[pipt'l= E[(-F2Q' Q Fýl 
k 
r' 
21 11 1 21 11 
k 
-F2Q Q-1ý1-j-'Fj 
11 
t-+00 i=O 
I 
Hence, it should be fairly evident that, for linear models, stochastic- simulation techniques, as 
long as they involve drawings from the estimated covariance matrix of the historical residuals 
E, will reproduce exactly the same steady-state variances as those we have derived 
analytically, regardless the presence of forward-looking expectations. 
7A careful structure of the model should rule out the presence of exact unit roots; on the other hand, the probability 
that the latter may arise as numerical coincidence can be assumed to be practically zero. 
Chapter Three 
Wages, Prices and Inflation-Output 
Variance Trade-offs: More on 
Inflation Targetry in the UK 
3.1 INTRODUCTION I 
The macroeconometric models that support , the empirical analysis of contemporary 
economic policy problems have several key features which originate in Denis Sargan's 
classic Colston paper (Sargan, 1964). Subtitled 'a study in econometric methodology' its 
primary intention was to develop new econometric methods, and it is the groundwork of 
modem time-series econometrics. In particular it introduced what, subsequently became 
known as the effor-correction -model, which allows ýa representation of 
both the 
characteristics of, the equilibrium structure, of the model and the process of dynamic 
adjustment. Further buttressed by their, role in the burgeoning literature on cointegration, 
error-correction models are now commonplace in empirical macroeconomics. 
Sargan chose the topic of wages and prices so that he could also 'consider practical problems 
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in the use of the methods in a typical econometric investigation'. His insistence that 'in order 
to discuss tile policy implications of the wage determination equation, it must be considered 
in relation to a price determination equation' again has wide acceptance nowadays, although 
the particular perspective has seen substantial evolution. , 
As we have already discussed in the first chapter of this thesis, the supply side of the 
economy has received increased attention from empirical ý modellers since the 1980s for a 
variety of reasons. The forecasting failures of the demand-oriented models of the 1970s in 
the face of supply-side shocks, a desire for greater theoretical consistency and a shift in the 
emphasis of policy all pointed in the same direction. Within aý modern macromodelling 
framework, goods and labour markets are assumed to be imperfectly competitive, and prices 
are set by firms as a mark-up on costs, given demand; they also set employment, given the 
wage, which is determined in a bargaining process (see Layard and Nickell, 1985, and 
Nickell, 1988, for example). An important question is then whether a model possesses a non- 
accelerati ng- inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU), that is, whether the long-run 
aggregate supply schedule is vertical, and what causes it to shift. This is typically addressed 
by analysing the core supply-side of the model consisting of the long-run versions of the 
wage and price equations together with, in an open-economy context, the response of the 
exchange rate (Joyce and Wren-Lewis, 1991; Turner, 1991). A key requirement is the static 
homogeneity of the wage and price equations, which again echoes Sargan's preferred 
specification, the Colston paper having been 'one of the very first to try to make some 
theoretical sense of the Phillips correlation by pointing out that, at least in the I ong run, the 
Phillips curve must be about real and not nominal wages' (Nickell, 1984). It was actually in 
the course of showing how homogeneity could be achieved by introducing into an equation 
expressed in differences a term in the levels of the variables that Sargan developed the error- 
correction model. Whereas the NAIRU may itself depend on the steady-state rate of inflation 
if the wage and price equations do not in addition exhibit dynamic homogeneity or inflation 
neutrality, it is often the case that this property does hold, so that the NAIRU is indeed the 
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'natural' rate of unemployment, independent of the inflation rate but affected by supply-side 
'wage-push' variables. For Sargan, on turning to policy implications, homogeneity led to 
'conclusions which differ fundamentally from those implied by previous investigators. In 
particular they suggest that the effect of devaluation is only temporary '. 
In this chapter a model of wages and prices is constructed, drawing on tile tradition initiated 
by Sargan's Colston paper, reinterpreted as discussed above. The model is then completed 
with an aggregate demand equation and an exchange rate equation, and used to study the 
performance of interest rate rules for targeting inflation. Nevertheless, in order to illustrate 
the role of monetary policy rules in stabilising inflation around is target path and therefore to 
make it possible to compare a range of monetary policy rules, a model needs to fulfil certain 
conditions. What we actually aim to emphasise in this chapter is the fact that notany model 
which is data consistent is also suitable for policy evaluation (in the specific context, for the 
assessment of monetary policy rules). 
In fact, since monetary policy has been explicitly focused on the control of inflation in 
several OECD countries including the United Kingdom (see section 2.1), there exists a 
growing literature assessing the statistical performance of different policy regimes through 
the application of appropriate analytic or numerical techniques to macroeconomic models. 
An important precursor is the classic article by Taylor (1979), who estimates a simple 
econometric model of the US economy with rational expectations, uses it to calculate 
optimal monetary policy rules to stabilise fluctuations in output and inflation, and hence 
defines and estimates a long-run trade-off between the variability of inflation and of output. 
The subsequent literature contains a wide variety of applications, to large-scale economy- 
wide econometric models or small stylised models, with forward-I ooking or backward- 
looking expectations, using counterfactual simulation - deterministic or stochastic - or 
analytic methods, with simple feedback policy rules or full optimisation, and for several 
countries. 
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However, as it has already been stressed in the previous chapter, if the macromodel 
underpinning the analysis lacks satisfactory first-moment properties, then it is very much 
unlikely that it may sustain reliable second-moment calculations. For this reason, in this 
chapter we allow for a more complete integration of steady-state properties and short-run 
dynamic adjustments within our estimated model. Careful attention is also granted to both 
statistical and economic issues, by recognising the policy implications of our empirical 
study. 
Let us consider, for instance, the monetary transmission channels and the role of inflation 
targeting in this regard. In a closed economy, standard transmission channels comprise an 
aggregate demand channel and an expectations channel. Through the aggregate demand 
channel, monetary policy affects spending components and, possibly, the availability of 
credit, via its effects on the short term real interest rate. Aggregate demand then affects 
inflation via the Phillips curve. The expectations channel, on the other hand, allows 
monetary policy to affect inflation expectations which, in turn, affect inflation via the wage- 
price system. In an open economy, there are additional channels for the transmission of 
monetary policy. The exchange rate is affected by policy rate setting via the interest rate 
differential, if an interest parity condition holds. With sticky prices, nominal exchange rate 
affects the real interest rate. The real exchange rate will have an effect on competitiveness 
which, in turn, will affect both domestic and foreign demand for domestic goods and hence 
contribute to the aggregate demand channel of monetary policy. Furthermore, the exchange 
rate influence directly domestic currency prices of imported final goods, which enter the CP1 
inflation. Typically, the lag of this direct exchange rate channel is considered to be shorter 
than that of aggregate demand channel. Hence, monetary policy can affect CPI inflation with 
a shorter lag whenever exchange rate movements are taken into account. Ruling out from a 
model an exchange rate transmission channel or, equally, downgrading the role of credibility 
by ignoring markets' expectations may then lead to a wrong assessment of the performance 
of any monetary policy rule. 
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Besides providing a sounder theoretical and empirical framework to previous chapter's 
results, we also intend to investigate the macroeconomic consequences of a range of 
different model specifications. In particular, crucial in the relation between monetary policy 
and the inflation process is the question of whether monetary policy should react 'strictly' to 
inflation or whether it should also consider other macroeconomic indicators while making 
policy decisions. Svensson's (1998a) argument for 'inflation forecast' targeting implies that 
the central bank should use all relevant information in implementing policy actions. Haldane 
and Batini (1998) seem to confirm this hypothesis: on the basis of stochastic simulation of a 
calibrated model of the UK, they show that strict inflation forecast targeting outperforms 
Taylor-type rules. According to the authors, the result gets even stronger the more the private 
sector (i. e. the labour market) is backward-looking. However, Haldane and Batini's result 
could also be explained by the fact that forward-looking rules are simply likely to smooth out 
the effects of temporary shocks, while this is not the case with respect to current measures of 
inflation. Levin et. al (1998) simulate a closed-economy model with smoothed inflation 
targeting rules: under these circumstances they find that the degree of forward-lookingness 
of the monetary authority does not make much difference. Rothenberg and Woodford (1998) 
also point out the irrelevance of forward-lookingriess in inflation targets, as far as the public 
is assumed to be 'rational' and policy credible (on the same argument, see Wouters and 
Dombrecht, 1999). As the issues look then strictly interrelated, we also analyse the impact of 
different degrees of forward-lookingness in both inflation targeting horizon and wage 
bargaining on the effectiveness of monetary policy. Moreover, two alternative forms of 
interest rate feedback rule and various parametrisations are considered, thereby allowing for 
different extent of policy activism and response 'smoothness'. 
Although econometrically estimated, the macromodel used in this chapter remains in the 
'small stylised model' tradition and is a considerable simplification compared to the large- 
scale economy-wide models used in practical policy analysis and forecasting; nevertheless 
some of its features mimic those of HM Treasury's model of the UK economy (Chan et al., 
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1995), and we use the Treasury model dataset. The model is essentially linear; hence, the 
analytical method developed in chapter 2 for the calculation of asymptotic standard errors in 
forward-looking models can also be employed in this context. The econometric modelling 
exercise is described in Section 3.2 and inflation targetry in Section 3.3. The implications of 
the analysis are discussed in Section 3.4. 
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3.2 MODELLING WAGES AND PRICES 
We focus on the same wage and price variables as Haldane and Salmon (1995), namely 
nominal per capita earnings and the GDP. deflator, in Treasury nomenclature ERPR and 
PPGDP (all variable definitions are given in the appendix). We consider error-correction 
formulations to describe both long-run and short-run features of the models. This is done in a 
single-equation context, for two reasons. First is the 'curse of dimensionality': the number of 
variables is too great for successful implementation of the VAR-based procedures of 
Johansen (1988). Second is the fact that several of the variables under consideration show 
considerable persistence but cannot be pure integrated processes: this is obvious in the case 
of rates of unemployment and taxation, while the weight of evidence is moving in the same 
direction in respect of the real exchange rate, that is, in favour of purchasing power parity as 
a long-run relation, albeit one from which deviations exhibit long-memory properties 
(Rogoff, 1996). In such circumstances we note the finding of Gonzalo and Lee (1998) that 
the original test procedures of Engle and Granger (1987) may be more robust than those of 
Johansen. 
3.2.1 The price equation 
Prices are determined as a mark-up on costs, with the mark-up a negative function of the 
demand elasticity. Whether this is pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical is uncertain theoretically, 
and empirical evidence is often ambiguous, nevertheless we find a significant positive effect 
for a measure of capacity utilisation in manufacturing, which we treat as the predominant 
sector in price formation. The equation also includes a term in the variance of price inflation, 
taken as a proxy for the effect of uncertainty on producers' margins, as in the Treasury 
model. The Treasury's cost variable is approximated as a weighted average, with weights 
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summing to one, of unit labour costs and import prices. The estimated long-run equations are 
given in Table 3.1. These are found to be statically homogeneous, with stationary errors. 
Table 3.1 Domestic price inflation equation 
I Long-run equations: 
log(MCOST) 1.37 + 0.300 log(PMBAI) + 0.700 log( 
ERPR (I + TE) 
PRODS 
SEE 0.0261 
CRDW = 0.254 
ADF(2) = -2.76 
YMF log(PPGDP) =-0.047 + log(MC0S7) - 0.0019 SVPPGDP + 0.296 log(7ý YMF 
SEE 0.0584 
CRDW = 0.112 
ADF(5) = -2.04 
Constrained LS estimates - Period of estimation: 1975q4-1997q 
Alog (PPGDP), = 0.005 + 0.178 Alog (PPGDP), -I 
(0.00 1) (0.09 1) 
+ 0.126 Alog (PPGDP)t-2 + 0-091 A log (PPGDP)t-3 
(0.084)' 
+ 0.148 Alog (MCOSI) + 0.040 Alog (MCOSI)t. 1 ýý 
(0.059) (0.059) 
+ 0.167 A109 (MCOSI)t-2 + 0.250 Alog (MCOST)t-3 
(0.059) , (0.070) 
- 0.156 A log( 
YMF 
150, ä2 log (MC0S7)t-3 
YMF s 
)t-4 « 0- 
(0.095) (0.037) 
YMF 
- 0.048 [log(PPGDP) - log(MCOSI) + 0.047+ 0.0019 SVPPGDP - 0.296 log( YMF ) 
It. i 
(0.017) 
+ 0.033 d78pl 
(0.008) 
SEE = 0.0073 
AR F( 5,70) 1.3322 [0.2608] 
Normality X2 (2) = 4.5223 [0.1042] 
ARCH F(4,67) = 1.1081 [0.3601] 
Heterose. F(21,53) 0.60233 [0.8986] 
LR test of restrictions: X2 (1) = 2.41883 [0.1199] 
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Specification of the dynamic equation follows the general-to-specific approach, with the 
general model extended to include the possibility of forward-looking behaviour by price 
setters. Tile preferred form (reported in the table) includes three lags of inflation, together 
with lagged cost terms, a ten-n in the aggregate output gap and the error correction term. It 
exhibits dynamic homogeneity, that is, the long-run solution is independent of the steady- 
state inflation ratel. 
3.2.2 The wage equation 
The wage equation is generated by a collective bargaining model, as discussed by Layard 
and Nickell (1985). Whereas wage negotiations typically focus on the nominal wage, 
employers and employees are not insensitive to inflation, but different real wage concepts 
are relevant to their objectives. For employers, what matters are their real wage costs, 
namely nominal wages plus employers' taxes deflated by producer prices, whereas 
employees focus on the real consumption wage, namely nominal wages less direct taxes 
deflated by consumer prices. Thus taxes and the relative price of imports drive a 'wedge' 
between the two wage concepts. The incidence of taxation, or the degree of real wage 
resistance, can then only be assessed in an equation which has one or other of the two real 
wage variables as the dependent variable: our long-run equation is formulated in terms of 
employers' real wage costs. It contains no significant long-run wedge effect, otherwise real 
earnings track productivity and are negatively influenced by the unemployment rate and 
positively by a term in union density, proxying union power. The estimated long-run 
equation is shown in Table 3.2. Putting this equation alongside the long-run price equation, 
their mutual static homogeneity implies the existence of a NAIRU, with unemployment 
1 It should be noticed that in the current specification of the price equation there is no evidence of 
residual heteroscedasticity. This appears to contradict our findings in chapter 2. However, the more 
complete integration of the long run through the error correction specification, the explicit inclusion of 
the variance of price inflation in the equilibrium term and the use of a shorter estimation period, 
should help explaining such seeming contraddictory result. 
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related to the 'wage-push' union density variable and the inflation variance term. 
Table 3.2 Earning inflation equation 
Long-run solution: 
ERPR (I + TE) log( 
PRODS 
ýý) = 2.41 + log(PPGDP) - 0.021 log(b), 4 + 0.538 log(UDEN), 4 
SEE = 0.0192 
CRDW = 0.441 
ADF(5) = -4.12 
(i) Backward-looking dynamic hargaining specification 
Constrained IV estimates - Period of estimation: 1975q4-1997q 
Additional instrument used: Fitted values from domestic price inflation equation (1) 
Alog[(ERPR) (I +TE)lt = 0.071AIog[(ERPR) (I +TE)],., + 0.336AIog[(ERPR) (I +TE)lt-2 
(0.095) (0.095) 
0.407 Alog (PRODS), + 0.347 Alog (PPGDP)t 
(0.095) 
0.205 Alog (PPGDP),, + 0.031 Alog (PPGDP)t-2 
(0.096) (0.100) 
0.0 10 Alog (PPGDP), 
-3, + 
0.098 Alog(WEDGE), -4 
(0.090) (0.053) 
- 0.259[log( 
ERPR (I + TE) 2.41-log(PPGDP),, +0.0211og(0t-s - 0.538 log(UDEN), -, s] PRODS " 
(0.052) 
- 0.013 d77p3 
(0.008) 
SEE = 0.0074 
AR F(5,71) 1.3745 [0.24421 
Normality X2(2) = 0.45609 [0.7961] 
ARCH F(4,68) = 0.45243 [0.77031 
Heterosc. F(19,56) 1.7656 [0.0516] 
LR test of restrictions: X2 (1) = 2.06424 [0.1508] 
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Table 3.2 Earning inflation equation (continued) 
(H) I-quarterforward-looking dynamic bargaining specification 
Constrained IV estimates - Period of estimation: 1975q4-1997q 
Additional instrument used: Fitted values from domestic price inflation equation (1) 
Alog[(ERPR)(I+TE)lt= 0.006+Alog(PPGDP)t.,, 
(0.003)( ) 
0.165 Alog (PRODS)t + 0.13 9 Alog(WEDGE), -4 
(0.125) (0.065) 
- 0.157 [log( 
ERPR (I + TE) )t-l - 2.41-log(PPGDP)1-1+0.0211og(b), -5 - 
0.538 log(UDEIV),. 51 PRODS 
(0.069) 
SEE = 
AR F(5,76) = 
Normality X2 (2) = 
ARCH F( 4,73) = 
Heterosc. F(8,72) 
0.0098 
0.70257 [0.6232] 
0.63535 [0.72781 
0.15273 [0.96121 
0.63591 [0.74501 
LR test of restrictions: X2 (1) = 0.93572 [0.3334] 
(iii) 2-quarterforward-looking dynamic bargaining specification 
Constrained IV estimates - Period of estimation: 1975q4-1996q 
Additional instrument used: Fitted values from domestic price inflation equation (1) 
Alog[ (ERPR) (I +TE)It = 0.004 +A log (PPGDP)t+2 
(0.003)( --- ) 
0.203 Alog (PRODS), + 0.093 Alog(WEDGE)t-4 
(0.125) (0.067) 
ERPR (I + TE) -, - 0.111 [log( 2.41-log(PPGDP)1-1+0.0211og(Ot-5 - 0.538 log(UDEN), -51 PRODS 
(0.072) 
- 0.036 d77p3 
(0.011) 
SEE = 
AR F( 5,76) = 
Normality X2(2) = 
ARCH F(4,73) = 
Heterosc. F(8,72) 
0.0097 
0.67002 [0.6474] 
5.3344 [0.06941 
0.4224 [0.7920] 
0.7149 [0.69341 
LR test of restrictions: X2 (1) = 0.017409 [0.8950] 
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We also note that the wage equation is dynamically homogeneous with respect to prices but 
not productivity. Thus the NAIRU is independent of the steady-state inflation rate and so is 
the 'natural' rate of unemployment, but productivity growth has a long-run effect, consistent 
with evidence presented by Manning (1992) that the slowdown in productivity growth is an 
important explanation of the increase in unemployment in many OECD countries. 
In the framework of a wage-bargaining process we consider a range of overlapping contracts 
models in line with Fuhrer and Moore (1995), which reflect the fact that wage contracts 
remain in effect for a number of periods hence nominal wages are fixed in the short run, and 
that different groups negotiate at different points in time. The observed aggregate nominal 
wage is then an average of wages negotiated at different points in time, while rational agents 
having relativ'e real wages in mind may also be forward-looking in prices. Accordingly we 
consider specifications in which prices lead wages by zero, one or two quarters and in which 
the short-run dynamics of nominal wages and prices may not coincide, although we always 
retain static homogeneity. The evidence is that the short-run dynamics do indeed differ, 
while the data cannot discriminate between different degrees of forward- lookingness. Such a 
flexible mixed lag/lead specification, allowing for a variable and data-determined degree of 
indexation in real terms, is appealing for mainly two reasons. Firstly, it generates inflation 
persistence, contrary to conventional two-period Taylor (1979) contracting models, which 
instead induce only price-level persistence. Secondly, it permits to test for different 
expectation horizons in the wage-bargaining process. The impact of this on policy issues 
discussed in Section 3.3 is an important question, and we retain all the three specifications 
given in Table 3.2, for the time being. As noted above, dynamic homogeneity is data- 
admissible, and difference terms in productivity and the wedge are also part of the dynamic 
equations. 
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3.2.3 Other equations 
We first summarise the aggregate demand side of the model with an equation relating actual 
output to potential output, estimated as a linear trend, and the real interest rate. Although the 
output gap is obviously a short-run concept in economic terms, our quarterly measure is 
highly persistent, hence our statistical model is again of error-correction form. The real 
interest rate is defined in terms of forward-looking inflation, and the expected appreciation 
of the exchange rate also enters the dynamic equation. Details can be found in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3 Output gap equation 
Long-run solution: 
YMF r r3c, 
log(-) 0.085-4.49[iL -Alog(PPGDP YMF 00 
IV estimates -Period of estimation: 1975q I- I 997q 
Additional instrument used: Lagged nominal domestic interest rate and fitted values from 
domestic price inflation equation (1) 
Alog( 
YMF )t 0.004 - 0.052, &Iog (Q)t-I YMF * 
(0.002) (0.020) 
(PPGDP)e YMF RS W 
- 0.049109(7-- ---, )t-4'0.219 [--log( YMF 400 PPGDP 
(0.018) (0.108) 
+ 0.044 d79p2 - 0.043 d79p3 - 0.057 d75p2 - 0.040 d8O 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.006) 
SEE 0.0111 
AR F( 5,77) = 0.36019 [0.3563] 
Normality X2 (2) 0.30854 [0.2430] 
ARCH F(4,74) 0.078465 [0.5536] 
Heterosc. F( 10,71) = 0.80467 [0.1935] 
Finally, in an open-economy context, we represent the exchange rate transmission channel 
by including equations for import prices and the exchange rate itself. Import prices are 
determined as a lagged pass-through of world tradeables prices in domestic currency. For the 
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sterling effective exchange rate, index we find that the forward-looking uncovered interest 
parity or open arbitrage condition is data-admissible. Corresponding estimation results are 
summarised in Tables 3.4 and 3.5, respectively. 
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Table 3.4 Import price inflation equation 
Long- n equation: 
log(PMBM)= log(. WPXM 
PIX 
LS estimates - Period of estimation: 1975q3-1997q 
Alog (PMBM), = Alog(- 
VIPXM )t + 0.573 - 0.0008 Trend RX 
(0.164) (0.0003) 
- 0.105 [log (PMBM) - log( 
UTXM ý ]t. 4- 0.13 5 d78p 1-0.13 7 d92p3 x? x 
(0.031) 
SEE = 
AR F(5,78) = 
Normality X2 (2) = 
ARCH 4 F(4,75) 
Heterosc. F(6,76) 
(0.053) (0.053) 
0.0526 
0.54252 [0.74351 
0.39215 [0.81361 
0.11932 [0.94211 
1.6694 [0.14011 
Table 3.5 Uncovered Interest Parity equation 
Constrained IV estimates - Period of estimation: 1974ql-1997q 
Additional instrument used: Lagged nominal domestic interest rate and lagged inflation rate 
e ("Xm) e RSt 
_log( 
(PPGDP)t., ROSHTtý t, Alog(Q)et,, =Iogtll+( ))]/[I+(--log( )M 400 PPGDP 400 WPXM 
+0.112 d92p3 
(0.036) 
SEE , AR F(5,86) 
Normality X2 (2) 
ARCH F(4,83) 
Heterosc. F(3,87) 
= 0.0359 
= 1.4862 [0.2027] 
= 1.8614 [0.3943] 
= 0.46102 [0.7641] 
= 0.3226 [0.8090] 
LR test of restrictions: X'(1) = 0.35668 [0.5504] 
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3.3 INFLATION TARGETRY 
3.3.1 Policy rules 
To study a monetary policy regime of inflation targeting, the'five-equation model of Section 
3.2 is closed with an interest rate feedback rule. We consider various parameterisations of 
two general forms of rule. The first is a 'difference' rule of tile form 
Ail = A(E, ; r,., j -; r 
T)+P(Y, 
_YT) (3.1) 
and the second is a 'level' or 'Taylor'ý rule of the form 
r* E,; r,,., + A(E 17rt+j _ IrT) +, U(Y, YT) (3.2) 
where i is the nominal interest rate, r* is the equilibrium real interest rate, y is the output gap 
and the inflation raten is defined as Alog(PPGDP); superscript T denotes target values. 
Three cases of each rule arise asj takes the value 0,1 or 2. lfj=O, then Etir, is simply ; r,, and 
this is a simple contemporaneous rule, adjusting interest rates whenever inflation deviates 
from its target. lfj'>O, we have a forward-looking rule which is probably closer to central 
bank practice, and such 'inflation forecast targeting' rules have been extensively analysed by 
Svensson (1997). Different values of A and p are considered below, including p=0, 
which reduces each rule to an 'inflation-only' rule. 
The general characteristics of (3.1) and (3.2), discussed by Leith and Wren-Lewis (1996), for 
example, are first, that the difference rule (3.1) implies that any shock to the price level is 
completely reversed, for any constant inflation target, whereas (3.2) implies that past 
deviations of the price level are neglected: bygones are bygones. Secondly, (3.1) implies that 
inflation overshoots whenever the inflation target is altered, whereas (3.2) implies monotonic 
adjustment. 
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3.3.2 Modelproperties 
The six-equation model comprising the five equations estimated in Section 3.2 and policy 
rule (3.1) or (3.2) contains rational expectations of one or two future-dated variables: the 
exchange rate and, depending on the specification of the earnings equation and the policy 
rule, inflation. It is linear in the variables of concern, once the first difference of the 
logarithm of the price level is equated to the inflation rate, for example, and so can be 
analysed using the solution methods of Blanchard and Kahn (1980). In each specification, 
the number of eigenvalues outside the unit circle (one or two) is equal to the number of 'non- 
predetermined' variables of the model, hence it is saddlepath stable. 
We undertake a simple check on the properties of the model via deterministic simulatiod, 
using inflation-only contemporaneous rules (a= 0, j= 0) . The experiment considers the 
effect of a reduction in the inflation target, a simulation used for comparative purposes by 
Church et al. (1996,1997,2000). They find that in the NIESR model of the UK economy, 
for example, this produces the same reduction in actual inflation, with a long-run reduction 
in the nominal interest rate also of the same amount, leaving the real rate of interest 
unchanged, as in a standard Dornbusch model. The inflation target is set at one-quarter 
percentage point below base-run inflation throughout the simulation period (1973q2- 
1999q3). 
The results in Figure 3.1 (with %=0.2) show a long-run inflation response of the same 
amount, with the level rule (3.2) producing a slower but smoother response and much lower 
output costs of disinflation. As in the NIESR model, tile forward-looking UIP condition 
results in an immediate jump in the exchange rate, the announcement of the new target being 
fully credible. That is, the exchange rate adjusts immediately to clear the asset market for 
any given rate of inflation, whereas goods market equilibrium is only achieved in the long 
run due to the inertia that characterises the inflation process. The initial inflation rate is in 
2 Deterministic simulations of the rnýdel have been performed using WINSOLVE software. 
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fact too high with respect to the new target value, thereby leading to increases in interest 
rates and to expected exchange rate appreciation, both of which cause implicit capital 
inflows and spot rate appreciation. Since the initial rise in interest rates required by the level 
rule (3.2) is relatively small, the corresponding exchange rate jump is also much smaller. 
Although the eventual exchange rate appreciation proceeds at the same rate irrespective of 
the rule, this initial difference explains the apparent divergence in the lower panel of Figure 
3.1. 
This experiment confirms properties of the model that originate in its econometric 
specification in Section 3.2, and confirms its suitability for the variance calculations which 
follow. Consistently with our a-priori, according to which a model without satisfactory f irst- 
moment properties can hardly sustain reliable second-moment calculations, we find that the 
same simulation produces nonsensical results in the model of Haldane and Salmon (1995), 
with increases in interest rates beyond reason. 
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Figure 3.1 Disinflation experiment under difference and level rule 
(reduction of 1/4 percentage point in the inflation target) 
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Note: All responses are expressed as deviations from base in percentage points, with the exception of 
nominal exchange responses which are given in percentage deviations from baseline. 
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3.3.3 The variance of inflation and output 
Calculation of variances for our linear rational expectations model rests on extensions of the 
Blanchard-Kahn analytical solution methods, as described in the appendix to chapter 2, 
which gives an expression for the steady-state variances for both forward-looking and 
'predetermined' variables. The covariance matrix of the underlying random shocks which is 
used throughout is given by the estimated residual covariance matrix of the model over the 
complete estimation period (1975q4-1997q2). With different degrees of forward- looki ngness 
in both monetary policy and wage bargaining, two rules and a range of variation in their 
parameterisation the potential set of results is immense. We highlight the key comparative 
questions by first considering inflation-only rules (ýL = 0), then showing the sensitivity of 
outcomes to variation in X and ;. L for one particular monetary policy/wage bargaining 
specification, and finally analysing output- inflation variance trade-offs under the same 
combination; comparisons between the two rules feature throughout. 
Inflation-only rules (v--O) We first consider inflation-output variance trade-offs ask varies 
(between 0.1 and 2.5), with g--O, under alternative degrees of forward- lookingriess in both 
wage bargaining and monetary policy. For comparative purposes, the results are presented in 
two different ways: Figures 3.2-3.4 plot inflation and output steady-state standard errors for 
the different inflation horizons in wage bargaining (denoted as 'bIw', 'Iflw' and '2flw', 
respectively) under each targeting horizonj for monetary policy in turn; Figures 3.5-3.7, 
instead, collect the same trade-offs for the different targeting horizons considered (j=0,1,2) 
under a backward- looking, one-quarter forward-looking and two-quarter forward-looking 
labour market in turn. Calculations carried out under difference rules (3.1) are reported on 
the left-hand side, with corresponding results for level rules (3.2) plotted on the right-hand 
side throughout. 
We first focus on figures 3.2-3.4. The range of variation in output steady-state standard 
errors is very small, since policy does not respond to output deviations. Nevertheless, the 
Wages, Prices and Inflation-Output Variance Trade-offs: More on Inflation Targetry in lite UK 63 
most strking feature is the outlying trade-off in the South-West corner that is obtained for 
any monetary rule implemented under backward-looking wage bargaining. This suggests 
that, whenever the labour market is backward-looking, monetary policy is better able to 
achieve inflation stabilisation. Under these circumstances, inflation standard errors range 
between 1-1.2% whereas output variability remains around 3.2%. The design of the policy 
rule itself (difference or level) and its degree of forward- looki ngness appear to make very 
little difference here. If, on the other hand, the labour market is forward- looking, then both 
the set-up of the rule and its own degree of forward- lookingness in accommodating inflation 
deviations from target have a greater impact, yielding greater variation in outcomes. In these 
cases, the trade-offs for one-quarter-ahead bargaining in general lies above that for two- 
quarter-ahead bargaining, although the differences are small. However, as Figures 3.6 and 
3.7 show, under difference rules (3.1) targeting inflation forecast deviations appears to be, 
ceteris paribus, a more efficient policy than accommodating to current inflation deviations. 
This may be explained by the fact that reactions to longer-horizon disequilibria may induce 
some smoothness in both inflation and output responses under such rules, thereby correcting 
their inherent overshooting and excess of policy activism. On the contrary, with level 
feedback rules (3.2), accommodating to two-quarter-ahead inflation deviations is more costly 
than accommodating to contemporaneous deviations. 
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Figure 2.2. Inflation-output standard error trade-offs under contemporaneous inflation-only rules 
a: difference rule (3.1) b: level rule (3.2) 
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Figure 3.3 Inflation-output standard error trade-offs under I -quarter forward-looking inflation-only rules 
a: difference rule (3.1) 
ouVranandard error ut sundard error 
U. uý 
0.0335 
0.033 
0.0325 
0.032 
0.0315 
ulmz 
). 033 
0328 
0326 
0324 
0322 
). 032 
nýo 
b: level rule (3.2) 
'd-fly__ I%flIC flfl1 
0.01 O. D12 0.014 0.016 0.018 0.02 0.022 0.024 0.01 U. U1 1 U. UI. Z U. U1j U. W1% U. Ulý 
i4lation standard error 
Inflaftom standard drro: 
Figure 3.4 Inflation-output standard error trade-offs under 2-quarter forward-looking inflation-only rules 
a: difference rule (3.1) b: level rule (3.2) 
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Figure 3.5 Inflation-output standard error trade-offs under backward-looking wage bargaining 
a: difference rule (3.1) b: level rule (3.2) 
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Figure 3.6 Inflation-output standard error trade-offs under I -quarter forward-looking wage bargaining 
a: difference rule (3.1) 
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Figure 3.7 Inflation-output standard error trade-offs under 2-quarter forward-looking wage bargaining 
a: difference rule (3.1) 
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Sensitivily to X and kt In the light of these results, the remaining comparisons focus on the 
most interesting wage bargaining/monetary policy specification; namely that in which both 
policyrnakers and private sector are one-quarter forward-looking. Within this set-up we next 
consider inflation and output standard errors as functions of the feedback rule parameters 
under the two alternative policy designs (see Figures 3.8 and 3.9). In both the cases it is 
shown that there exists a floor for inflation volatility together with a ceiling for output 
variability. The corresponding estimates of such asymptotic standard errors for inflation and 
the output gap are found to be approximately 1.1% and 3.3%, respectively. The particular 
shapes characterising the output and inflation asymptotic standard error response surfaces is 
another way of identifying the 'rectangularity' in policy frontiers noted by Bean (1998) and 
others. That is, in the context of assessing the relative weight to be placed on output versus 
inflation volatility, even in cases of extreme preferences, losses in output stability cannot 
exceed a certain limit, whereas inflation standard errors have a lower bound. With level 
feedback rules, output volatility can only be reduced to 2.6%. This can be done by attaching 
to output gap deviations a weight 10 times as large as that on inflation deviations from target 
and implies an asymptotic cost of about 3% of inflation variability. With different feedback 
rules, output volatility can be reduced in the same way to 1.2%, but this implies a steady 
state inflation uncertainty of 8%! This means that caring about real variability under a simple 
difference feedback rule results in a larger loss of efficiency in terms of inflation control than 
under a level feedback rule. This seems to be explained, once again, by the overshooting and 
aggressive responses to exogenous shocks that characterise difference rules. A smoother, 
even though more prolonged, adjustment path to equilibrium seems both to help inflation 
stabilisation and to reduce output variability. 
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Figure 3.8 Inflation standard errors as a function of target rule parameters 
(I -quarter forward-looking wage bargaining and I -quarter ahead inflation-forecast target) 
A: difference rule (3.1) b: level rule (3.2) 
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Figure 3.9 Output standard errors as a function of target rule parameters 
(I -quarter forward-looking wage bargaining and I -quarter ahead inflation-forecast target) 
A: difference rule (3.1) b: level rule (3-2) 
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Output- inflation trade-offs In Figures 3.10 and 3.11 maps of standard error trade-offs 
arejuxtaposed. Whereas in Figure 3.10 each trade-off is constructed by varying, % (0.1 - 2.5) 
for a given value of g, 'in Figure 3.11 we keep % fixed and vary g (0.0 - 1.0) along each 
trade-off. Again, the relevant model specification assumes one-quarter forward-looking 
labour market and one-quarter-ahead forecast inflation target. In general both inflation and 
output standard errors vary within a smaller range of values under level rules (3.2). 
Moreover, Figure 3.10 shows that, as g increases, some reductions in output variability can 
be achieved with either rule. However, in order to keep inflation uncertainty at a reasonable 
level, X has to be increased accordingly, thereby moving towards the left end of the locus. 
This implies that, if a target of such a form is publicly announced, then stronger signals of 
inflation control have also to be sent to the market in order to make it effective. Nonetheless, 
the kink that appears at the upper left end of any trade-off confirms the existence of a lower 
bound for reductions in inflation variability: further tightening of the monetary policy cannot 
induce any better inflation control beyond such a point. Figure 3.11 shows that such a critical 
value for X can be identified as LO: for greater values of X, the corresponding inflation- 
output trade-offs are further away from the origin. Furthermore, output variability remains in 
the range 3.0-3.3% as X is increased beyond 1, irrespective of the weight g on output 
deviations. With difference rules, the trade-offs appear to be indistinguishable from one 
another as soon as X reaches 0.5. 
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Figure 3.10 Map of inflation-output standard error trade-offs under fixed g and varying X 
(I -quarter forward-looking wage bargaining and I -quarter ahead inflation-forecast target) 
A: difference rule (3.1) 
output itandard wor 
0.035, 
0.03 
0.025 
0.02 
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 
i? &ion standard error 
b: level rule (3.2) 
output 3sandard error 
0.034 ý 
0.033 
0.032 
0.031 
0.03 
0.029 
AVý 
0.02B ,1 
0.012 0,014 0.016 0.018 0.02 0.022 0.02' 
inflazion 52anc 
Figure 3.11 Map of inflation-output standard error trade-offs under fixed X and varying ýL 
(I -quarter forward-looking wage bargaining and I -quarter ahead inflation-forecast target) 
A: difference rule (3.1) 
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3.4 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter uses a small data-congruent rational expectations model to assess the 
performance of the new monetary arrangements in the United Kingdom. Within the model 
detailed attention is given to the determination of wages and prices, reflecting the substantial 
developments in this area that have occurred since the publication of Sargan's Colston paper. 
Nevertheless in many respects - careful attention to both statistical and economic issues, 
appreciation of the policy implications of the empirical analysis and, for this purpose, the 
need to go beyond single-equation modelling - it also respects the spirit of that paper. 
A major implication of our analysis concerns the 'lump' of inflation uncertainty that 
characterises United Kingdom inflation targetry. In contrast to the estimates of Haldane and 
Salmon (1995) of a standard error of annual inflation in the range 3 to 41/2percentage points, 
the results presented above cover a much lower range of values. Our 'optimal' value of about 
1% inflation standard error implies that a tolerance interval of plus or minus one percentage 
point can be achieved approximately two-thirds of the time, compared with their argument 
for an inflation target band width 'at least as large as the three percentage points [then] 
operating in the United Kingdom - and possibly much wider'. This value also represents a 
reduction of approximately one-half of the corresponding estimate of inflation volatility 
provided by Bean (1998) for comparable policy objectives in a much simpler model. These 
divergences are generally driven by the endogenisation of the exchange rate and an explicit 
treatment of expectations in financial markets, which suggests that credibility plays a central 
role when stabilisation goals are at issue. However, our results provide support to Bean's 
evidence of rectangularity of inflation-output standard error trade-offs. The lowest bound for 
inflation variability is in fact found to be coupled, over the relevant period, with a ceiling for 
output volatility. This means that beyond a certain point, further tightening of the monetary 
policy cannnot induce any better inflation control. At the same time, if some weight is to be 
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placed on output variability, then stronger signals of inflation control have also to be sent to 
the market, to make an inflation target monetary policy effective. Finally, we argue that 
forward-lookingness in labour and foreign markets is likely to have a crucial impact on the 
effectiveness of monetary policy, whereas the choice of which inflation targeting horizon 
does not seem to make much difference. 
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APPENDIX 
EEA7C 
EMF 
EMPNIC 
ENMF 
ERPR 
MCOST 
A7S 
OCR 
PMBM 
PCE 
PPGDP 
PRODS 
Q 
RETRA 
ROSHT 
RS 
RX 
SD 
SVPPDGP 
TE 
TYEM 
u 
UDEN 
Employees' contributions of NICs (EM) 
Employment in LJK manufacturing (000s) 
Employers' payments of NICs (EM) 
Employment in UK non-manufacturing ('000s) 
Average earnings per employee, private sector (E) 
Index of manufa rs' costs (1990 = 100) 
NI supplementary contributions (EM) 
Employers' other contributions (EM) 
AVI for imports of basic materials 
Consumers' expenditure deflator (1990 = 100) 
Deflator for average measure of GDP at factor cost (1990 100) 
(YPROM+278.29-YMF) 
Private sector productivity: - (EMF + EMWF) 
Sterling effective real exchange rate: (RX - WPXVP/ PPGDP 
Retention ratio: I- (YYEM + 0.914 EEIVIC) / WFP 
01 
Trade weighted three month major 7 (excl. UK) interest rate (UK effective exchange rate 
weights) 
UK three month inter-bank rate (% p. a. ) 
Sterling effective exchange rate (1990 = 100) 
Standard deviation of annual inflation (percentage points): 
PPGDP PPGDP SD = 1001 -115 L (I+L+I! +L3+0) Lý (PPGDP) 0 (PPGDP) 
Variance of annual inflation defined as a moving average over the last 5 quarters of 
inflation squared deviations: SVPPDGP = 115 L (SD2+L(SD2)+O(SD2)+L3(SD2)+O(SD 2)) 
Employers' tax rate: - 
(ENTIWC + NIS + OCR) 
var 
Accruals of tax on employment income (EM) 
Seasonally adjusted UK unemployment consistent with current coverage ('000s) 
Union density (constant from 1980q4) 
UEDGE Tax wedge: (TE)-(l-RETRA)-(PCF. 1PPGDP) 
WFP Wage and salary bill (incl. forces' pay) (EM) 
WP" OECD manufacturers' export prices, $ 
YMF Manufacturing output index adjusted for stock changes (1990 = 100) 
YMF Potential manufa turing output, expressed by the fitted values of a regression of YMF on a 
constant and a trend 
YPROM Output in the private non-oil, non-manufacturing and public traded sectors at constant 
factor cost (EM, 1990). 
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Monetary Transmission Channels, 
Monetary Regimes and 
Consumption Behaviour 
4.1 RqTRODUCTION 
During recent years, academic researchers and policy-makers have paid an increasing amount 
of attention to the process of globalisation and hannonisation of fmancial structmes, 
especially with regard to EMU (among many others, Borio, 1997; Buttiglione and Ferri, 1994; 
Cecchetti, 1995; Dale and Haldane, 1995; De Bondt, 2000). Since January 1999, eleven EU 
members have locked their currencies together, with the European Central Bank officially in 
charge of the short-term interest rate policy. This has certainly raised an interest, at the 
macroeconomic level, in assessing whether a common monetary policy will have a different 
impact in different economies. There have been several attempts to shed light on this issue, 
but findings have been contradictory. On the one hand, vector autoregression analyses tend to 
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show little differences in the policy transmission mechanisms among European countries (see 
Gerlach and Smets, 1995; Britton and Whitley, 1997; Dombusch et aL, 1998 as an exception). 
Such evidence has made many economists sceptical of the view that noticeable cross-country 
differences exist in the speed, intensity and compass of the transmission of monetary policy 
impulses to economic activity. On the other hand, a study of the Bank of International 
Settlements (1995) based on central banks' large-scale macroeconomic models linked to the 
Fed's global model arrives at opposite conclusions. It suggests, for instance, that the UK has 
an exceptionally large sensitivity of output to interest-rate movements, in contrast to other 
continental European countries. A recent paper by Maclennan et A (1998) assesses in detail 
the conflicting empirical evidence on the issue, and argues that there are 'enormous 
differences in housing and financial market institutions' across EU states. These are likely to 
have profound effects on the responsiveness of output and prices across countries to 
(common) policy interest rate movements. 
This chapter takes stock of current debate and aims to analyse the characteristics of the UK 
monetary transmission mechanism by undertaking simulation exercises on the January 1999 
version of the National Institute's Domestic Econometric Model (NiDEM). In view of the 
UK's decision not to enter EMU at its commencement, there is an interest in assessing 
whether monetary policy would exert an analogous influence on the real economy under the 
current monetary arrangements and a fixed exchange rate. This is not, however, our unique 
goal. In this chapter, we also intend to disentangle the total change in real output into the 
individual contributions from several transmission channels. In particular, we aim to assess 
the repercussion effects of monetary impulses on spending components through their impact 
on fiscal variables. Given the deccntmlisation of fiscal policy and fiscal structures within 
EMU, evidence of a quantitatively important fiscal channel of monetary policy would weaken 
the argument for a broadly similar response of the EU economies to a common change in the 
0 
policy rate. 
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Furthermore, a large body of the litemture has recently returned to the classical empirical 
question 'What are the real effects of monetary policyT, by analysing both the relation 
between money and income and the mle of fmancial intermediation and asset prices. Most 
policy-makers and econozdsts now agree that monetary policy can significantly affect real 
economic activity, at least in the short nnL Considerable debate remains, however, about how 
exactly monetary policy affects the economy (see below). In this respect, we are here 
interested in filling the gap between the traditional perspective, according to which monetary 
policy exerts its effects on spending components through its direct influence on the cost of 
capital (Taylor, 1995), and the more recent 'credit view', which argues that other 'accelerator' 
variables, such as cash flow, have the greatest impact on spending (Bemanke and Gertler, 
1995). To do this, we focus on consumers' expenditure and, in the light of the recent literature 
on life-cycle consumption, we re-estimate the corresponding equation in NiDEM. The 
inclusion of permanent human capital, as well as the explicit modelling of Ricardian non. 
neutralities, is likely to account for a weaker interest rate sensitivity of consumption and a 
higher sensitivity of consumption to changes in current disposable income and fiscal policy. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview of the main types 
of monetary transmission channels that can be found in the literature on private consumption. 
In this respect, we explicitly consider two alternative approaches to the modelling of 
aggregate consumers' expenditure: firstly, the 'disposable funds' approach suggested by Pain 
and Westaway (1994) and currently employed in NiDEM, and secondly, a modified version of 
the Darby and Ireland's (1994) life-cycle consumption equation. The latter is currently 
implemented in COMPACT, a relatively small model of the UK economy with transparent 
theoretical foundations, developed at the University of Exeter by a group of modellers led by 
Simon Wren-Lewis. Section 4.3 summarises the main properties of the model we use, 
NiDEM'. We proceed by simulating the effects of a temporary, 50 basis point, reduction in 
e 
the policy rate under both endogenous and exogenous nominal exchange rates, using both 
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specifications for aggregate consumers' expenditure specified above. The simulation results 
are presented in section 4.4. Here, the sensitivity of the UK monetary transmission mechanism 
to different policy regimes as well as the implications of employing alternative models of 
consumers' expenditure are finally quantified. By virtue of the methodology adopted, not only 
the total impact of the temporary monetary shock on the main GDP components is evaluated, 
but the contribution of the various transmission channels to such an impact is also measured. 
Section 4.5 concludes the chapter. 
Ir 
I An comparison of the properties of the these two leading macromodels of the UK economy is 
provided in Church et aL (2000) under standardised simulation exercises. - 
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4.2 TRANSMISSION MECHANISMS AND CONSUMPTION MODELS 
4. ZI 
I 
Monetary transmission channels 
Private consumption is undoubtedly the single most important component of national income. 
In 1998, for example, consumers' expenditure accounted for some 65 per cent of UK total 
GDP. For this reason, there is an interest in understanding how, and possibly how much, 
shocks to policy-determined interest rates affect consumption and, thereby, total GDP. In this 
respect, research results are not unambiguous. On the one hand, theory and empirical evidence 
seem to suggest that interest rates changes affect consumers' spending both directly and 
indirectly (see, for instance, Muellbauer and Murphy, 1993,1997, for a focus on income 
expectations and housing market; Borio, 1997, for an appraisal of the credit channel; Church 
et al., 1994, for a survey on UK large-scale macroeconomic models; Maclennan et al., 1998, 
for a comprehensive discussion of the general issue); on the other hand, the puzzle of 
consumption's interest rate sensitivity looks still far from being resolved (Deaton, 1992; 
Muellbauer and Lattimore, 1995, and the symposium on the monetary transmission 
mechanism in the Journal of Economic Perspective, 1995). Below, we briefly describe the 
main channels through which policy-determined movements in the short-term interest rate are 
thought to affect consumption (for an extensive review of the theoretical literature on 
consumption see Muellbauer, 1994). 
The direct channel captures the intertemporal substitution effect of a change in interest rates 
on private consumption., Empirically, the real interest rate effect on consumption is likely to 
be unstable and may even have an indeterminate sign. To explain this, let us consider a simple 
two-period consumption-choice problem. Most consumption literature assumes 
intertemporally additive preferences, which accordingly imply life-time utility, U, to be the 
sum of the sub-utilities of consumption in each period, discounted by a subjective discount 
rate, S. Namely- 
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A ftuther assumption of homothetic preferences (aHowing the ratios of consumption in 
different periods to be independent of income or wealth given a linear intertemporal budget 
constraint) lets the utility function exhibit a constant elasticity of substitution. Under this 
hypothesis 
up 
= C. -P +1;, a cip, 
where the elasticity of substitution, a= 
(4.2) 
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consumption ratio to relative prices in the two periods, i. e. to 
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The intertemporal maximisation of the life-time utility function (4.2) given a life-cycle linear 
budget constraint expressed in real terms, i. e. 
Cl+--LC2=Ao(I+R)+Yl+ 1 Y2E, (4.3) 1+r 1+r 
allows derivation of the following Euler consumption equation: 
1+r Cilia. (4.4) 
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This is a first-order condition stating that marginal utility is equal to the next period's 
marginal utility weighted by the ratio of the market and subjective discount rates. Taking the 
logarithm of the Euler equation (4.4) shows that, in this case, the planned log-change in 
consumption is approximately equal to a (r - 5). Thus, the greater the elasticity of substitution, 
the greater the increase in current consumption required to substitute into lower future 
lp 
consumption when the real interest rate falls. 
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However, there are good reasons to believe that the extent of intertemporal substitutability is 
low, that is consumers prefer consumption patterns to be steady over time. Taking this 
hypothesis to an extreme level, let us consider the special case where the elasticity of 
substitution is zero. If, in addition, future non-property income is expected to be unchanged 
from present levels, a reduction in the real interest rate r is likely to reduce current 
consumption, as effectively, initial assets will yield lower returns and consumption will fall 
when the real rate of return is lowered. This is illustrated by the solution for the consumption 
function which is obtained when the -a power of the Euler equation (4.4) is combined with 
the life-cycle budget constraint (4.3). This gives 
c'= 
1 
[Ao(I+R)+Yl+ 1 Y20,19 
1+r 1 
cr 
which reduces to 
1+r 
(Ao (I+R) ]+ Y, 
(4.5) 
(4.6) 
in the special case where there is a zero elasticity of substitution and static real income 
expectations. It is clear, therefore, that the higher the assets-to-income ratio, the less likely it is 
that a negative interest rate effect will result, ceteris paribus. The overall effect is ambiguous 
if, with positive assets, the elasticity of substitution is below unity, but the effect is more 
likely to be negative the higher the elasticity. Since the ratio of assets to income varies over 
time and most empirical evidence agrees that the elasticity is 0.5 or less, a relatively small and 
unstable intertmnporal substitution effect is to be expected. 
The income channel represents the impact interest rate changes have on flows of interest and 
dividend payments between sectors. Within a simple life-cycle framework, consumers attempt 
to keep planned consumption constant. However, empirically, consumption follows income 
rather more closely over the life cycle than theory predicts. Uncertainty about future income 
a. 
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and future needs provides part of the explanation. If future income is more heavily discounted 
due to uncertainty, current income must necessarily play a larger part in determining current 
consumption. This is particularly true for the young who have no buffer of assets. Similarly, 
the retired do not dissave on the scale predicted by simple life-cycle theory. The uncertainty 
surrounding consumption needs is indeed likely to be particularly acute for the elderly, as 
health in later life is more fragile. Credit constraints are another reason why consumption in 
many empirical studies follows the hump-shaped profile of life-cycle income more closely 
than theory suggests. Inasmuch as households are unable to borrow against their future 
income, their consumption decisions are essentially driven by cash-flow variations. In 
practice, consumption is equal to current income for the majority of credit-constrained 
households. Consumers are more likely to encounter credit constraints whenever their initial 
income and asset levels are low relative to expected income, and this is generally the case for 
the young. 
The opposite is true when financial deregulation occurs. As was the case in the UK during the 
1980s, credit becomes more easily available following a period of fmancial liberalisation. 
While the share of credit-constrained households falls, the debt-to-income ratios rises. The 
amount of gearing signi-ficantly increases in the economy and the spendability of illiquid 
assets is boosted. In these circumstances, the credit channel becomes accordingly more 
important within the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Thus, the effect of a change 
in the short-term interest rates on households' debt burden may help explain the strong 
stimulus to housing demand, despite the presumably weak link between monetary policy and 
real long-term rates. This correlation becomes even stronger when, as is the case in the UK, 
most mortgage debt is subject to variable interest rates and therefore highly sensitive to short- 
term interest rate movements. The wealth channel represents the impact interest rate changes 
have on expenditure via house price and financial asset responses, and, hence, the value of 
households' wealth. Consumers typically hold a balance of liquid assets which can easily be 
converted into expenditure when required, and illiquid assets, that typically yield a higher rate 
01 
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of return. Housing, which is the most important single asset for most households, has 
spending consequences which differ from those of other illiquid financial assets: it enters the 
utility function via housing services. As the relative price of any durable good has an effect on 
the consumption function of both durables and non-durables, expenditure for non-housing 
consumption will be affected by the price of housing. Life-cycle consumer theory therefore 
suggests that a rise in real house prices, following a reduction in the market interest rate, 
should have a positive wealth effect on non-housing consumption. At the same time, however, 
negative income and substitution effects on housing demand may occur, provided that the fall 
in interest rate is believed to be long-lived. 
As the interest rate falls, prospective returns on other financial assets (such as equities and 
pension funds), also grow by means of increased expected growth, higher after-tax cash flow 
and the lower discounting of future returns. The interest sensitivity of consumption via the 
asset price channel is, in general, positively correlated with wealth-to-income ratios, although 
the perceived liquidity of the assets themselves should also be taken into account. A fall in 
interest rates is indeed likely to induce a portfolio switch towards more liquid assets and away 
from interest-bearing deposits or more expensive assets such as equities. 
The asset price par excellence is the exchange rate. It is unambiguously recognised as the 
main channel through which interest rate changes have an impact on prices, particularly via its 
pass-through into import prices. Price competitiveness also affects domestic demand in a more 
direct way, that is by determining the proportion of consumers' expenditure lealdng into 
imports. This is true also for a large economy such as the UK, given its relevant degree of 
openess. 
Let us finally consider the less obvious, and generally ignored, transmission channel of 
monetary policy, the governmentfiscal stance. A fall in interest rates has a positive effect on 
expenditure by operating through the government's fiscal policy reaction function. There is a 
01 
decline in the debt-service burden and an enlargement of the tax base following the cut in 
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interest rates. Both effects will engender tax cuts and have a positive impact on disposable 
income and, in turn, on consumption decisions. 
In this work we explore the monetary transmission mechanism by considering the effect of a 
fall in the short-term interest rate on consumers' expenditure within a large-scale 
macroeconometric model, considering in turn two different approaches to the modelling of the 
consumption equation: a 'disposable funds' and a modified life-cycle approach. We believe 
consumption responses to interest rate changes are essentially determined by the theoretical 
assumptions built into the equation. This means, for instance, that the puzzle of consumption's 
interest rate sensitivity outlined above could be reformulated in terms of a debate on 
alternative theoretical frameworks. Evidence of a weak interest sensitivity of consumption 
within a life-cycle perspective would also provide empirical support for the neo-classical 
argument against deficit financing. Within a neo-classical growth model framework, 
embedding a life-cycle model of consumption behaviour allows deficit financing to 
significantly crowd out capital forniation, thereby reducing the future stock of capital and thus 
increasing the real interest rate (Blanchard, 1985, Farukee et aL, 1997). If consumption is 
unresponsive to changes in real interest rates, then consumers hardly adjust their saving in 
response to budget relaxations, crowding out effects are, thereby, even more likely to emerge. 
4.2.2 The 'disposablefunds'approach 
The default NiDEM consumption equation is based on a forward-looking dynamic 
optimisation in the presence of adjustment costs (see Westaway, 1993). The underlying idea is 
that consumers aim to achieve given steady-state consumption-to-income and total net wealth- 
to-income ratios (where total net wealth is given by net financial assets, W, plus housing 
assets, B). Accordingly, the sum of the coefficients on the non-property income term, NPY, 
and wealth term is equal to the sum of the coefficients on the CE terms, implying that the 
system has a long-run unit income elasticity in a steady state where wealth and income are 
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growing in line. There is a negative long-run effect from the nominal interest rate so that 
important inflation non-neutralities feature throughout. Finally, the model incorporates 
adjustment costs through a term in lagged consumption. The corresponding equation, as 
reported in the NiDEM manual, is given below2. 
In (CE)t = 0.359 ln(CE),., + 0.583 In(CE) + 0.005 In[ 
'OO(W + H) 
CPI 
100 
MEW 
100 
CRED 
0.053 [ln(ArPI) + 0.75 CPi + CPI It 
NPY ATY 
- 0.005 (RREAL), - 0.0004537 INFt - 0.217 AUt-2 + 0.090 Aln(API), 2 + dummies 
The equation captures the role of borrowing constraints, and the way in which they may 
change following financial deregulation, by modelling consumers, expenditure conditional on 
the flow of credit. For this reason, Pain and Westaway (1994) describe this specification as the 
, disposable funds' approach. In this way, the modelling of consumption is separated into two 
parts, firstly the modelling of borrowing decisions and secondly the modelling of spending 
which is not credit financed. The equation suggests that 75 per cent of mortgage equity 
withdrawal (MEff) and all new consumer credit (CRED) is used to finance consumers' 
expenditure (CE). Net property income does not appear in the equation, as it affects 
consumption only through its effect on wealth. Dynamic effects from changes in 
unemployment (A[/) are also included as a proxy for income uncertainty. 
4.2.3 A modified 'life-cycle permanent-income'approach. 
The alternative model of consumers' expenditure considered, determines consumption per 
head as a function of human and non-human wealth and the extent of borrowing constraints. It 
01 
2 Since we intend to use this equation only for purposes of sensitivity analysis, it has not been re-estimated in this 
context. For t-ratios and diagnostic statistics the reader should then refer to the original study by Pain and 
Westaway (1994). 
II 
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closely follows Darby and Ireland's (1994) consumption function, although it regards the 
balance between forward-looking and credit-constrained consumers (k) as being constant over 
time. Estimation results, obtained using NiDEM's database, are presented below together with 
corresponding residual graphic analysis. 
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(Robust-White standard errors are given in brackets) 
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The theoretical basis for this alternative consumption model is taken from Blanchard's (1985) 
'constant probability of death' model. The model is however modified such that consumption 
is determined by the decisions of both forward-looldng and credit-constrained consurners. The 
former are assumed to smooth consumption over their lifetime, whereas the latter make their 
consumption choices on the basis of their current disposable income. For permanent-income 
consumers, consumption is proportional to a combination of non-human and human wealth. 
Non-human wealth is given by the sum of net financial assets, W, and housing assets, H. 
Human weal& is proxied by per-capita permanent non-property income, defined as a 
discounted sum of current and future non-property disposable income flows (QRDNPI). The 
discount factor applied is given by a fixed mark-up on the post-tax real interest rate 
(PTREAL), whose magnitude is estimated around 31.7%. The fact that consumers excessively 
discount the future by a constant factor can be explained both in terms of fmite lifetime 
horizons and credit market imperfections. The wedge between the market and the subjective 
discount factor, however, has not been explicitly related to a time-varying measure of 
financial deregulation, as in the original Darby ad Ireland's specification. Namely, given the 
sample period considered, we assume the implicit financial liberalisation index to maintain a 
constant value, that is its peak of 0.24. Because of such constancy assumption, the markup and 
the extent of credit constraints (, %) become two unidentifiable parameters in Darby and 
Ireland's model. Relying on their own estimates, we therefore impose a corresponding share 
of current income consumption (%) equal to 0.161, while letting data determine the (fixed) 
markup on the market interest rate. Disposable-income consumers are instead assumed to 
spend all their current available income, namely A (QRDNPY )t. Moreover, they are allocated POP 
a proportion X of total consumer credit (CRED), thereby mimicking the common practice of 
credit limits being set as multiple of income. Finally and contrary to the original model 
Following Darby and Ireland (1994) and in line with Hayashi (1982), the unobservable human wealth term is 
however eliminated from the model by quasi-differencing. Such a procedure gives rise to the MA(l) component in 
the residuals of the equation. To ensure asymptotic efficiency of the parameter estimates, the presence of an MA 
process requires the use of a GMM Hansen's (1982) estimation technique and twice lagged endogenous variables 
as valid instruments. Estimation was carried out using TSP software. 
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specification, unconstrained consumers are also assumed to be more responsive to income 
uncertamty (captured by the YU term) than their counterparts who experience lower than 
average mcome gro 4. 
The behaviour of households is ftnther described by other relationships determining, for 
instance, housing market fluctuations and wealth accumulation. These relationships are given 
by those incorporated within NiDEM, and will remain unchanged in the present study. It is 
therefore necessary to clarify theway in which monetary policy affects households' choices in 
NiDEM. Firstly, the stock of credit is negatively correlated with the interest payments-to- 
income ratio. This is consistent with the idea that gearing considerations are one of the major 
influences acting to constrain consumer borrowing, due to front-end loading of interest 
payments when inflation is Wgh. Secondly, mortgage equity withdrawal grows in line with 
outstanding housing equity, while being influenced by financial liberalisation effects via a 
term representing the loan-to-value ratio for first-time buyers. Finally, as demand for housing 
is derived as an intertemporal Euler condition, and thereby conditioned on consumption, the 
same measures of human and non-human wealth used in consumption decisions also affect 
housing demand. Other features of the model important for model simulation are outlined in 
the following section. 
4 It is worthwhile to stress that no encompassing test of the two consumption models can be undertaken, as no re- 
estimation of the default model has been Previously carried out. Discrimination among the two models on the 
ground of their relative performance in fitting the data is not of relevance, for the present purpose. Our interest is 
rather to assess the effects of simulating the model under two competing theoretical consumption fi-ameworks on 
the composition of the monetary transmission mechanism. 
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4.3 NIDEM: MAIN FEATURES 
Since 1969 the National Institute of Economic and Social Research has maintained and 
developed a large-scale econometric model of the UK economy which is widely recognised as 
one of the leading empirical domestic macroeconomic models. It is specifically designed to 
generate the Institute's UK economy quarterly forecasts, but it is also used to analyse 
individual macroeconomic relationships and to inform debates about macroeconomic policy. 
in accordance with the leading paradigm in macroeconometric modelling, the Institute's 
domestic model can be described as Keynesian inasmuch as short-term fluctuations in output 
are largely determined by changes in the components of aggregate demand. Nonetheless, its 
long-run properties broadly reflect those of a neo-classical growth model, for the medium-to- 
long-term output response is primarily shaped by supply-side factors through technical 
progress and population growth. Coexistence of a neo-classical view of macroeconomic 
equilibrium with a new Keynesian view of short-term adjustments would imply that, while in 
the long run the level of real activities is independent of the steady-state inflation rate, in the 
short run adjustment costs and contractual arrangements prevent markets from clearing, 
inducing thereby potential output persistence and employment disequilibria. However, 
behavioural inflation non-neutralities within NiDEM's consumers' expenditure equation, as 
well as the lack of indexation of the tax systen-4 cause inflation to affect long-run 
macroeconomic outcomes (see Young, 1997, for an analysis on the issue). As a result, the 
model leaves considerable scope for monetary and fiscal policy, primarily with temporary 
effects, and additionally it allows for some long-tenn consequences. 
Monetary Transmission Channels, Monetary Regimes and Consumption Behaviour 89 
4.3.1 The demand side' 
Within the abovementioned fi-amework, the model's equations are consistent with the 
imperfectly competitive market theory, as both the goods and labour markets contain a 
demand curve determining the quantity traded and price setting equations. Namely, the 
demand curve in the goods market consists of the domestic expenditure and trade equations, 
where domestic expenditure is given by (private and public) consumption and investment in 
both fixed capital and stocks. 
Aggregate consumers' expenditure, as described by the model's default consumption 
function, is based on forward-looking dynamic optimisation in the presence of adjustment 
costs. Consumers are thought of as aiming towards particular steady-state consumption-to- 
income and total net wealth-to-income ratios. The model also captures the role of borrowing 
constraints by modelling consumer spending conditional on the flow of credit, while 
excluding net property income as this only affects consumption through its indirect impact on 
wealth. Inflation non-neutralities, also feature in the equation as it allows for negative long-run 
effects froM the level of nominal interest rates. As one of the aims of this chapter is to analyse 
the monetary transmission mechanism under the alternative consumption model described in 
section 4.2.3, the alternative model will eventually replace NiDEM's default consumption 
function. Aggregate consumption is split between durables and non-durables. The share of 
durable expenditure in total consumers' expenditure is positively related to the proportion of 
total consumption financed by credit and mortgage equity withdrawal and negatively related 
to real interest rates. The change in disposable income term in the equation allows for a 
transient effect on consumption, and this does not completely disappear in the long run. The 
treatment of public consumption is quite unusual. By default, it is used to target the ratio of 
general government expenditure-to-GDP, but it can be employed as a policy instrument to 
achieve alternative fiscal targets. For present purposes, we would rather switch this equation 
.P 
off and consider government procurement as exogenous. 
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Underlying the factor demand relationships in the model is a Cobb-Douglas production 
function, broadly similar in each sector of the economy and incorporating exogenous labour 
augmenting technical progress. Under the assumption that fmns maximise the present 
discounted value of their cash flow subject to such a production function and an adjustment 
cost function which is linear in capital and investment, the optimum investment capital ratio 
depends on the expected investment rate itself and also on the expected gap between the 
marginal product of capital and its user cost. Analogously, stock levels are determined by 
forward-looking expectations in both output and the marginal fmancial cost of stockholding. 
The extent of companies balance-sheet disequilibrium is also a determining factor. Unlike 
investment in manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, public sector investment simply 
grows in line with public consumption. Firms' employment decisions are instead modelled by 
inversion of the production function and are defined in terms of hours of labour input. 
Exports are described by overseas demand functions for domestically produced goods which 
depend upon world trade measures and relative prices defted for each category. 
Total final expenditure, in turn, can either be satisfied from domestic or overseas production. 
Consistent with the imperfectly competitive fi-amework, the allocation of the different 
categories of national and overseas production is defined by a system of demand curves which 
depend mainly, on relative prices, although a time -trend is allowed for as a proxy for 
international specialisation effects., ý, T 
4.3.2 The supply side 
As noted above, the supply side is extremely important in determining model properties, not 
only because the dynamic responses of these variables determine the outcome for price 
inflation but also because, the long-run solution to these equations can be used to derive an 
expression for the long-run rate of unemployment, the NAIRU. The equation for average 
01 
earnings has a long-run solution in which real wage costs depend on the level of productivity, 
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the unemployment rate and long-term unemployment, this latter term capturing upward 
pressures due to insider-outsider effects. 
Direct taxes, indirect taxes and the relative price of imports have no long-run effects, although 
dynamic effects from changes in these wedge terms do arise. Prices in the goods market 
depend on costs (labour, import and stockholding), productivity and demand pressures. 
Adjustment costs imply that current prices depend heavily on past prices, but also expected 
movements in costs and demand. All of the trade-price equations exhibit both static and 
dynamic homogeneity and simply relate trade prices to world prices or a combination of 
world and UK prices. NiDEM's wage and price equations can be combined to form an 
expression for the NAIRU, the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment. Given the 
inflation neutrality characterising the system, the NAIRU will be independent of the level of 
inflation itself (see section 4.4.3), while it will be affected by the proportion of unemployment 
which is long terrn, changes in the wedge term and the real exchange rates. 
The exchange rate plays a crucial part in the model, helping to determine output, inflation and 
the price level in both the short and long term. It is detemlined by an explicit forward-looking 
uncovered interest parity arbitrage condition. This implies a steady state in which the rate of 
change in the nominal exchange rate, and hence price inflation, is consistent with the nominal 
interest differential, whereas the current value of the exchange rate 'jumps' in response to 
anticipated future movements in interest rates. This would leave the equilibrium price level 
undetermined unless an interest rate feedback rule on inflation or another monetary aggregate 
is otherwise specified. 
4.3.3 The monetary stance 
The main policy instrument in the monetary sector is the Bank's base rate. This is given by 
the sum of an endogenous and an exogenous component. The endogenous component may be 
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set according to the deviation of the rate of inflation or a pre-selected nominal variable from 
its target. Here we consider two alternative monetary regimes. In the first, characterised by a 
floating exchange rate, the endogenous component of the interest rate varies endogenously so 
as to accommodate deviations of the PPLUWP inflation rate from its desired path. In the 
second regime, both the effective exchange rate and the short-term interest rate are kept fixed 
at their baseline values, so as to imitate a fixed exchange rate regime. 
v 
4.3.4 Thefiscal stance 
The most important component of direct taxation on household income consists of taxes on 
non-property income. Variations in the tax yield net of mortgage interest tax relief are 
detennined by applying variations in the basic tax rate to the net of allowance tax base. The 
latter is defined as wages and salaries plus ten per cent of any social benefits received by 
households. Taxes on property income have a similar structure, with the tax base given by the 
household gross operating surplus plus half of gross property income. For present purposes, 
the basic rate of income tax is modelled as a policy rule targeting deviations of the public 
deficit-to-GDP ratio from a desired target level. 
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4.4 THE SIMULATION EXPERIMENT 
4.4.1 The design 
The aim of our analysis is pffinarily to show how changes in policy-detemiined interest rates 
affect the UK economy, and particularly British private consumption. In light of this, we 
simulate a temporary, 50 basis point, reduction in the policy rate for eight quarters. The 
simulation is performed under both endogenous and exogenous nominal exchange rates and 
with the default and alternative specifications for aggregate consumers' expenditure imposed. 
The simulated effects on real GDP are decomposed both by GDP component and by 
transmission channel, with respect to each of the four selected scenarios. Six channels of 
interest rate transmission are reported: (i) a fiscal channel, (ii) a direct interest rate channel on 
consumers' expenditure for durable and non-durable goods, capturing intertemporal 
substitution effects, (iii) a cost-of-capital/rate-of-return channel on investment, (iv) an 
income/cash flow channel, (v) a wealth/asset prices channel, and (vi) an exchange rate 
charmel. 
As our aim is to show the sensitivity of the UK monetary transmission mechanism to changes 
in the monetary regime, we need to simulate a monetary shock which is applicable (and 
comparable) under both an inflation targeting rule and a fixed exchange rate regime, thus we 
shock the policy-controlled interest rate temporarily. However, two major caveats are 
necessary. 
Firstly, it should be remembered that, to carry out such an experiment, we assume the 
economy to be in some initial equilibrium position prior to any monetary policy perturbation. 
in reality, though,. the economy is continually affected by a variety of disturbances, and the 
aim of the monetary authority is to respond to such exogenous shocks in order to move 
nominal target variables (such as inflation), to desired levels. -This 
has led model builders to 
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depict monetary policy as an endogenous reaction function so that the interest rate changes 
following simulation exercises are those required to bring the target variable to its desired 
path, subject to various constraints. Hence, in the case of inflation targeting, the default 
endogeneity of the monetary policy rule and the contemporaneous implementation of an 
impulse via the 'policy-controlled interest rate' might be viewed as an exercise investigating 
the implications of a 'policy error'. The monetary authority is, in the baseline scenario, 
following a constrained optimal path, given the monetary reaction fimction, but then decides 
to lower interest rates for two years. This implies that the monetary authority is initiating the 
shock rather than just responding to exogenous disturbances. In order to be able to represent a 
situation in which the authority is using its policy instrument to initiate the shock and, at the 
same time, responding to the resulting deviation of the target variable from its desired level, 
the base nominal interest rate is split in two components, one is exogenous whereas the other 
is endogenous. In this way, under inflation targeting, endogeneity of the monetary rule is 
maintained even during the period in which the shock is implemented. It should therefore be 
clear that our simulation experiments are designed ad hoc to elucidate model properties under 
alternative states-of-the-world, inasmuch as they are not reflecting realistic policy making. 
Results should therefore be interpreted with this in mind. 
Secondly, it is our intention to evaluate whether the relative contribution of different monetary 
transmission channels is unaffected by changes in either private consumption specification or 
monetary regime. We must therefore recall that, with linear backward-looldng 
macroeconomic models, the decomposition of a simulation into contributing channels is 
unique and independent of the order in which the decomposition is carried out, this is not true, 
however, when the expectations formation is explicitly forward-looking. For this reason, 
although the decomposition exercise for the above considered scenarios is undertaken by 
simulating the full NiDEM model with the various channels sequentially turned off in an 
order suggested by the model's structure, we continually repeat the experiment with different 
orderings to check for discrepancies. As differences are quite small and the ranking of 
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contribution across transmission channels does not change in the short teim, we only report 
the sequential approach results. 
We now turn to the analysis of the simulation exercises. Firstly, we evaluate the monetary- 
shock transmission process across the financial sphere. The impact on real GDP (decomposed 
by spending components), prices, and other macroeconomic variables of interest is assessed. 
The effects under an endogenous exchange rate (scenario a) are compared to those under a 
fixed exchange rate (scenario b); a comparison of the simulation results using the default 
consumption function (scenario 1) and those using the alternative life-cycle function (scenario 
2) also features throughout. 
4.4.2 Ylefinancial stnicture 
In NiDEM, the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is modelled, to a large extent, as 
an interest rate transmission mechanism. The central bank sets the short-term interest rate, 
which then affects interest rates over the whole maturity spectrum, other asset prices and the 
exchange rate via the operation of a relatively simple term structure and arbitrage condition. 
Financial variables will then influence output and prices through their effects on individual 
spending components. 
ne responses of the relevant interest rates, asset prices and monetary aggregates following a 
half percentage point reduction in the policy rate are shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, for the 
default and alternative consumption specifications respectively. The comparison of rates' 
dynamics under inflation tar-geting and a fixed exchange rate regime is also reported 
throughout. 
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Figure 4.1: Monetary variables responses under a 'disposable funds' approach 
0.5 percentage points reduction in the exogenous component of the interest rate 
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Figure 4.2: Monetary variables responses under a 'life-cycle' approach 
0.5 percentage points reduction in the exogenous component of the interest rate 
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Talcing the left-hand side of Figure 4.1 first, the most strilcing feature is that for the majority of 
interest rates employed within the model, the dynamic profiles cannot be distinguished from 
that of the policy rate, RBASE (see, for example, the Treasury bill rate, RTB, and the building 
society mortgage rate, RMORY). There are however two notable exceptions worth mentioning, 
these are the interest rate on government debt, RGDEBT, and the UK dividend yield, 
UKDIVA, both depend almost entirely on the long rate, RLONG. Movements in the equity 
price, EQPR, which reflect the balance-sheet position of financial companies, also seem to be 
somewhat divorced from the original policy rate shock, although short-term bank lending 
plays a central part in corporate finance. The real cost of finance, RCF, the main component 
through which the cost-of-capital channel is operating, cannot be directly compared with the 
other rates, as it refers to, a post-tax real interest rate. Again, this is just a function of the 
Bank's base rate. The user cost of housing, USERH, reflects to a large extent the adjustment 
path of the policy rate and impressively resembles the most important asset price, the nominal 
exchange rate, EFFRAT. This constitutes the main monetary transmission 
channel to prices. In NiDEM, as we have discussed -above, 
the nominal exchange rate is 
modelled in the form of a UIP condition and is treated in an explicit forward-looking way. 
That is, a reduction in the policy rate, with foreign rates unchanged, provokes an immediate 
devaluation which-feeds into the wage-price system driving prices up. Given the temporary 
nature of the shock, however, the interest rate is expected to move back after eight periods, 
thereby inducing an intefim revaluation of the -nominal exchange rate. 
In contrast, the role of 
money is a passive one, in the sense that both broad (M4) and narrow (MO) money are demand 
determined. 
It should be clear, therefore, that the whole interest rate transmission mechanism is centred on 
short-market rates. As a consequence, each spending component -in 
NiDEM is likely to be 
strongly dependent on short-term interest, rates. Nevertheless, if it is true that the financial 
structure determines which rates are modelled and how sensitive spending decisions are with 
respect to these rates, it is also true that the structure of balance-sheet positions also 
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determines the importance of income and cash-flow effects. In NiDEM, there exists an 
explicit banking sector, whose balance-sheet items entering households' net wealth (i. e. liquid 
deposits, mortgage and credit lending), influence both consumers' expenditure and investment 
in private dwellings. In this way, these variables may capture both changes in interest rates 
(and intertemporal substitution effects), and a direct credit channel on household demand, thus 
allowing a complete assessment of the role the financial structure has in an economy. 
Moving on to the comparison of interest rate and asset price responses under a pegged 
nominal exchange rate, it is evident that when an inflation targeting rule is at work, interest 
rate responses are slightly weaker overall. This is because, even during the first eight quarters, 
endogenous accommodation of the shock is engineered. Moreover, under a fixed exchange 
rate regime, no overshooting occurs during the periods immediately following the shock, 
whereas overshooting is present with an inflation targeting rule. The comparison of Figures 
4.1 and 4.2 is strilcing. With the inflation targeting regime, we notice that the long-run non- 
neutralities present characterise the responses of all rates in Figure 4.2, whereas this is not the 
case with an exogenous interest rate. Furthermore, 'urider both monetary regimes, the use of an 
alternative equation for private consumption leads to a lower interest rate sensitivity. In 
particular, the response of narrow money demand is smaller and somewhat different following 
the interest rate reduction. Long-run interest rate non-neutralities and a low interest rate 
sensitivity are generally viewed as inherent properties of any neo-classical model with a 
forward-looking consumption function that explicitly contains Ricardian non-neutralities. 
4.4.3 Macroeconomic responsesfollowing a monetary loosening 
The macroeconomic effects of a change in the market interest rate depend upon the scenario 
considered, that is the chosen monetary regime and consumption model. Analysis of 
simulation results is organised as follows. 
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Table 4.1: Macroeconomic responses under a 'disposable-fund' consumption function 
Scenario la: 0.5% temporary reduction of the exogenous component of the 
policy Interest rate under inflation targeting regime, standard consumption function 
Year I Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
GDP convm*ms 
GDP 
Consumers' expenditure 
Investment 
Trade balance 
Lhemployment 
DIs pos able Income 
ý*alth compomts 
Net Wealth Households 
Household Credit 
mortgage debt 
Mges and Pdces 
Wages and Salaries 
Import Prices 
inflation 
GavemmOccounts 
Debt to GDP ratio 
surplus to GDP ratio 
Standard rate of income tax 
0.15 0.20 0.07 - 0.02 - 0.06 
0.10 0.18 0.09 0.01 - 0.04 
0.07 0.07 0.02 0.00 - 0.00 
0.03 - 0.06 - 0.05 - 0.03 - 0.02 
2.66 - 5.42 - 5.08 - 3.47 - 1.72 
0.06 0.00 0.05 0.04 - 0.01 
0.17 0.22 0.04 - 0.08 - 0.15 
0.43 0.86 0.74 0.45 0.19 
0.07 0.17 0.19 0.16 0.14 
0.20 0.39 0.26 0.10 0.02 
0.26 0.14 - 0.02 - 0.03 - 0.03 
0.07 0.03 - 0.01 - 0.02 - 0.02 
0.71 - 1.41 - 1.50 - 1.29 - 1.08 
0.07 0.16 0.09 0.01 - 0.02 
0.01 - 0.06 - 0.08 - 0.07 - 0.06 
Scenario 2a: 0.5% temporary reduction of the exogenous component of the 
policy interest rate under fixed exchange rate, standard consumption function, 
Year I Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
CDP conVwenis 
GDP 
Consumers' expenditure 
Investment 
Trade balance 
Lhemplayment 
Dis pas able Income 
Malth corqxxvnts 
Net Wealth Households 
Household Credit 
Mortgage debt 
VAges and Nices 
wages and Salaries 
Import Prices 
inflation 
Govenunent. Accouns 
Debt to. GDP ratio 
surplus to GDP ratio 
Standard rate of income tax 
0.17 0.23 0.13 0.05 - 0.00 
0.13 0.24 0.16 0.08 0.01 
0.11 0.11 0.06 0.03 0.02 
0.09 0.13 0.09 - 0.06 - 0.04 
2.85 5.76 6.20 - 5.36 - 3.91 
0.05 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.03 
0.19 0.24 0.06 - 0.08 - 0.19 
0.48 1.09 1.07 0.80 0.51 
0.08 0.21 0.25 0.25 0.23 
0.22 0.44 0.35 ý0.20 
0.11 
0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 - 0.01 
0.03 0.05 0.01 - 0.01 - 0.02 
0.77 1.69 - 2.05 - 2.01 - 1.91 
0.07 0.21 0.14 0.06 0.02 
0.01 0.07 - 0.10 - 0.10 - 0.10 
0- 
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Scenafio ]a: The upper panel of Table 4.1 summarises the responses obtained with the 
inflation targeting regime and default consumption function in place. The 50-basis-point 
reduction in the policy-determined interest rate for two years brings about a devaluation of 
sterling, as we saw above. The loosening of monetary conditions creates inflationary pressure 
for both real output and prices. Inflation rises by 0.7 per cent during the first year of the shock, 
whereas endogenous monetary-rule accommodation curbs its growth to 0.3 per cent above 
baseline in the final quarter of the perturbation. Once the interest-rate stimulus is turned off, 
inflation overshoots its target level and remains below baseline for most of the simulation 
period. This tightening manifests itself, in part, via a rise of the nominal short-term interest 
rate, peaking some 10 basis points above its baseline level in year 3, and,, in part, via an 
increase in the exchange value of sterling during years 3-5 (see Figure 4.1). The nominal 
exchange rate grows by almost 0.2 percentage points in the first quarter following the removal 
of the shock. 
More importantly, real interest rates rise above base values so that the real exchange rate rises 
above baseline for some three years. The tightening of -monetary conditions that results 
suppresses the inflationary pressure -on aggregate demand and helps price inflation move 
towards its target level. The latter, adjustment occurs due to second-round effects from 
aggregate demand onto prices and via the pass-through of declining import prices to consumer 
prices. 
The slowdown, however, is delayed, as the level of output remains above base in year 3 
despite the policy restriction, a result, which is due to the economy's intrinsic adjustment 
costs. Output is above base for more than three years, pealdng at the end of the second year 
with GDP 0.2 per, cent above baseline. The, same is true for investment and consumers' 
expenditure. Nonetheless, whereas investment grows by 0.07 per cent of baseline GDP due to 
the initial fall in the real cost of fmance, private consumption is driven up by 0.18 percent of 
baseline GDP, similar to the GDP response. The boom in, consumption reflects both an 
improvement in households' net wealth, which rises by 0.22 per cent at the end of the second 
01 
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year, and, above all, an increase of 0.9 per cent in consumer credit. The robust and long- 
lasting response of households' credit, together with the modest and transitory worsening of 
their disposable income, emphasises the significance of the households' debt position. 
Upward pressures in wages are also found to be strongly persistent and, thereby, responsible 
for the medium-term improvement in households' disposable income. The trade balance 
deterioration is given by the mirror image of the internal demand's dynamics. The 6 
percentage point reduction in the current account ratio during year 2 is determined by the 
degree of openness in the UK economy, and the expansion in domestic demand, triggered by 
the inflationary monetary policy, results in higher imports. This is, however, partially offset 
by the gain in competitiveness following the endogenous devaluation of sterling during the 
first two years of the simulation. 
Finally, there is an overall improvmnent in the general gove=ent sector following the 
policy-determined interest rate reduction. The prolonged expansion of the tax base provides a 
lasting boost for the surplus to GDP ratio as it is still above baseline -values after five years. 
Similarly, the debt to GDP ratio falls by more than 2 percentage points after three years, 
thereby inducing a reduction in the interest burden. The combined effect of the larger tax base 
and lower interest burden allows the basic rate of income tax to fall and remain below baseline 
values for the entire simulation horizon. 
In the long run, nominal and real interest rates along with the nominal and real exchange rate 
return to baseline values, providing evidence that the model is inflation neutral. It is therefore 
the case that in the long run the Phillips curve is approximately vertical, as is apparent from 
Figure 4.3. The Figure combines together unemployment and inflation responses following a 
temporary monetary relaxation in order to obtain a Phillips-curve diagram. The familiar anti- 
clockwise dynamics show a peak at the end of the fourth quarter, some 0.1 percentage points 
above baseline, whereas the largest impact on real activity, a fall of 6,000 units in 
Ir 
unemployment, occurs when the shock ends. There is considerable inertia in the adjustment 
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towards equilibrium, although ultimately there is no trade-off between employment and price 
stability. 
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Scenario 2a: The lower panel of Table 4.1 contains the simulation results under a fixed 
exchange rate regime and the default consumption function. The results, while sharing many 
of the qualitative features discussed for Scenario ]a above, show more pronounced deviations 
from baseline values, with the exception of the import price response. This arises due to the 
fact that an exogenous (nominal) exchange rate closes off one channel of interest rate 
transmission. Implications are twofold. On the one hand, it inhibits the price competitiveness 
gain present'in the previous experiment. As there is no initial depreciation of the exchange 
rate, import prices hardly move away from base and the increase in exports is negligible. On 
the other hand, however, the absence of an exchange rate pass-through onto consumer prices 
eliminates a channel through which monetary policy operates and price stability is, thereby, 
ensured. The Phillips-curve shown in Figure 4.3, scenario 2a illustrates the combined 
consequences of these two effects. The inflationary pressure following the monetary 
relaxation under a fixed exchange rate is half the size of the corresponding effect under 
inflation targeting, as no depreciation takes place. Despite this, inflation takes one year longer 
to return to base. More importantly, the utter exogeneity of the interest rate in this simulation 
amplifies the magnitude of the shock during the first eight quarters compared to that in the 
previous experiment. It follows that the macroeconomic responses will be generally larger 
under this scenario, as the initial stimulus to the policy rate is larger. 
Real GDP increases by 0.23 per cent in year 2, remaining above during following years and 
standing 0.05 per cent above base in year 4. Similarly, consumption remains above its 
baseline value throughout the simulation horizon, with an increase of 0.24 per cent of baseline 
in the second year. The rise in investment is also more pronounced, still standing above 
baseline at the end of the fifth year. The deterioration of the trade balance is sizeable, and in 
the second year more than counters the contribution of investment to the expansion in 
demand. This is due to both stronger leakage of domestic demand into imports and a marginal 
export response. As the stimulus to the economy is larger than that under the previous 
scenario, the improvement in the government accounts is also amplified. 
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Table 4.2: Macroeconomic responses under a 'fife-cycle' consumption function 
Scenario 1b: 0.5% wqmnuy reduction of the exogenous conponent of the 
policy interest rate under inflation targeting regane, altemative consumption finiction 
Year I Year2 Year3 Year4 YearS Year 3D 
CIP cmpcnem 
CDP 
Consumers' expenditure 
Investirmt 
Trade balance 
UOTOWM 
r1spmaNehinm 
Mthcmpmem 
Net Wealth Households 
Household credit 
Mortgage debt 
YAM and Pflas 
wages and Salaries 
Inport Prices 
Inflation 
G"nninkmm 
Debt to CDP ratio 
Surplus to GDP ratio 
Standard rate of income tax 
0.09 0.10 0.04 0.01 - 0.01 - 0.02 
0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 
0.07 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 
- 0.00 0.00 0.02 - 0.03 - 0.02 - 0.02 
- 1.70 - 3.21 3.01 - 2.17 - 1.32 1.05 
- 0.09 - 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 
0.11 0.15 0.07 0.01 - 0.03 0.02 
0.41 0.82 0.71 0.45 0.23 0.06 
0.07 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.05 
0.14 0.26 0.18 0.08 0.05 - 0.02 
0.29 0.17 0.01 - 0.01 - 0.01 - 0.08 
0.07 0.02 0.02 - 0.02 - 0.01 - 0.00 
0.28 - 0.78 1.02 - 0.97 - 0.91 - 0.02 
0.04 0.10 0.07 0.02 0.01 - 0.01 
0.00 - 0.04 0.05 - 0.05 - 0.05 - 0.03 
Scenario 2b: 0.5% tempomry reduction of the exogenous corqponent of the 
policy interest rate under fixed exchange rate, altennative consuqAon fiinction 
Year I Year2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 3D 
ap comum 
GDP 
Consumers' expenditure 
Investment 
Trade balance, 
aspsablehmm 
Mthcaipaxigs 
Net wealth Households 
Household credit 
mortgage debt 
VAX am PdM 
Wages and Salaries 
Inport, Prices 
inflation 
Debt to GDP ratio 
Surplus to GDP ratio 
standard rate of income tax 
0.07 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.00 - 0.00 
0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.01 
0.09 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.00 
- 0.04 - 0.05 - 0.03 - 0.03 - 0.02 0.00 
- 1.30 - 2.00 - 1.82 - 1.28 - 0.63 0.35 
- 0.10 - 0.15 - 0.06 - 0.00 - 0.01 0.00 
0.09 0.10 0.02 - 0.03 0.07 0.16 
0.45 0.99 0.93 0.66 0.41 0.04 
0.08 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.04 
0.11 0.21 0.15 0.06 0.02 0.01 
0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01, 0.00 
0.02 0.02 - 0.00 - 0.02 0.02 0.00 
0.30 - 0.78 - 1.03 - 1.01 - 0.99 - 0.27 
0.03 '0.11- 0.08 0.03 0.02 - 0.01 
0.00 - 0.04 - 0.06 - 0.05 - 0.06 - 0.06 
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This results in a more pronounced, and lasting reduction in income taxation, which in turn 
reverses the sign of the disposable income response as the stimulus to the policy rate comes to 
an end. 
Scenafio 1b: The upper panel of Table 4.2 reports the results under an inflation targeting 
regime and the modified life-cycle consumption function. This experiment highlights the key 
role played by the consumers' expenditure equation, as consumption's share in changes to 
GDP is larger than that for any other component. Also its interest rate responsiveness is 
crucial when determining the impact of monetary policy on the economy as a whole. 
Simulation results are therefore amazingly clear-cut. If households are assumed to make their 
spending decisions on the basis of their life-cycle permanent income and to discount fiiture 
income at a higher rate than the market rate, then the interest sensitivity of consumption falls 
dramatically. With this policy scenario, private consumption increases by 0.03 percent of 
baseline GDP at the end of the second year, and moves slowly back thereafter. Investment 
responses are exactly the same as those for scenario ]a, and there's practically no 
deterioration of the current account. This is due to the small amount of import leakage from 
private consumption as a result of its weak growth. 
As for asset components, consumers, credit and. mortgage debt are marginally changed. 
Households' net wealth falls, mainly due to, lower money balances, which are, as already 
noted, demand determined. Disposable income falls by more than that under scenario Ia. This 
is due to less demand pressure on wages, and salaries and a smaller income tax reduction. The 
latter, a consequence of the small expansion of the tax base in this exercise, results in a 
modest PSBR to GDP ratio improvement and slight debt relief. As expected, the supply side is 
only marginally affected by modifications in consumption behaviour as both the import price 
and inflation dynamic responses (Figure 4.3) generally resemble those for scenario ]a. 
Scenario 2b: The lower panel of Table 4.2 shows the results under a fixed exchange rate 
regime and the alternative life-cycle consumption function. Aswith scenario 2a, there is the 
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absence of an exchange rate channel of monetary transmission. This is confumed by looking 
at the investment, trade balance and price responses. As there is no initial depreciation of the 
exchange rate, import prices remain around base values and any increase in exports is 
negligible. Thus, during the first two years, the current account deteriorates more than with 
scenario 1b. Furthermore, as there is no correction to the inflationary disturbance during the 
perturbation period, the increase in investment is more pronounced during the first eight 
quarters and lasts until the end of year 5. The effects on credit and mortgage debt are also 
reinforced due to the lack of endogeneity of the monetary rule. However, in contrast with the 
results for scenario 2a, where the exchange rate is also fixed, consumption responsiveness is 
here further reduced, as compared to that with inflation targeting. This is due to the larger'fall 
in disposable income, following the larger reduction in the interest rate. Given that consumers 
excessively discount the future and that there is a crucial part played by discounted flows of 
future income within a life-cycle consumption model, income reductions quickly feed into 
consumption. As a consequence, consumers' expenditure is markedly reduced throughout the 
simulation period. This is the reason why, under this scenario, the effects of the initial 
disturbance on the economy are generally smaller. GDP, unemployment and nominal wage 
responses, all determined by consumption movements, are smaller than under inflation 
targeting. The impact on total net wealth is also lessened, as lower money holdings reduce the 
stream of property income. This results in a perverse disposable income-consumption spiral. 
Public account responses are slightly larger than under scenario 1b. It therefore seems that the 
lack of accommodation of the initial shock more than offsets the fall in disposable income, at 
least in the short run. 
4.4.4 Decomposition of transmission channelsfor selected scenarios 
The structure of NiDEM allows the total effects of the simulated interest rate changes on 
spending components to be attributed to the following transmission channels: (a) the direct 
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channel, which represents the interternporal substitution effect of the change in interest rates 
on private consumption for both durable and non-durable goods; (b) the fiscal channel, which 
captures the effects of movements in the policy interest rate on government financing and, 
thereby, on households' spending decisions; (c) the cost-of-capital channel, capturing the 
effects of the user cost of capital on investment in housing, manufacturing and non- 
manufacturing sector, as well as on inward/outward direct and portfolio investments; (d) the 
cash-flow channel, which proxies for the impact of interest rate changes on the flows of 
earnings, interest and dividend payments between sectors; (e) the wealth channel, capturing 
the effects of interest rate disturbances on expenditure through the response of financial asset 
prices, house prices as well as direct changes in the entity of each households' balance-sheet 
component (i. e. liquid assets, equities and pension funds, credit, mortgages and houses); (f) 
the exchange rate channel, which comprises all the effects engineered by the resp onse of the 
exchange rates to changes in the interest rate. 
The relative importance of the various transmission channels to the overall result is analysed 
empirically by closing off the different channels sequentially, in the logical order suggested 
by the structure of NiDEM (reported above). This implies that the contribution each channel 
makes is strictly dependent on the sequence of'elimination. This is because in each case a 
different model is simulated. However, as previously mentioned, a double-check of results is 
undertaken by simulating one channel at a time. Results show that differences in the size of 
the contribution made by each transmission channel appear to be negligible in the short term, 
although discrepancies do increase somewhat towards the end of the simulation period. - The 
advantage of the chosen approach is that the sum of the partial effects exactly equates to the 
total effect, inasmuch as interdependence among channels is internalised. 
The contribution each monetary transmission channel makes to changes in GDP and the In 
spending components, for each of the four selected scenarios, is reported in Tables 4.3 to 4.6. 
Decomposition by transmission channel with respect to GDP, and aggregate consumers' 
expenditure is further illustrated in Charts 5 and 6, respectively. At a glance, the results 
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convey the idea that the choice of monetary regime and the assumption regarding 
consumption behaviour (among other things), matter when determining the relative 
contributions the various monetary transmission channels make to the effects of a policy 
change. 
Let us first focus on the default consumption function simulation results (Tables 4.3 and 4.4 
and scenarios ]a and 2a in Figures 4.4 and 4.5). Under the endogenous monetary rule, the 
main interest rate transmission channel to real output is the direct channel, accounting for 
approximately half of its variation during the first two years. The exchange rate and wealth 
effect jointly explain the remaining GDP movements during this period. The GDP fluctuations 
arising from the wealth effect are due to one component of the households' balance-sheet, that 
is credit. When the shock to interest rates ends, both the exchange rate and credit effects ease, 
while the fiscal channel becomes more important. The relevance of the, intertemporal 
substitution effect on consumption is amplified when the exchange rate channel is turned off, 
as it becomes responsible for 0.17 per cent of a 0.23 per cent increase in GDP during the 
second year of the simulation. The credit channel provides the second largest contribution to 
the GDP response in the first two years, but, as is the case with inflation targeting in place, its 
contribution diminishes thereafter, while the' fiscal channel's contribution grows 
progressively. The negative income effects also increase steadily over the medium term. In 
summary, both the ranking and the time profile of the various transmission channels do not 
change when consumption responses are considered, exceptions being the exchange rate and 
fiscal channels. The exchange rate channel'is ineffective, whereas the fiscal channel is 
important when explaining consumption movements., 
Let us now turn to assess the simulation results obtained when the model is simulated with a 
life-cycle consumption function (Table 4.5 and 4.6 and scenarios Ib and 2b in Figures 4.4 and 
4.5). Under an inflation targeting rule, real GDP is driven by exchange rate movements, with 
the exchange rate channel determining more than half of its variation in year 2. The other 
channels are generally weaker. When the exchange rate is exogenous, the cost of capital 
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channel gives rise to the largest impact, explaining almost all of the change in GDP during 
years I and 2. The fiscal channel, on the other hand, makes the largest contribution during the 
medium term. Focusing on consumption again, the story changes substantially from that 
discussed above. The cash flow channel produces the largest (negative) impact on 
consumption when an inflation targeting regime is in place. Its effect builds over time, but is 
offset by the combined effects of the cost of capital and fiscal channels. When the exchange 
rate channel is closed off, the cost of capital channel delivers a positive contribution to 
consumption variations during the first year, but Us turns increasingly negative soon after the 
shock ends. From the second year onwards, the government financing channel becomes the 
main method of transmission of the shock on to consumption, this is closely followed by a 
strengthened direct channel. 
in summary, the transmission channels decomposition corroborates our interpretation of the 
different macroeconomic responses to the monetary shock obtained under each of the 
scenarios. Our results show that when consumers are assumed to make their spending 
decisions within a life-cycle perspective, while 'excessively' discounting the future, the 
contribution consumption makes to GDP changes is very small. Decomposing GDP responses 
by transmission channel shows that the main contributions come from monetary transmission 
mechanisms that affect either exports (the exchange rate channel) or investment (the cost of 
capital channel), as any consumption effect is negligible. Switching from an inflation 
targeting regime to a pegged (nominal) exchange rate magnifies the importance of the two 
domestic monetary transmission channels present. Both these channels, the intertemporal 
substitution (direct) effect and repercussions from government financing, affect real output 
through their impact on consumers' expenditure. The former is important when households 
are assumed to make their choices according to a 'disposable funds' approach, and the latter is 
significant regardless the consumption model adopted. - 
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4.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter studies the characteristics of the UK monetary transmission mechanism, as 
portrayed by the National Institute's Domestic Econometric Model (NiDEM). UK real output 
and its spending components are found to be highly sensitive to monetary policy disturbances, 
in line with the findings of the BIS (1995). We argue, however, that the impact of interest rate 
movements on real variables is strictly determined by both the monetary regime at work and 
the underlying assumptions regarding consumption behaviour. 
Under the model's default consumption specification, interest rate sensitivity increases when 
an inflation targeting rule is replaced by a pegged exchange rate regime. In both cases, 
however, it is the direct channel which transmits most of the policy change to the real 
economy, so that strong intertemporal substitution effects are a feature of British consumption 
behaviour. Wealth effects are also important, but this is only true during the first two years 
when the interest rate change is applied. This reflects the fact that mortgage debt and 
consumer credit respond vigorously to the short-term market rate rather than long rates. 
The relevance of the fiscal transmission channel following a change in monetary policy is 
striking. We show that movements in the policy interest rate affect spending components 
strongly via its influence on the fiscal stance. In particular, the fiscal channel's contribution to 
the transmission of monetary shocks on to consumption under a fixed exchange rate regime is 
found to be one of the largest. Given the sluggish debt reabsorption present, its effect is not 
only limited to the short term but is likely to be more pronounced in the medium-to-long run. 
It should also be noted that given the decentralisation of fiscal policy and fiscal structures 
within EMU, evidence of a quantitatively important fiscal channel of monetary policy is likely 
to weaken the argument for a symmetric response to a common change in the policy rate. 
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Finally, the adoption of a life-cycle permanent-income consumption function containing 
human and non-human capital, liquidity constrained consumers and a future discount rate 
higher than the rate of interest, accounts for a smaller interest rate sensitivity of consumption 
under the standard scenario assumptions. In particular, intertemporal substitution effects are 
likely to be insignificant in this case. 
Part Three 
A Multi-Country Model 
Chapter Five 
The Fiscal Dimension of a 
Common Monetary Policy 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Since January 1999, eleven EU members have locked their currencies together, with the 
European Central Bank officially in charge of the short-term interest rate policy. The 
credibility problem involved in the sovereign choice of the output/inflation combination and 
the consequences of the fiscal stance in a context of international policy coordination have 
become recently hot topics in macroeconon-fts (for an overview, see Allsopp and Vines 
(1998) and the other articles on the same issue of the Oxford Review ofEconomic Policy). In 
fact, despite the monetary scenario facing joining EMU countries is one in which control of 
monetary policy is ceded to an independent central bank committed to price stability, fiscal 
decisions will remain essentially decentralised in the hands of eleven independent finance 
ministers - although in compliance with the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP, henceforth). In the light of this, cooperative agreements and an appropriately designed 
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policy mix become the sine qua non for the success of EMU. The widespread consensus 
within EMU on the need for coordinated fiscal restraint seems indeed to be inspired by the 
recognition that fiscal discipline allows the credibility of monetary policy to strengthen. 
This, in turn, is judged to increase the likelihood of system-wide interest-rate cuts, certainly 
necessary to offset the country-specific costs of fiscal consolidation. Lax enforcement of the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure and Stability Pact is instead likely to bring greater pressure to 
bear on the central bank. Under these circumstances, the credibility of the latter's 
commitment to price stability would be greatly lessened (Alesina and Grilli, 1992). 
However, despite the growing literature on the issue, no agreement seems to exist on the 
merits of enforcing international institutional arrangements such as the SGP. On the one 
hand, studies developed within a Keynesian fi-amework tend to show that the current 
European institutional set-up, by assigning two distinct targets (price stability and real 
growth) to two distinct authorities (an independent Central Bank and (eleven! ) independent 
national gove=ents) each with only one instrument at hand (the nominal interest rate and 
fiscal deficits, respectively), creates unavoidable dichotomisation in the economy. The 
outcome will be a (i. e. eleven) suboptimal Nash equilibrium (equilibria) if compared with an 
alternative steady state in which monetary and fiscal authorities are in fact allowed to 
cooperate. In other words, everyone would be better off if monetary policy could actually 
accommodate to fiscal policy, that is with a Central Bank willing to give up part of its 
4 conservativeness'. According to this perspective, introduction of a SGP enforcing 3 percent 
deficit-to-GDP ratio ceilings imposes a further constraint to national fiscal authority, thereby 
threatening European economic growth and trapping the economy in a low-level equilibrium 
(Buiter, Corsetti and Roubini, 1993; Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1998; Deinertzis et aL, 
1999). 
On the other hand, models departing from the traditional IS/LM fi-amework and assuming 
that transmission mechanisms of fiscal policy are different from those of the Keynesian 
multipliers, reach opposite conclusions. If fiscal effectiveness is rather the result of 
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distortions or non-neutralities affecting the economy, then the presence of excessive deficits 
will still be justified, in spite of the fact that they cease to represent a Pareto-optimal 
solution. In this way, the greater the degree of distortion in the economy, the more effective 
is fiscal policy, but also the lower will be the outcome in terms of social welfare. This kind 
of analytical fi-amework, therefore, calls for a deus ex-machina able to remove inherent 
distortions and make everyone better off. The key question is then the source of the non- 
neutrality that features in the economy and provides the incentive to run deficits. Beetsma 
and Uhlig (1999), for example, analyse the requirement of a SGP among EU countries in the 
context of a multi-country political economy (see also Roubini and Sachs, 1989). As each 
national government is assumed to be run by a party having probability less than one to be 
re-elected in the next period, each fiscal authority fails to fully internalise the consequences 
of debt financing, given that debts are meant to be repaid in the next period. Such non- 
neutrality will create an inflation bias with real effects in a monetary union since the fiscal 
stance of one country will be reflected in changes in the real economy of the others via a 
gullible ECB. In this context there is, therefore, an incentive for the other member states to 
agree upon a SGP and enforce international fiscal responsibility. Detken (1999) addresses 
the case for a SGP within an overlapping generations model characterised by disconnected 
generations counting money and debt as net wealth. In this non-Ricardian closed economy, it 
is consumers who fail to internalise the consequences of future tax liabilities, thereby 
substituting future for current consumption in the face of higher stocks of debt. The 
argument in favour of a SGP is then that, as a 'conservative' ECB delivering a lower degree 
of monetary financing will in fact exacerbate Ricardian non-neutralities, an SGP will be 
needed 'as an intergenerational contract safeguarding the interest of future generations'. 
In this chapter, we present an empirical analysis of the links between monetary and fiscal 
policy within EMU. This is done through simulation of a neo-classical highly non-Ricardian 
multi-country model: the IMF's MULTIMOD Mark III (MM3). In MM3 monetary policy 
has a quasi-fiscal dimension, since money both enters the government budget constraint and 
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affects real wealth. Each European economy is characterised, - even in steady state - by a 
different debt/money composition of deficit financing and assumed to sustain it by running a 
different primary surplus. This allows us to assess the effects of a common monetary policy 
on country-specific fiscal stances as well as the implications of enforcing an institutional 
arrangement such as the Stability and Growth Pact for the Monetary Union itself 
Results suggest that indeed, in a global economy like the one described in MM3, the primary 
source of cross-country heterogeneity in response to a common monetary shock is the 
differences in national economies' budgetary positions. Centralising money supply seems to 
induce long-term cross-country wealth redistribution in response to a common monetary 
shock, unless accompanied by offsetting country-specific corrections in their debt stocks. 
Although the convergence criteria implicit in the Stability Pact are not necessary in MM3 to 
ensure fiscal sustainability, their strict enforcement is shown to be associated with overall 
ever-lasting benefits. Transition to the new steady state appears, however, remarkably costly 
for high-debt EMU countries. We also note that different degrees of rigidity in national 
labour markets crucially determine the size and speed of adjustments to a common monetary 
shock. On the contrary, different degrees of efficiency characterising European credit 
markets are per se unlikely to play a major role in explaining asymmetric responses. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. The next section describes the main features of the 
model. The baseline scenario and the design of the simulation experiments are illustrated in 
section 5.3, whereas the results are presented in section 5.4. Section 5.5 contains concluding 
remarks. In the appendix, main simulation results are discussed analytically. 
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5.2. MULTIMOD MARK IH: MAIN FEATURES 
To explore the implications of asymmetries in the transmission of monetary policy, we use 
the IMF's multi-country econometric model, MULTIMOD Mark III. In its basic version, it 
contains linked annual models for each of the G-7 economies plus three country blocks 
which aggregate the small industrial economies, the developing countries and the high- 
income oil-exporters, respectively. It is a general equilibrium macroeconomic model 
developed at the IMF to analyse the effects and the transmission of policy changes within 
and across countries. MM3 is in fact well suited for policy analysis, since its explicit 
characterisation of technology, household and firm preferences allows for parameter 
calibration to replicate certain stylised facts. Conversely, the model is not thought of as a tool 
for making unconditional forecasts. Rather, it takes the IMF's World Economic Outlook 
forecasts as the baseline for simulation scenarios. The structure and properties of MM3 are 
thoroughly described in Laxton et aL (1998), while its detailed documentation and 
codification can also be obtained at the IMF's external publications website 
(http: //www. imf. org). The advantages of basing our research on this particular model are as 
follows. 
MM3 is a forward-looking dynamic model whose simulation involves simultaneous 
solutions of both the dynamic system and its steady-state analogue counterpart. Solution of 
the steady-state model describes convergence to a balanced-growth path characterised by 
simultaneous stock and flow equilibrium. The steady-state model can thus be used both as an 
interpretative device and to determine model-consistent terminal conditions for dynamic 
analysis. Agents' behaviour is assumed to be purely forward-looking in asset markets (i. e. 
arbitrage condition and term structure equations) and partially forward-looking in goods 
markets, while being consistent with the Long-Run Natural Rate Hypothesis. 
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Striking in MM3 is the presence of a convex Phillips curve, which reflects short-run capacity 
constraints in such a way that, whereas inflation responds strongly to demand pressures 
under conditions of full employment, it is relatively insensitive to changes in activity in case 
of recessions. MM3 short-run inflation-output trade-off can be surnmarised by the system of 
equations reported below, where (5.1) describes the Okun's law translating output gaps 
(yt - y, 
) into unemployment gaps (U, - U, 
) and (5.2) specifies the shorl-run Phillips curve 
model. Corresponding country-specific parameter estimates are shown in table 5.1, limiting 
our attention to the four European economies. 
(Ut -ff, 
)=100-p, (yt 
-Y, 
)+P, (U, 
-. -a, 
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=K 9e 
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-Ut)+et (5.2) 
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Table 5.1: Okun's Law and Phillips Curve parameter estimates 
Germany France Italy UK 
A -0.33 -0.30 -0.09 -0.33 
P2 0.18 0.44 0.79 0.69 
Ic 0.744 0.753 0.912 1 
J, r 
0.53 11 0.53 
r 0.819 1.137 2.305 2.364 
4.521 5.104 5.676 2.248 
8.521 9.104 9.676 6.248 
Equation (S. 1) can be regarded as a demand function for labour, with output demand taken as 
given. Partial adjustment entailed in p2 implies that turnover is costly, so fmns adjust 
employment slowly to changes in demand conditions. The expectations augmented Phillips 
curve (5.2) distinguishes between intrinsic dynamics and expectation formation (the term in 
square brackets). Namely, the model embodies fixed weights on forward- and backward- 
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looking components for inflation expectations (8, and (1-8, ), respectively), which can 
however be modified to allow for alternative assumptions about expectations' formation and 
policy credibility. Moreover, the model reflects an overlapping contracting framework, 
according to which a proportion r of workers negotiates nominal wage adjustments on the 
basis of expected fi=e inflation, while remaining wage contracts are linked to lagged 
inflation. In this way, MM3 exhibits short-run Keynesian dynamics intended to capture 
inertial effects that are features of the inflation process. Finally, the non-linear term in 
unemployment can be derived from standard wage- and price-setting behaviours on the 
assumption that the degree of wage rigidity is a positive function of the actual level of 
unemployment, as it is implicit in labour market theories such as the 'efficiency wage' 
model. As a consequence of such non-linearity, the higher the rate of unemployment, the 
greater the degree of real rigidity that characterises the labour market (embedded in ý). 
Ceteris paribus, this will make the curve flatter and real responses to aggregate demand 
shocks larger, as shown for instance in Debelle and Laxton (1997). In an EMU context, the 
assumption of a non-linear Phillips curve implies that country-specific adjustments to a 
common shock hitting aggregate demand depend crucially on the relative initial position of 
the economy, not only on the parameter estimates of its short-run inflation-output trade-off. 
Consumption-saving behaviour in MM3 is based on the Blanchard (1985) model in which 
agents are assumed to have finite planning horizons, extended to allow for age-dependent 
hump-shaped earning profiles and credit constraints. Within this fi-amework, deficit 
financing and associated higher future tax burdens have important macroeconomic effects as 
private agents fail to fully internalise the implications of the government intertemporal 
budget constraint. Sigriificant departures from Ricardian equivalence - in the form of 
consumers 'excessively' discounting future taxes or being 'excessively' sensitive to 
disposable income - result in fiscal policy having large effects on the real economy both in 
the short run and in steady state. A summary of the system of equations that make up the 
consumption model in MM3 is provided below. 
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where O=f( a-', p, n, rst) and i= 1,2,3. 
Consumption is determined by the decisions of both permanent-income and disposable- 
income consumers (5.3). Credit constrained households choose their consumption based on 
current disposable income (&'). The parameters 4. in (5.4) represent the proportions of 
households constrained by current disposable income at each stage of life (that is, youth, 
middle age and retirement). Excess sensitivity of consumption characterising current-income 
consumers thus depends on the relative share of aggregate disposable income accruing to this 
category of households over the entire life cycle, rather than simply on the proportion of 
liquidity constrained consumers in the population. 
Unconstrained households make their decisions on the basis of permanent income (Cp), 
which consists of financial wealth and human wealth (5.5). Financial wealth equals the sum 
of domestic equities (WK), net foreign assets (NFA), government bonds (B) and real balances 
(MIP). Human wealth (H), measuring the present discount value of future disposable labour 
income, is expressed by (5.6) as the sum of three components, reflecting the hump-shaped 
profile of individual's income over the three stages of his lifetime. The marginal propensity 
to consume, denoted by 0, is estimated as a function of the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution (a") and subjective time preferences, under the assumption of constant relative 
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risk aversion utility (see Faruquee et al. (1997) for an exploration of the issue). The 
dynamics governing age-dependent human wealth (5.7) also reflect the concave profile of 
labour income over the life cycle. By introducing a finther positive wedge (given by aq) 
between the public rate (rs, ) and the private discount rate, beyond those resulting from finite 
planning horizons (p>O) and non-zero population growth (n), a consumption model 
embedding concave income profiles further enhances Ricardian non-neutralities. Namely, 
with disconnected generations, an increase in the fiscal deficit is not fully offset by an 
increase in private saving, as a share of debt burden falls on future generations whose current 
marginal propensity to save is zero. With life-cycle hump-shaped earnings and retirement, 
consumers further discount the impact of future tax liabilities, as the prospective tax base 
shifts to future generations with higher taxable income. In this way, the consequences of 
deficit financing in MM3 are clearly magnified. 
Parameter estimates of the MM3's consumption model are reported in table 5.2, with respect 
to the four European economies. These are generally common values obtained by pooled 
regression technique for all G-7 countries. The coefficients characterising the concave 
earning profiles (ds and P's) are instead obtained by using data on labour income and 
employment by age cohort only for the US, and then imposed to be invariant across all 
industrial countries. The only exceptions are given by the country-specific estimates of the 
proportion of credit-constrained consumers in each age cohort. The effects of partially 
removing credit market imperfection within EMU-3 shall also be explored. 
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5.4. RESULTS 
Results of a permanent 5 percent reduction in the EMU-3 money supply target on the main 
macroeconomic indicators for our four experiments are illustrated in Figures 5.1 to 5.5, with 
respect to the three major economies in the Euro area. 
5.4.1. A common moneta? ypolicy 
In Figure 5.1 we compare the macroeconomic effects of a5 percent reduction in the aggregate 
target of monetary supply across the three major European economies. This simulation 
represents the benchmark for further experiments as it allows us to assess cross-country 
asymmetries in the interest rate transmission of a common monetary shock under standard 
assumptions and model specification. 
As a result of an unanticipated and fiffly credible reduction on the EMU-3 money supply target, 
the initial money stock in the economy is judged to be excessive; an increase in the common 
interest rate is thus engineered to eventuafly restore equilibrium in the money market. %ile the 
common nominal interest rate rises by 1.4 percentage points in the fix-st year, the corresponding 
fall in country-specific price level ranges between 0.5 and 1.5 percent, owing to the price 
stickiness characterising MM3. The forward-looking behaviour of the exchange rate yields an 
immediate appreciation of its nominal rate on the order of 6 percent, since the new target for 
money is fully credible and lower prices are to be expected in the future. The tightening of 
monetary conditions depresses aggregate demand and drives unemployment above its natural 
level. The combined effect of the slowdown in nominal GNP and higher nominal short-term 
interest rate worsen debt burdens. To meet intertemporal government constraints, tax rates are 
adjusted upwards so that disposable income falls, thereby inducing finther reductions in current 
consumption. As prices and money adjust to the new target, interest rate moves back to base and 
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EMU-3 conversion rates 
Germany France Italy 
DM 1 3.35 990 
Euro 1.95583 6.55957 1936.27 
Furthermore, to introduce an ECB in charge of a common monetary policy, we replace the 
German interest rate with a common rate driven by a reaction function containing the same 
parameters as the old German reaction function (i. e. with a feedback parameter on deviations 
from money target equals to 0.333 and zero weight on any other target), but with European 
level variables for money supply and target money supply. These are given by the sums of 
their three national counterparts. Hence, short-term interest rate adjusts to accommodate 
deviations of the European money stock from its supply target, according to the following 
monetary rule: 
rs, = rs, _, - 
0) log 
JU2 
IOWPIU) 
(5.8) 
where oj is the feedback parameter and u2 is the (identical) interest elasticity of money 
demand in each of the EMU-3 economies. Jointly estimated money demand equations relate 
the logarithm of real money balances to the logarithm of real domestic absorption and the 
short-term interest rate, 
log 
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with P2 = -0.0054 and /4 = 0.789 for all industrial countriesi. Conversely, po differs across 
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economies so that, in steady-state, domestic stocks of money as proportion of nominal GNP are 
consistent with national governments budgetary stances, under preassigned money growth and 
nominal interest rate. 
National fiscal stances are governed in MM3 by identical reaction functions with imposed 
parameters. Specifying fiscal closure rules enforcing government's intertemporal budget 
constraint is nowadays commonly recognised as an essential requirement in large-scale models 
(Mitchell et. al, 2000). Their inclusion is intended to preclude the possibility of explosive 
solutions in which debt grows boundless as proportion of nominal GNP, thereby ensuring 
consistency of the theoretical structure of the model in the long run. Moreover, if rational 
expectations are incorporated, as it is in MM3, then sensible long-run properties are necessary to 
warrant also a plausible short-run behaviour (Mitchell et aL, 2000). MM3 is characterised by the 
following moving-average forward-looking tax rules: 
tt 
2+ 
-r(b - I tt+i 5 i=-2 
(5.10) 
where t, is the average tax rate, -r is the feedback parameter, identically equal to 0.2, b denotes 
country-specific debt-to-GNP ratios and !ý the corresponding desired path. The target value for 
any debt ratio is throughout assumed to be consistent with its steady-state value. It should be 
noticed that such forward-looking moving average tax rule has the interesting feature of 
accommodating both past and future expected deviations of debt ratios from target. This seems 
to extend the conceptual fi-amework traditionally characterising monetary policy to fiscal policy. 
Such assumption does not reflect a complete lack of realism (The Economist, 1999). However, 
given that MM3 features a contemporaneous monetary reaction function, this implies that fiscal 
authority moves fir-st, while central bank is forced to take action to achieve its target. The matter 
is likely to be crucial to assess the short-run responses to permanent shocks to budget deficit. 
The first step to shed light on the fiscal dimension of monetary policy within EMU, is 
understanding the long-run implications of public deficit financing. Let us consider the system 
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of equations comprising the tax rule (5.10), the intertemporal. government budget constraint 
(5.11) and the definitional identity for deficit financing (5.12): 
rB, -, + 
(Gt - TI) (5.11) 
AB, + äM, 
where D, denotes public deficit and (G , -T t) is the primary deficit (all the variables are 
expressed in nominal terms). Public deficit can be financed either by issuing new bonds (, dB, ) or 
by printing money (AM, ). In MM3, money growth is uniquely determined by country-specific 
changes in money demand. We will initially simulate an EMU-3 under such assumption. Later, 
we will consider the case where money creation is centralised in the hands of the ECB, and 
money growth reflects changes in the European aggregate. 
The stability properties of the two-equation system (5.10)-(5.11) can be described by the 
implied fifth-order difference equations for t,, 2 for each of the three countries. In all the cases, 
stability is ensured by the existence of two roots lying inside the unit circle; the existence of a 
complex conjugate pair outside the unit circle implies that adjustment trajectories for debt ratios 
are overall characterised by damped oscillations. However, because money stocks and primary 
surplus ratios to non-dnal GNP differ in equilibrium across the EMU-3 countries, their dynamics 
are correspondingly dissimilar, with Germany exhibiting the largest fluctuations as its roots get 
closer to the unit circle. To derive mutually consistent steady-state values for debt, primary 
surplus and money stock ratios in each country, we use the long-run solution of the system 
(5.1l)-(5.12). This is given by: 
B+M 1B 79- 
py -ýF jF 5. PY 
177 1 
(5.13) 
where F is the steady-state nominal rate on government bonds, ýF denotes steady-state inflation 
and ?T is the corresponding real growth rate, so jF g yields equilibrium money growth. Results 
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are surnmansed in table 5.3. It should be noticed, first, that the equilibrium budgetary stances 
are presumed to differ significantly across the EMU countries. 
Second, and more strikingly, MM3 assumes that a country like Italy will never be able to meet 
Maastricht requirements, by permanentýv running a deficit in excess of 3 percent of GNP and 
maintaining a debt-to-GNP ratio above 89 percent. It is worth noticing that this is indeed a 
perfectly sustainable fiscal policy, under the assumption that the country is able to run a 
permanent primary surplus of 1.73 percent and given the steady-state parametensation of the 
model. However, its implications for the conduct of a common monetary policy are unlikely to 
be negligible. We can in fact show that, without a strict surveillance of medium-terin fiscal 
positions, differences in the transmission of a common monetary shock across the Euro area can 
be seriously large, thereby undermining the stability of the Monetary Union itself. 
Table 5.3: Country-specific steady-state budgetary positions 
Germany France Italy UK 
Debt 32.7 42.2 89.3 30.3 
Money 9.27 3.96 9.62 3.90 
Deficit 1.98 2.18 4.68 1.62 
Primary surplus 0.363 0.846 1.73 0.558 
Total taxes 20.9 21.6 19.1 20.9 
Government spending 20.6 20.7 17.4 20.4 
Values are expressed as percentage to nominal GNP 
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5.3. THE SWULATION EXPERIMENT 
5.3.1. The baseline scenario 
Table 5.4 shows the baseline forecast for a set of key macroeconomic variables for the four 
European countries belonging to the G-7 group, based on projections in the IMF's annual report 
World Economic Outlook for 1998. Precisely, projections run forward 21 years from 1999. 
Those over the next 4 years are shown in the second panel of the table. The last column shows 
medium-to-long term projections that can be interpreted as abstracting from effects of business 
cycle variations and, in MM3, these reflect the steady-state levels or growth rates of the relevant 
variables. Since the aim of our chapter is to identify asymmetric transmissions within EMU 
owing to country-specific differences in the structure of their economy, rather than to their 
initial position in the business cycle, we decided to simulate the model starting from 2020, that 
is from an equilibrium position. The model is further solved sufficiently far ahead, to 2 100, so 
as to remove any influence of the terminal conditions on our simulation results. For model- 
consistent expectation variables are solved to be equal to the projected outcome for the relevant 
horizon, the World Economic Outlook baseline defines our conditioning information set. 
In 1998, growth in the Euro area has been weak (averaging 2.64 percent) and unemployment 
has continued the trend rise that started in the 1970s (peaking at 11.8 percent). In particular, in 
Gennany the need for fiscal consolidation after the heavy costs of unification has played a 
major role in slowing recovery, although this is thought to gain strength, reaching its peak of 3.1 
percent in year 2000. In France, growth performance looks more vigorous than in Germany and 
Italy for two main reasons. First, the degree of fiscal consolidation in France has been less than 
in the other countries over the 1990s. Second, labour market policies have been more effective, 
thereby boosting France's competitiveness within the Euro area and expected to reduce 
unemployment by about 2.9% over the period 1998-2002. Economic growth in Italy has been 
the weakest among Europe's major economies at the end of the 1990s, in part reflecting the 
The Fiscal Dimension of a Common Monetary Policy 126 
particularly tight fiscal policies that have been needed. Perspective entry to EMU is assumed to 
reduce both inflation and short-term interest rate by 0.3 percentage points by 2002. Outside the 
Euro, area, UK seems to experience higher inflation rates (on the order of 2.7 percent in 1998) 
while keeping unemployment at outstandingly low levels (5 percent). This certainly reflects the 
lower NAIRU and the higher degree of flexibility characterising UK labour market compared 
with the rest of Europe (see also table 5.1). 
With respect to the medium-term forecasts, potential output growth rates are assumed to be on 
the order of 2.2 percent in all the G-7 countries. Inflation is assumed to stabilise at 2.7 percent in 
the whole industrialised world. As a result, money grows in steady state at an annual rate of 4.96 
percent. The equilibrium real short-term interest rate is 5.34 percent, while the corresponding 
long-run rate is assumed to be 103 basis points lower. The steady-state real rate on government 
bonds is given by the average of short- and long-term rates (that is 4.83 percent). 
Such steady-state values represent the information set upon which our simulation experiments 
will be conditioned. This implies that our assessment of fiscal policy sustainability, just to 
mention one example, that is our derivation of equilibrium national budgetary stances according 
to (5.13), is constructed on the implicit assumption that these values are given and never 
believed to change. 
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Table 5.4: MM3 baseline forecasts 
1998 1999 
Forecasts 
2000 2001 2002 
Steady 
state 
Germany 
Inflation rate 1.55 1.70 1.70 1.74 1.70 2.7 
Real growth 2.79 2.98 3.10 2.78 2.49 2.2 
Money growth 4.42 4.73 4.85 4.55 4.96 4.96 
Short-term interest rate 3.8 4.7 5.1 5.1 5.1 8.04 
Long-term interest rate 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.4 7.01 
Unemployment rate 11.16 10.55 9.95 9.42 8.92 8.52 
France 
Mation rate 1.17 1.80 1.80 1.80 1.80 2.7 
Real growth 2.89 3.07 3.18 3.19 3.19 2.2 
Money growth 3.98 4.80 4.93 4.94 4.96 4.96 
Short-term interest rate 3.98 4.85 5.3 5.3 5.3 8.04 
Long-term interest rate 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.3 6.3 7.01 
Unemployment rate 12.30 11.59 10.87 10.16 9.43 9.10 
Italy 
Inflation rate 2.30 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.7 
Real growth 2.25 3.05 3.11 2.90 2.74 2.2 
Money growth 4.41 4.90 5.00 4.82 4.96 4.96 
Short-term interest rate 6 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 8.04 
Long-term interest rate 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 7.01 
Unemployment rate 11.94 11.65 11.06 10.46 9.74 9.68 
United Kingdom 
Inflation rate 2.71 2.52 2.55 2.57 2.58 2.7 
Real growth 2.50 2.34 2.23 2.18 2.14 2.2 
Money growth 5.39 4.97 5.00 4.98 4.96 4.96 
Short-term interest rate 7 7 7 6.5 6.5 8.04 
Long-term interest rate 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.01 
Unemployment rate 5.04 5 5 5 5 6.25 
I Values are expressed in percentage points 
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5.3.2. The design 
The aim of our analysis is primarily to show that differences in national economies' budgetary 
positions can generate significant asymmetries in the transmission of a common monetary shock 
in the context of an Economic and Monetary Union among Germany, France and Italy. In the 
light of this we simulate a permanent 5 percent reduction in the EMU-3 money supply target, 
under the assumption that a fully independent ECB is adjusting short-term policy rate to reduce 
aggregate money supply to the new target. In the face of a permanent and fully credible 
deflationary shock, the money Euro aggregate in equilibrium decreases by 5% with prices 
adjusting one for one with the reduction in money supply (for theoretical analysis see Ball, 
1994). This experiment represents our benchmark scenario. It permits us only to evaluate the 
relevance of cross-country asynchronies in adjustments to a common monetary shock. Under 
these circumstances, asymmetries are almost entirely driven by dissimilarities in the structure of 
national labour markets, which is reflected in the model by country-specific parameterisation of 
short-run inflation-output relationships. To show that, in a world where bonds and money are 
counted as net wealth, the primary source of cross-country heterogeneity in response to a 
common monetary shock is the differences in national economies' budgetary positions, we must 
repeat the same experiment under sensible alternative assumptions, namely: 
*a common rate of money financing across the three countries, as a result of the 
centralisation of seigniorage revenues under EMU; 
a strict enforcement of the SGP, ensuring that Maastricht criteria will be met by all 
European countries, at least in steady state; 
e more efficient credit markets all over the Euro area. 
Contrary to country-specific adjustments to an interest-rate transmitted monetary shock-, wealth 
effects are likely to be ever-lasting, as they reflect dissimilarities in national fiscal stances which 
are expected to be maintained in equilibrium. Given that static homogeneity is an inherent 
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feature of MM3, any evidence of long-run real effects following a pennanent reduction in 
money supply is then to be associated with the so-called 'fiscal dimension' of monetary policy. 
Repeating the deflation experiment under the above-mentioned alternative scenarios will thus 
allow us to determine (i) the sources of asymmetric adjustments to a common monetary shock, 
(ii) the transmission channels operating in each case, (iii) the relative magnitude of short- and 
long-term responses across European countries. 
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5.4. RESULTS 
Results of a permanent 5 percent reduction in the EMU-3 money supply target on the main 
macroeconomic indicators for our four experiments are illustrated in Figures 5.1 to 5.5, with 
respect to the three major economies in the Euro area. 
A common monetarypolicy 
In Figure 5.1 we compare the macroeconomic effects of a5 percent reduction in the aggregate 
target of monetary supply across the three major European economies. This simulation 
represents the benchmark for further experiments as it allows us to assess cross-country 
asymmetries in the interest rate transmission of a common monetary shock under standard 
assumptions and model specification. 
As a result of an unanticipated and fully credible reduction on the EMU-3 money supply target, 
the initial money stock in the economy is judged to be excessive; an increase in the common 
interest rate is thus engineered to eventually restore equilibrium in the money market. While the 
common nominal interest rate rises by 1.4 percentage points in the first year, the corresponding 
fall in country-specific price level ranges between 0.5 and 1.5 percent, owing to the price 
stickiness characterising MM3. The forward-looking behaviour of the exchange rate yields an 
immediate appreciation of its nominal rate on the order of 6 percent, since the new target for 
money is fully credible and lower prices are to be expected in the future. The tightening of 
monetary conditions depresses aggregate demand and drives unemployment above its natural 
level. The combined effect of the slowdown in nominal GNP and higher nominal short-term 
interest rate worsen debt burdens. To meet interternporal government constraints, tax rates are 
adjusted upwards so that disposable income falls, thereby inducing finther reductions in current 
consumption. As prices and money adjust to the new target, interest rate moves back to base and 
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recession starts being reabsorbed. In the long run, prices are 5 percent below base whereas 
nominal exchange rate is 5 percent higher. Inflation and real variables move back to their pre- 
shock values. 
Though such adjustment process characterises all EMU-3 economies, responses to a common 
monetary shock differ across countries with respect to both size and persistence. Differences in 
the amplitude of responses are primarily due to: 
(a) differences in the degree of nominal and real rigidity in national labour markets, 
determining the extent to which inflation responds to its own future expected changes and 
demand conditions in each economy; 
(b) differences in national debt stocks, as debt burdens will be proportionally boosted in the 
face of an identical increase in the nominal interest rate. 
Let first focus on Italian adjusments, as they seem to differ substantially from those of the other 
EU countries considered. Prices are by far less sticky, with an immediate fall by 1.5 percent on 
announcement of the new monetary target. This is explained, in part, by the high degree of 
nominal flexibility characterising its short-run expectations augmented Phillips curve (given by 
the estimate of ic in equation (5.2) reported in table 5.1), and in part by the assumption, 
embedded in 6,, that the Italian labour market consists only of rational agents (or, equally, that 
there exists an immediate learning about future price inflation). As prices fall sharply, the real 
value of Italian public debt stock boosts. The higher (nominal) debt service induced by the 
endogenous increase in common interest rate will move finther upwards the debt ratio in 
proportion to baseline GNP. As a fact, the corresponding Italian response is about three times as 
large as in the other EU countries in the face of a common shock. Analogously, the adjustment 
in the average tax rate needed in Italy to ensure long-run fiscal policy sustainability is about 2.2 
percentage points, while a mere 0.8 percentage-point increase is sufficient to guarantee the same 
result in the other EMU-3 economies. As the fiscal closure rule is forward-looking, current tax 
rates overreact to accommodate both current and future deviations of the debt ratio from target. 
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Given the strong presence of liquidity constrained households featuring the model, consumption 
is extremely sensitive to changes in disposable income. In this way, effects of a common 
monetary shock on consumption and, thereby, on GNP components, appear to be significantly 
larger for Italy than for any other country of the Euro area. Interestingly, such large swings in 
real output are not reflected in correspondingly larger fluctuations in Italian unemployment. 
This can be explained by the fact that the parameter estimate on the output gap (pl) in the 
Okun's law (5.1) is remarkably low for Italy. This is likely to shelter labour market conditions 
from the consistent fall of real output from potential following the monetary shock. 
As far as Germany and France are concerned, asymmetries in the transmission of a common 
shock are much less noticeable, as their debt stocks in proportion to GNP are on the same order 
of magnitude (32.7 and 42.2 percent, respectively) and substantially lower than the Italian debt 
ratio. Nonetheless, for Germany, where significant real and nominal rigidities characterise the 
short-run inflation-output relationship (compare yand ic in table S. 1), changes in aggregate 
demand show more persistent effects on real economic activity and unemployment than in any 
other European country. A slightly slower debt reabsorbtion can also be observed in Gerniany, 
owing to the intrinsic dynamics characterising its fiscal side (recall section 1). 
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Figure 5.1: Deflation experiment within EMU-3 - Reducing aggregate money target by 5% 
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5.4.2. A common degree of debt monelisation 
134 
Under the default scenario, changes in money financing of national government deficits 
correspond to country- spec i fic changes in money demand. However, as money creation 
under EMU is centralised in the hands of the ECB, variations in the degree of money 
financing should rather reflect changes in the European money aggregate. For each of the 
three EMU economies considered here we, hence, replace (5.12) with: 
M EMU 
(PY) i 
t Dj =ABj +A ttt (PY) ti 
(5.14) 
The last term on the RHS of (5.14) represents tile weight of countryj's norninal GNP on the 
European aggregate and is required to ensure consistency with MM3 terminal conditions for 
money growth. 
What distinguishes this scenario from the previous one is tile fiscal dimension of the 
common monetary shock which is transmitted to national economies via changes in their 
degree of debt monetisation. Under the previous scenario, money balances only adjusted 
endogenously in response to changes in the common interest rate. However, their pre-shock 
equilibrium levels were eventually restored as money is neutral in MM3. Here we assume 
that changes in the monetary aggregate have a direct impact on tile fiscal stance, inasmuch as 
they are mirrored by variations in the degree of money financing. Under these circumstances, 
a permanent shock to the EMU-3 money target may turn into apermanent shock to national 
fiscal deficits, if having common money supply happens to alter country-specific seigniorage 
revenues in equilibrium. This is always true if tile steady-state for (tile inverse of) money 
velocity is allowed to vary across countries. In fact, within EMU, where 
MEMU Mj holds, the corresponding new equilibria for seigniorage revenues in 
proportion of GNP will be given by 
AMEMU MEMU 
rather than by country-specific MEMU EpjYj 
i 
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AM. M. 
values ! ý- j. It follows that, under EMU, country-specific steady-state fiscal stances m PY. iiJ 
must also cliange, as shown by the modified long-run solution of the systern (5.1l)-(5.14): 
B MEMU IB[F 
+(G-T) (5.15) PY IP ýF PY ýF PY jyj 
In particular, given the kind of shock simulated in the experiment, the rate of money growth 
remains constant at 4.96 percent in the new equilibrium. However, steady-state money bases 
vary as a simple consequence of aggregating across national money stocks. It follows that 
the more dissimilar expected national money ratios are, tile more evident (long-run) 
asymmetries in tile transmission of tile monetary shock will be. 
Under the current set-up, inherent mechanisms of transmission offiscal policy shocks are at 
work alongside tile above-mentioned short-run interest rate adjustments. In this respect, 
steady-state implications of permanent shocks to budget deficit are mainly driven by the 
degree of "non-Ricardianess" embodied in the model. This strictly depends on the degree to 
which consurners are assumed to count government bonds as net wealth. In MM3, as we 
have noticed before, households adjust their savings by only part of tile higher future tax 
burden associated with permanently higher government debt. Actually, agents treat a portion 
of government bonds as net wealth because they excessively discount tile future higher tax 
liabilities necessary to meet the intertemporal budget constraint. Both disconnectness of 
today's generations from future ones and life-cycle considerations imply that permanently 
higher level of primary deficits will be associated with a tendency to overconsurne current 
resources. This will induce higher real interest rates and, eventually, lower capital stock and 
lower sustainable levels of real income. The reverse is true in case of permanent reductions 
in primary deficits. 
The Fiscal Dimension of a Common Monetary Policy 136 
Results for this experiment are illustrated in Figures 5.2 to 5.4, for Germany, France and 
Italy, respectively. Their post-shock equilibria for money ratios are reported in table 5.3. The 
corresponding common post-shock steady-state value is, instead, 7.78 per cent. This implies 
that whereas a country like Germany will face a permanent reduction in money financing, a 
country like France will enjoy an increase in seigniorage revenues. The comparison between 
the cases of Germany and France is striking. Though their responses keep being similar in 
the order of magnitude, their adjustment paths and steady-state values with respect to 
consumers' expenditure differ here substantially. As Germany is in deed experiencing a 
permanent reduction in money financing with unchanged debt and spending ratios in tile face 
of the common monetary shock, a consistently higher primary surplus is expected to 
characterise its new equilibriUM2. Long-run responses for Italy are similar to those for 
Germany as their initial money ratios do not differ significantly. Tile cases of Germany and 
Italy mimic, indeed, permanent fiscal contraction (on this point see also tile appendix). As 
such, for these two countries, having a common money supply is likely to bring about a 
lower equilibrium level of consumption (approximately 0.1 percent) and higher new steady- 
state values for current account balance and real GNP (on the order of 0.2 and 0.3 percent, 
respectively), as plotted in Figures 5.2 and 5.4. 
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Figure 5.2: GERMANY - Deflation experiment within EMU-3 under common 
seigniorage revenues 
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Figure 5.3: FRANCE - Deflation experiment within EMU-3 under common 
seigniorage revenues 
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Figure 5.4: ITAILY - Deflation experiment within EMU-3 under common seigniorage 
revenues 
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As it is evident from the consumption plot in Figure S. 3, conclusions are diametrically 
opposite in the case of France, where a deflationary shock combines its effects with those of 
an implicit pemanent fiscal expansion. The case of France reflects, therefore, all the long- 
lasting distorsionary effects explained above. Namely, consumption rises in equilibrium by 
some O. OS percent, current account balance shrinks by approximately 0.1 percent, with a fall 
in steady-state GNP on the order of 0.15 percent. 
To check that such long-run real effects emerge as a mere consequence of wealth 
redistribution and not because of money non-neutralities, one should notice that, at aggregate 
European level, nominal interest rate eventually comes back to base and so does real 
exchange rate. It should be clear therefore that, in a model in which bonds and money are 
counted as net wealth, the primary source of cross-country heterogeneity in response to a 
common monetary shock is the differences in national economies' budgetary positions. 
Centralising money supply seems then to induce long-term cross-border wealth 
redistribution in response to a common monetary shock, unless accompanied by offsetting 
country-specific corrections in their debt stocks. This is however very unlikely to happen in 
practice, as both the degree of international policy coordination and the cost of information 
involved would be ridicolously high. 
5.4.3. Strict enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact 
What if the World Economic Outlook baseline forecasts embodied the assumption of a strict 
enforcement of the SGP on the part of Italy? As already shown by Winckler et aL (1998), 
Maastricht criteria are unlikely to constitute either a necessary or a sufficient condition for 
the sustainability of a deficit-debt pair. The, implicit assumption embodied in MM3 baseline 
forecasts - i. e. Italy will be running a permanent deficit of 4.7 percent of GNP while 
maintaining a debt-to-GNP ratio above 89 percent - is, as a fact, pointing to the same 
conclusion. In spite of these considerations, in the current simulation experiment we assume 
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that Italy will be forced, somehow, to maintain its permanent deficit ratio at 3 percent. This 
is done by reconstructing the baseline in a consistent manner. The new steady-state deficit 
ratio can be sustained at constant money and spending ratios, if the debt ratio is assumed to 
converge to 53.87 percent. As we limit ourselves to re-calculate the residuals of fiscal 
reaction functions, the long-run Italian response in tax rate denotes the reduction in the 
primary surplus that Italy can enjoy in the new steady state (see appendix). In line with the 
previous scenario, we keep assuming that money financing is centralised in the hands of the 
ECB. 
In Figure 5.5 the responses to the deflationary shock triggered by the ECB, under the implicit 
assumptions that Italian debt-GNP ratio is reduced in steady state by more than 30 percent, 
are denoted with "SGP" (in other words, while the baseline value for the debt ratio response 
is 89.3 under the 'mnu3' and the 'conunon monetisation' scenario, it is in fact reduced to 
53.9 under 'SGP'). The model specification is the same as in the 'common monetisation' 
experiment. 
Given the relevance of the shock and the degree of Ricardian non-neutralities in MM3, it is 
not surprising that the new steady state for consumption is lower than the initial equilibrium 
value by I percent of baseline GNP. As a result of the reduction in government bonds, the 
current account surplus in the new equilibrium is higher by 1.5 percent of baseline GNP, 
with real output rising in equilibrium by more than 2 percent. Contrary to the entire set of 
results obtained so far, under this scenario the new equilibrium features a slight appreciation 
of the Euro in real terms and a drop in Euro-wide real interest rates. This is because we are 
simulating here a common monetary shock coupled with an asymmetric permanent reduction 
in the Italian government debt. Steady-state nominal interest rate is hence endogenously 
reduced to re-equilibrate international saving and investment, whilst inflation remains 
neutral. 
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Simulation confirms, therefore, that there exist ever-lasting benefits from strict enforcement 
of the SGP, with cross-border positive spillovers. However, short-run adjustment to the new 
steady state appears to be remarkably costly for a country like Italy. This is due to the fact 
that any effect of sizeable fiscal consolidation must be regarded as additional to the 
tightening in monetary conditions following the ECB deflationary shock. Under this scenario 
inflation falls in the first year by more than 2 percent with a dm=tic recession in output on 
the order of over 5 percent and a rise in unemployment of over one percentage point. 
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Figure 5.5: ITAILY - Deflation experiment within EMU-3 under common seigniorage 
revenues and strict enforcement of the SGP 
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5.4.4. Increasing efficiency in credit market 
In this final experiment, we remove the assumption that the degree of efficiency in credit 
markets differs across European economies. Namely, we exogenously reduce the share of 
credit constrained consumers at any li fe stage to 60 percent, all over Europe. This is intended 
to reduce both 'excess sensitivity' of consumption to income, thereby eliminating a potential 
source of Ricardian non-neutrality, and the degree of asymmetry in the structures of the 
European economies. The same deflationary shock to the EMU-3 monetary aggregate is then 
simulated under the joint assumption of common seigniorage revenues and strict 
enforcement of the SGP on the part of Italy. Results (reported in Figure 5.6 for Italy only) 
are thereby directly comparable with those from the 'SGP' experiment. Even limiting our 
attention to the Italian credit market, which was originally characterised by the highest share 
of liquidity-constrained consumers, responses look essentially unchanged. This can be 
explained by the fact that cross-country asymmetries in monetary transmission are found to 
be mainly driven by long-run (financial) wealth effects. Financial wealth is relevant for 
unconstrained permanent-income households, whose intertemporal consumption-saving 
choices are forward-looking and independent of changes in current disposable income. In 
this respect, it is the rate of time preference, that is the wedge between private and market 
discount rate, that matters. Reducing excess sensitivity of consumption seems to produce (if 
any) only short-term effects on consumption. We conclude that increasing efficiency in 
credit market is unlikely to be very effective in reducing adverse policy non-neutralities 
induced by the shrinkage in deficit financing associated with both common degree of money 
financing and strict enforcement of the SGP. Besides, different degrees of efficiency 
characterising European credit markets per se do not appear to play a major role in 
explaining cross-country heterogeneity in monetary transmission. 
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Figure 5.6: ITAILY - Deflation experiment within EMU-3 under common seigniorage 
revenues, strict enforcement of the SGP and increased efficiency in credit market 
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5.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Despite convergence pressures, significant differences in structures and responsiveness to 
policy changes are still acknowledged across EMU member states. This chapter provides a 
model-based quantitative exploration of the effects of a common monetary stance when 
neither the degree of labour markets' rigidity nor the level of public debt ratios is expected to 
converge across countries. It shows that, under these circumstances, country-specific short- 
run adjustments to changes in European monetary aggregates will differ in both size and 
persistence. If the, medium-to-long term money/debt composition of national deficits 
financing is anticipated to remain different across EMU economies, then ever-lasting effects 
from cross-border wealth redistribution are, also likely to arise. 
It is certainly possible to argue that, given the presence of short-run constraints, different 
degrees of rigidity in country-specific inflation-outpui relationships are alone stifficient to 
undermine synchronisation in their business cycle in the face of a common monetary shock. 
This certainly raises the question whether this is also a necessary condition for symmetric 
monetary responses, that is whether labour market discipline is able to ensure convergence 
on its own. However, as responsiveness to monetary changes is found to be greater - ceteris 
pafibus - in high-debt countries, increased nominal and real flexibility in their labour 
markets might well trigger further booms and busts in the face monetary shocks, rather than 
favour macroeconomic stabilisation. As the matter carries important implications for the 
order in which structural reforms in these countries need to be undertaken, it certainly calls 
for ftuther investigation. 
Nonetheless, the analysis of the differences in the structure of European economies does not 
end with labour market considerations. MacLennan et al. (1998), for instance, stress how 
institutional differences in financial and housing markets across EMU countries may indeed 
constitute barriers to convergence and increase the potential for financial instability within 
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the Union. Sensitivity analysis to alternative calibrations of the model and related changes in 
model specification would then also be of interest for further research on the issue. In fact, 
though in MM3 cross-country differences in the behaviour of agents are generally reflected 
in country-specific parameter calibration, this is not always the case. For example, in the 
consumption function MM3 employs pooled estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution, which is hence constrained to be the same across G-7 countries. It is 
unanimously recognised. how critical such a parameter is in affecting the degree of debt non- 
neutralities, since it determines the sensitivity of consumption to changes in the monetary 
policy instrument. As it is allowed to vary across economies, further asymmetries in 
monetary transmission are also likely to arise. Analogous considerations apply with respect 
to the concave earnings profiles, which are believed to portray life-cycle consumers' labour 
income. The related coefficients are estimated using data on labour income and employment 
by age only for the United States and are then imposed to be invariant across all the other 
countries. Jappelli and Pagano (1989), however, do not find any support for cross-country 
homogeneity in this regard. . Once again, country-specific' effects of debt stabilisation on 
consumption-saving ehaviour should then be re-assessed on the basis of sounder parameter 
estimates of the model. 
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APPENDIX 
A simple version of MM3's fiscal submodel (5.10)-(5.1l)-(5.12) is used in this appendix to 
illustrate analytically the theoretical underpinnings of the simulation results discussed in 
sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3. While the intertempoml budget constraint (5.1l)-(5.12) is 
unchanged, the fiscal reaction function in (5.10) is here simplified to a tax difference rule 
responding to current deviations of the debt ratio from target. 
ABt + AMt = rtBt-, + (pt, -Tt ) 
Att =, r(bt -i; 
) 
(A.! ) 
(A. 2) 
In (A. 2) t, denotes the average tax rate, b, the debt ratio and b the corresponding target 
value. 
Recalling from Section 5.2 that all the variables in (A. 1) are expressed in nominal terms, we 
can re-define nominal total taxes, nominal public debt and high-powered money as ratio to 
nominal GDP, so that: 
T 
tt a 
(-ý- )t 
; bt aB 
)t 
; mt aM y py py t 
Moreover, growth rates are denoted as follows: 
x= pt ; g= Yt ; u= 
mt 
Pt-, yt_, m t-1 
with a= mg at any time, and kept constant throughout3. Under the innocuous assumption 
of constancy of government spending, further normalised to zero, (G / PY)t =k=0, t, also 
indicates the primary surplus and (A. 2) its corresponding motion law. Thus, dividing (A. 1) 
by PY, and re-an-anging, we obtain the following systmn of difference equations: 
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i; ) (A. 4) 
By limiting our attention to the dynamics of (b,, t) pairs, while assuming any other 
macroeconomic variable as given, we rule out by construction Sargent and Wallace's (19 8 1) 
Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic. The monetary authority enjoys here the first mover 
advantage (the so called role of Stackelberg leader), knowing that the fiscal authority will 
react by adequately adjusting its policy. This fi-amework is quite plausible for EMU 
countries as the European Central Bank is independent and cares about price stability 
(thereby targeting ;r or 0), while Maastricht criteria should prevent fiscal agencies to run 
excessive deficits. However, it can be shown that, even under these circumstances, monetary 
policy may be required to step in and a monetary policy switch to inflationary policy may be 
needed to ensure debt stabilisation. 
Let us consider the two Scenarios we referred to in section 5.4.2 and 5.4.3. Under the first 
scenario, m, is meant to fall exogenously to a lower level; under the'second scenario, an 
institutional arrangement such as the SGP is somehow enforced and i; is, thereby, 
correspondingly reduced. We can show that, in both cases, the likelihood of unsustainable 
fiscal pairs increases. The phase diagram of equations (A. 3)-(A. 4) under the first scenario is 
drawn in Figure 5.7, whereas the second scenario is depicted in Figure 5.8. 
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Figure 5.7: Implications of common seigniorage revenues for Germany and Italy: 
phase diagram 
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Point E is the steady state. In this position, debt is at its target level 6, so that there is no 
tendency for taxes to move, while the primary surplus necessary to stabilise b without 
creating extra inflation, given an interest rate r and a growth rate g, is determined by: 
(A. 5) 
The equilibrium is a saddle point with an upward sloped stable manifold identified by the 
following eigenvector: 
I+a-r+V(-I+a-r)' -4a(l+rý 
2(l + rý 
(A. 6) 
Any pair (bo, to) below it represents an unsustainable fiscal stance: in these initial position the 
speed of fiscal adjustment T is too low so that b is reached before the primary surplus has 
been sufficiently increased. An inflation target z (or, equally, a target for the debt ratio 
6) is 
i --0 ý, =a 
The Fiscal Dimension of a Common Monetary Policy 1 
151 
likely to be eventually abandoned. The slope of the stable arm detem-dnes, therefore, the 
sustainability condition of national fiscal stances. The Mgher the speed of fiscal adjustment, 
r, the steeper is the saddlepath and the more pairs (bo, to) are sustainable. 
Let assume a permanent fall in money balances as percentage of GDP, due either to an 
exogenous increase in money velocity or to cross-border wealth redistribution following 
centralisation of European seigniorage revenues. Such a shock will shift upwards the 
intercept of the locus 6=0 by (a-l)/atimes the change in money balances (see Figure 5.7). 
The new steady state (E, ) will thus be characterised by the same target for debt-to-GDP ratio 
as in E, though featuring a proportionally higher primary surplus. Moving upwards the 
equilibrium position brings about a similar shift of the stable manifold. As a result of the 
reduction in m,, every debt-primary surplus pair lying above the old stable arm but below the 
new one becomes suddenly unsustainable. To rule out the possibility of an accommodating 
monetary policy we need to assume that the new fiscal target (i. e. the higher equilibrum level 
of taxation) is fully credible, so that the economy will immediately jump onto the new stable 
path as the policy change is announced. This is basically the assumption implicit in the 
simulation results presented in section 5.4. 
Consider now the case of an exogenous reduction in the debt-to-GDP target (iý), as 
visualised. in Figure 5.8. According to (A. 5), under the new steady-state EsGp, the primary 
surplus necessary to stabilise b without creating extra inflation will also be lower than under 
the initial equilibrium position E. Nonetheless, as the slope of the saddlepath is greater than 
that of the locus 6 =0 (compare A. 5 with A. 6), a movement of the steady state from E to 
EsGp will also shift the stable manifold upwards. Hence, as it was the case under the previous 
scenario, strict enforcement of the SGP criteria increases the likelihood of unsustainable 
fiscal pairs. Conclusions are, thus, analogous. 
Finally, it is interesting to notice that exogenous shocks to money base and debt target may 
have offietting effects on steady-state fiscal positions. Namely, given the reduction in money 
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base under the first scenario, it seems feasible (at least in theory) to counteract this shock 
through an increase in the objective of the fiscal authority, such as to bring the economy 
back on the old stable arm (although not towards the old equilibrium position itselo. 
Similarly, under the second scenario, given an exogenous reduction in the debt target, the 
economy could move back on the old stable manifold had the money base increased 
appropriately. 
Figure 5.8: Implications of enforcing SGP criteria for Italy: phase diagram 
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Chapter Six 
When is Labour Market 
Flexibility Welcome? More on 
Asymmetric'Policy Impacts in 
Europe 
6.1 RSTMODUCTION 
Since the Delors Report was published in April 1989, a lively debate has ensued among 
macromodelling groups about the costs and benefits of Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) in Europe. 
The first notable attempt to use empirically-based macromodels to evaluate the economic 
performance of EMU relative to an Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) with occasional 
realignments was made by the EC Commissioes study 'One market, one money', (1990). It 
used stochastic simulation of the IMF's MULTIMOD model to compare variability of output 
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and inflation under alternative exchange rate arrangements and concluded that EMU reduces 
average inflation variability (but at the cost of increased average output variability). Masson 
and Symansky (1992), using the same approach and model, do not find any strong evidence 
in favour of EMU over the alternative regime; on the other hand, they conclude that ERM is 
much less of a potential source of instability than implied by Minford and Rastogi (1990). 
Minford and Rastogi, also in a revised version with Hughes-Hallett (1993), using the 
Liverpool annual global model, argue that the best regime for EC countries would be floating 
with monetary policies co-ordinated either world-wide or within EC-coalition; the European 
Monetary System (EMS), instead, as it allows for realignments, would produce instability. 
Such initial debate mainly concentrated on two issues: (i) the gains from the elimination of 
transaction costs and exchange rate uncertainty, which turn out to depend crucially on the 
method of estimation of risk premia and the modelling of exchange-rate realignments under 
EMS; (ii) the costs of losing or pooling sovereignty, which are uniquely determined by the 
nominal and real rigidities present in the underlying model. 
More recently, the context of the analysis has changed dramatically. The debate among both 
economists and policy-makers has moved oný to how to make EMU work as a new 
macroeconomic structure. EMU institutional design was defined well before its official 
starting date, on I" January 1999. The statute of the European System of Central Banks 
singled out price stability as the primary goal of policy and made the ECB responsible for 
the stability of the payments and financial system. The Pact for Stability and Growth, agreed 
at the Amsterdam summit in the summer 1997, left fiscal decisions in the hands of eleven 
independent national authorities while endorsing continuing fiscal virtue. Nonetheless, a 
large degree of uncertainty still remains over what the macroeconomic structure of the new 
Europe should look like. The reaction function of the ECB is unknown and its target is 
unlikely to be published. The way in which the ECB board is likely to vote is also uncertain, 
thereby raising the concern that national interests might actually overcome a genuinely 
European perspectiv e. Country-specific fiscal reaction functions are equally unknown, with 
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the further crucial question about whether fiscal policies should be co-ordinated, not only 
among themselves but also with the actions of the monetary authority. 
The related macroeconomic literature is vast, but fails to reach agreement even on whether 
policy co-ordination is per se desirable. On theoretical grounds, harmonisation of monetary 
and national fiscal policies is generally welcomed, to prevent a sub-optimal mix of loose 
fiscal and tight monetary policies from leading to hard landings with seriously rising 
unemployment/welfare costs (Begg et aL, 1998; Allsopp and Vines, 1998; Demertzis et al., 
1999). Empirical studies, however, seem to suggest that the benefits from policy co- 
ordination are almost negligible (Oudiz and Sachs, 1984; Masson and Taylor, 1993). 
The picture remains blurred even if empirical scepticism is set aside. The yet-to-be-resolved 
issue then turns into how monetary, fiscal and supply-side policies should be co-ordinated 
across Euroland in order to favour achievement of Euro-wide policy stabilisation goals. On 
one side are those who argue that a European country which ties its monetary hand behind its 
back should retain fiscal flexibility as an instrument of adjustment. Eichengreen and 
Wyplosz (1998), for instance, suggest that there is a danger that the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure and SGP will limit counter-cyclical fiscal action, thereby threatening EU growth. 
On the other side are those who insist that lax enforcement of such institutional agreements 
is likely to bring greater pressure to bear on the European Central Bank. Under these 
circumstances, the credibility of the latter's commitment to price stability would be greatly 
lessened (Alesina and Grilli, 1992; Bolt, 1999). Another rationale for fiscal restraints is to 
internalise cross-border interest-rate spillovers. Within a monetary union, excessive debt 
financing in one country will raise the level of interest rate Europe-wide, unless international 
fiscal responsibility is enforced (Beetsma and Uhlig, 1999). 
Moreover, the objective of macroeconomic policy co-ordination in EMU is complicated by 
the evidence that EU member states show significant differences in structures and 
responsiveness to policy changes. MacLennan et al (1998) stress how institutional 
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differences across EU member states - which are at the origin of such different responses to 
common policy changes - may constitute barriers to convergence and increase the potential 
for financial instability within EMU, unless corrected. Using simulation of MULTIMOD 
Mark IH, we have shown in the previous chapter that possible asymmetries in monetary 
transnfission may convert a common monetary policy into different national outcomes; in 
particular, national budgetary positions are likely to be a primary source of long-lasting 
divergences. Hughes Hallett et aL (1998), via deterministic simulations of the Fair 
multicountry econometric model, point out that a common monetary policy can generate 
large country-specific effects. Dombush et aL (1998) use vector autoregression analysis to 
compute national responses to common and simultaneous changes in interest rates (for a 
similar approach see also Gerlach and Smets, 1995, and De Bondt, 2000). Although 
asymmetries are smaller than reported in the abovementioned studies, they do not seem to 
vanish in the long run. 
Clearly, the diverse response across countries is a serious problem on its own right but no 
one can deny that rather little is known about how the system as a whole is expected to react 
to common interest-rate changes. Not only the behaviour of monetary aggregates is likely to 
be subject to structural breaks. The degree of wage and price flexibility, the characteristics of 
the wage bargaining and price-formation processes, not to mention the mechanism of 
expectation fortnation, are also unlikely to remain unchanged. In this respect the Lucas 
critique bites quite hard. As the option of exchange-rate changes to facilitate ad ustments is J 
no longer available in a monetary union, and fiscal policy is also constrained by the 3% 
ceiling to the deficit ratio imposed by the SGP, both workers and policymakers will 
recognise the need to substitute greater labour-market flexibility. This can materialise in the 
form of both wage adjustments and worker mobility. In other words, giving up monetary and 
fiscal freedom will increase efforts at labour-market reforms simply because there is no other 
choice. Nonetheless, the thesis that the existence of a Monetary Union would favour the 
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emergence of (national) wage adjustment mechanisms has been challenged by the literature 
in many respects. 
First, there are objections grounded on natural-rate considerations (Buiter, 1995): as money 
is neutral in the long run, monetary policy simply does not have the ability to influence long- 
term divergences in real economic structure, real wage rigidities or any other real 
development that matters. A fortiori, the choice of the monetary regime is irrelevant when 
nominal rigidities are at issue. As nominal rigidities are transient, changes in 
policy/institutional arrangements that would compensate for the loss of national monetary 
sovereignty need only to have temporary effects. However, hysteresis provides an argument 
against such a position. Empirical estimates on European data show that structural 
unemployment follows actual unemployment developments closely, thereby maldng the 
natural rate model inadequate for the European context (Blanchard and Katz, 1997). Real 
business cycle studies also confirm that strong persistence effects may arise when nominal 
and real wage rigidities co-exist, irrespective of the natural rate assumption (Jeanne, 1998). 
Furthermore, as we illustrate below, even though the Phillips curve is vertical in steady state, 
monetary policy can still affect long-run real outcomes if, for instance, non-linearities feature 
in the short-run inflation-output trade-off. 
Second, it has been noticed that policy co-ordination might suffice to compensate for the 
lack of adjustment mechanisms. If Euroland shock absorbers are rigid and a likely source of 
hysteresis, then the ECB has simply to be relatively more prudent when tightening monetary 
policy in order to avoid hard landings with seriously rising unemployment (Begg et al., 
1998). Otherwise, as no adjustment mechanism is likely to shelter European countries from 
asymmetric shocks, a system of interregional fiscal transfers could compensate for such a 
lack. Obstfeld and Peri (1998) point out, however, that the existence of generous fiscal 
transfers could prevent the emergence of an effective market-based adjustment mechanism in 
Euroland, as it would provide a lasting disincentive against labour mobility. 
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Thirdly, and more strikingly, it has been argued that it is the shift to a monetary union itself 
that hampers labour market reform. Calmfors (1998), for instance, shows that the likelihood 
of labour market reforms is actually reduced by becoming a member of EMU. This is 
because labour market reforms are much easier to introduce if monetary policy is 
accommodating and supporting demand while labour flexibility is introduced. Hence, 
reforms are more likely to take place outside EMU, where supply-side and monetary policy 
can be co-ordinated. Dornbusch et al. (1998) argue that replacement of the national monetary 
authorities with the ECB will lead to disruption of the direct link between wage hikes and 
unemployment exactly for the opposite reason: as Euro-wide inflation does not rise one-for- 
one with decentralised wage hikes, the need for disinflationary policy on the part of the ECB 
will be less. The implicit accommodating ECB response will then remove much of the 
discipline now in place, bringing about either a rise in local equilibrium unemployment or a 
EMU-wide inflationary shock. The point that the degree of centralisation of wage bargaining 
affects the outcome in terms of wage inflation and equilibrium (un)employment is also made 
in game theoretical models such as Cahnfors and Driffill (198 8), Soskice and Iversen (1998), 
Cuckierman and Lippi (1999,2000). These models show that strategic interaction among an 
increased number of uncoordinated unions and a single central bank results in a worsening of 
the inflation-output short-run trade-off faced by the monetary authority. In particular, they 
suggest that a switch to a monetary union is likely to make labour unions more aggressive, 
thereby increasing unemployment, as it reduces each union's perception of how inflationary 
its individual actions are. In this perspective, centralisation of monetary policy seems to call 
for a single pan-European union setting wage patterns for the entire Eurozone. 
Burda (1999), in turn, speculates that nominal price rigidities uill increase within Euroland, 
mainly for two reasons. Firstly, as Europe will look more like a closed economy and inputs 
will become increasingly nontraded goods priced in Euros, cost pressures will be restricted 
to 'domestic' labour markets, marginalising the importance of exchange rate changes in price 
decisions. Because such an 'inwardisation' process increases exposure to the sheltered 
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domestic market, the greater will be the incentive to price to market and to set nominal prices 
in advance for longer periods. Factors like customer relationships and menu costs will then 
become relatively more important, thereby favouring nominal rigidities. Secondly, as 
monetary policy credibility is enhanced, agents will expect lower inflation and be willing to 
fix nominal contracts for longer periods. At the same time, however, the author argues that 
real wage rigidities are likely to be reduced. This is due to a rise in product market 
competition, which translates into an increase in the elasticity of both product and labour 
demand. Moreover, the increasing importance of capital as a competing production factor as 
well as its growing transnationality is reckoned to attenuate the bargaining power of national 
unions. Given the incompatibility of current national structures with co-ordinated European 
bargaining, and given the limited EU budget to provide for accommodating social safety 
nets, local unions insisting on aggressive wage hikes are seen as simply facing higher local 
unemployment. 
Who is right? Eichengreen (1998) tries to answer this question by surveying empirical 
evidence on the link between nominal wageflexibility and exchange rate regimes. He finds 
that studies looking across exchange-rate regimes (Alogoskoufis and Smith, 1991) or 
focusing on single-country cases (Gressani et al., 1988; Kremers, 1990; Hochreiter and 
Winckler, 1995; Artus and Salomon, 1996) tend to confirm the existence of greater nominal 
wage flexibility when exchange rates are fixed. Cross-country econometric analyses, 
nonetheless, do not provide much evidence of an EMS-related structural break in the wage- 
determination process (Artis and Omerod, 1996). 
Taking stock from such debate, this chapter provides a model-based quantitative exploration 
of the effects of a common monetary stance when monetary transmission mechanisms differ 
across countries. At the same time it tries to answer a number of relevant questions. Is the 
choice of institutional monetary arrangement neutral with respect to cross-country real 
divergences? Can labour market flexibility correct for asymmetric policy responses thereby 
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favouring convergence across European countries? Is labour market flexibility always good 
news? The answer is found to be negative in all cases. 
We employ the IMF's multi-country model, MULTIMOD Mark III (MM3), which embeds a 
non-linear Phillips curve under the assumption of the existence of a natural rate of 
unemployment. In the presence of convexity of the inflation-output trade-off, it is possible to 
show that monetary policy choices have real effects in the long run. In particular, as 
discussed in section 6.2, a policy which is more effective in stabilising fluctuations in the 
business cycle is, under these circumstances, also able to lower the mean value of the 
unemployment rate. 
Section 6.3 shows how different degrees of rigidity in country-specific inflation-output 
relationships are a sufficient but not necessary condition to undemiine synchronisation in the 
business cycle in the face of a common monetary shock. The sensitivity of the asymmetries 
to alternative (uncoordinated vs. co-ordinated) monetary designs is assessed in section 6.3.1- 
In particular we note that, since a Monetary Union internalises cross-border exchange-rate 
fluctuations and enforces monetary co-operation, overall sensitivity to monetary policy is 
likely to be lessened. This would render the degree of cross-country heterogeneity less 
evident, at least with respect to the more rigid European economies, irrespective of any 
active labour market reform. Conversely, for countries characterised by higher (nominal and 
real) flexibility, EMU seems to induce policy overreaction compared with uncoordinated 
monetary stances. In this way, a Monetary Union could widen the gap between rigid and 
flexible European economies. 
While these initial results are obtained under the assumption that all the economies are 
starting from conditions of full-employment equilibrium, such a pre-condition is removed in 
section 6.3.2. We can then show that different extant economic conditions represent weighty 
barriers to the process towards convergence. 
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Section 6.3.3 analyses the effects of increasing the degree of nominal and real flexibility in 
European labour markets. It is shown that for countries like Italy, characterised by a high 
level of initial debt, the output responsiveness to monetary shocks is greater than elsewhere, 
ceteris paribus. In these cases, allowing for greater nominal and real flexibility in the labour 
market may have undesirable consequences. Since a lower degree of rigidity implies a 
greater inflation responsiveness to output and unemployment conditions, we show that 
structural reforms of the labour market which are not preceded by fiscal consolidation may 
actually induce destabilising effects on the economy. We hence find support for Burda's 
(1999) conclusion that '[c]alls for additional flexibility may be the economic equivalent of 
whipping a dead horse, and could provoke counterproductive reactions'. Concluding remarks 
end the chapter. 
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6.2 THE TOOL OF ANALYSIS: MULTIMOD MARK III 
To explore the implications of asymmetries in the transmission of monetary policy across 
European countries, we use the IMF's multi-country econometric model, MULTIMOD Mark 
III. In its basic version, it contains linked annual models for each of the G-7 economies plus 
three country blocks which aggregate the small industrial economies, the developing 
countries and the high-income oil-exporters, respectively. As a general equilibrium model, 
MM3 is well suited for policy analysis, since its explicit characterisation of technology, 
household and firm preferences allows for parameter calibration to replicate certain stylised 
facts. The model is however unsuitable for making unconditional forecasts. Rather, it takes 
the IMF's World Economic Outlook forecasts as the baseline for simulation scenarios. The 
structure and properties of MM3 are thoroughly described in Laxton et aL (1998), while its 
detailed documentation and codification can also be obtained at the IMF's external 
publication website (http: //www. imf. org). Here we smply emphasise (i) the implications of 
employing a non-linear model of the inflation-output nexus; (ii) the modifications which are 
needed to simulate MM3 under alternative monetary regimes for Europe. 
62.1 A convex Phillips curve model 
Research in the inflation-output trade-off debate has traditionally relied on a linear analytical 
framework, assuming that the response of inflation to a positive gap between actual and 
potential output is equal and opposite to the response to a negative gap of the same size. 
Though analytically convenient, the linear model ignores the evidence that under conditions 
of full employment, inflation appears to respond strongly to demand conditions, whereas in 
deep recessions it is relatively insensitive to changes in activity. The case for asymmetry in 
the transmission mechanism between unemployment and inflation has been recently stressed 
by researchers at the IMF, with a growing literature on the topic (see, among others, Chadha, 
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Masson and Meredith, 1992; Laxton, Meredith and Rose, 1995; Debelle and Laxton, 1997; 
Clark and Laxton, 1997; Laxtor4 Rose and Tambakis, 1999). 
In MM3 the entire system of wage and price determination is subsumed in a reduced-form 
expectation augmented Phillips curve. In the light of this research, it is not surprising that 
such a relationship is non-linear. The presence of a convex Phillips curve in MM3 reflects 
short-run capacity constmints in such a way that, whereas inflation responds strongly to 
demand pressures under conditions of full employment, it is relatively insensitive to changes 
in activity during recessions. The MM3 short-run inflation-output trade-off can be 
summansed. by the pair of equations reported below, where (6.1) describes Okun's law, 
which translates output gaps (y, - y, 
) into unemployment gaps (u ,-a, 
), and (6.2) 
specifies the short-run Phillips curve model. Corresponding country-specific parameter 
estimates are shown in table 6.1, limiting our attention to the four European economies that 
are separately modelled. 
(Ut - Ht) 100'Pi 
(Yt - i7t) + P2 (Ut-I - Ut-1) (6.1) 
,ý 
[S 
,e, +++ -L- 
(U; 
- ut 
)+c 
(6.2) Jr, =x t+ 100 ju-ýýOt t 
Table 6.1 Okun's Law and Phillips Curve parameter estimates 
Germany France Italy UK 
-0.33 -0.30 -0.09 -0.33 
6.18 0.44 0.79 0.69 
0.744 0.753 0.912 1 
0.53 1 1 0.53 
7 0.819 1.137 2.305 2.364 
0 4.521 5.104 5.676 2.248 
U* 8.521 9.104 9.676 6.248 
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Equation (6.1) can be regarded as a demand function for labour, with output demand taken as 
given. Partial adjustment represented by p2 implies that turnover is costly, so fmns adjust 
employment slowly to changes in demand conditions. In line with the prevailing paradigm in 
macroeconomic modelling, the expectations augmented Phillips curve (6.2) retains inflation 
neutralitý in the long run, while featuring some degree of inertia in the short-to-medium-tenn 
adjustment. Moreover, it distinguishes between intrinsic dynamics and expectation formation 
(the term in square brackets). Namely, the model embodies fted weights on forward- and 
backward-looldng components for inflation expectations (8, and (I-Q, respectively), which 
can however be modified to allow for alternative assumptions about expectation formation 
and policy credibility. Moreover, the model reflects an overlapping contracting framework, 
according to which a proportion At of workers negotiates nominal wage adjustments on the 
basis of expected future inflation, while remaining wage contracts are linked to lagged 
inflation. In this way, MM3 exhibits short-run Keynesian dynamics intended to capture 
inertial effects that are features of the inflation process. Finally, the non-linear terin in 
unemployment can be derived from standard wage- and price-setting behaviour on the 
assumption that the degree of wage rigidity is a positive function of the actual level of 
unemployment, as is implicit in labour market theories such as the 'efficiency wage' model 
(see appendix for analytical derivation). As a consequence of such non-linearity, the higher 
the rate of unemployment, the greater the degree of real rigidity that characterises the labour 
market (embedded in the parameter 0. Cetefis paribus, this will make the curve flatter and 
real responses to aggregate demand shocks larger, as shown for instance in Debelle and 
Laxton (1997). In an EMU context, the assumption of a non-linear Phillips curve implies that 
country-specific adjustments to a common shock hitting aggregate demand depend crucially 
on the relative initial position of the economy, and not only on the parameter estimates of its 
short-run inflation-output trade-off (on this point, see section 6.3.3). 
Another important implication of the convexity in the Phillips curve is the distinction 
between the NAIRU and the average rate of unemployment prevailing in the economy. This 
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distinction, which is not present in linear models of the Phillips curve, is illustrated in Clark 
and Laxton (1997) by considering the following expectations augmented model: 
74 2-- iet+l + (D(y(u* - uj) + et (6.3) 
where u* indicates the NAIRU, i. e. the level of unemployment at which there is no tendency 
for inflation to depart from its steady-state value in the absence ofshocks (say n*), and 4)(. ) 
is some convex function that represents the effects of excess demand in the labour market on 
inflation, such that 4)(O)=O, (D' (-)>O and (D"(-)>O. Assuming that the error term e, is 
normally distributed with zero mean and that 4)(. ) is in fact a (symmetric) exponential 
function, then the average rate of unemployment in a stochastic steady state is given by E[uj 
=u *+ var(u, )/2, which is greater than the NAIRU, u *. The gap between the NAIRU and the 
average level of unemployment generated by an average set of shocks is, thus, a function of 
both the variance of the idiosyncratic shock and the way in which this traslates into 
unemployment variability var(ul). This, in turn, depends on the specific non-linear function 
subsuming the model, i. e. (D(-), and its degree of curvature. The basic intuition behind is that, 
since the Phillips curve is convex at the origin, any excess demand in the labour market is 
more inflationary than excess supply is deflationary. Hence, the mean value of excess 
demand conditions (u .- E[uj) must be negative for inflation to be stable. In these 
circumstances, any policy which is more effective in stabilising fluctuations in the business 
cycle is also able to lower the mean value of the unemployment rate. Such "first-order 
effects" are clearly absent in traditional linear models of the Phillips curve where the two 
concepts of non-accelerating inflation unemployment rate, u and 'average unemployment 
rate consistent with stable inflation, E[uj, coincide. 
For illustrative purposes, Figure 6.1 compares two different states of the economy, each 
characterised by a different degree of variability of the shocks, given a non-linear 
unemployment-inflation relationship denoted P. Let us assume that there exists a given 
inflation target, n*, that the policyrnaker is able to achieve in the long run. Without shocks, 
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this is associated with a non-accelerating level of unemployment equal to u*. Suppose that, 
under the first state, the size of the shocks hitting the economy is such that inflation rises to 
n, at time 1, whereas unemployment falls below u*. The policyrnaker, in order to ensure an 
inflation target Tc* on average, must therefore generate an inflation iý, in the next period, 
thereby moving the economy to a higher unemployment rate. The average unemployment 
rate brought about by such shocks is labelled E[u] in the figure and is necessarily larger than 
u*, given the convexity of P. Let us now compare this first state of the economy with a 
second one, where larger shocks are assumed to periodically overheat the economy. In this 
event, the gap between the average level of unemployment ensuring stable inflation and the 
NAIRU is much larger, though the NAIRU itself is unchanged. Larger excess supply will be 
needed to ensure that the desired inflation rate 7c* will still be achieved on average. As a 
result, a greater average unemployment rate, E[u]', will arise. 
Figure 6.1 Implications of employing a non-linear model of the Phillips curve 
Ic I 
it , 
It . 
Ic 2 
TC 2 
Let us now turn to another important implication of employing a non-linear model of the 
Phillips and consider a shift of the curve down and to the left (figure 6.2). Such a change of 
position induces not only a corresponding decrease in the NAIRU (this is true in a linear 
context as well), but makes also the gap between E[u] and u* shrink, assuming an unchanged 
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variance of the shocks hitting the economy. The non-linear model is therefore suitable also to 
explain hysteresis effects, where the actual and equilibrium rates of unemployment co-move, 
though without questioning the long-run natural rate hypothesis. 
Figure 6.2 Implications of a shift of the Phillips curve down and to the left 
TC 
nII 
It . 
1C 2' 
62.2 Modelling alternative monetarypolicy regimesfor Europe 
As noted above, in the basic version of MM3, only the four major European economies (i. e. 
Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom) are explicitly modelled. Nevertheless this 
6reduced notion' of Europe, to which our attention is thereby limited, accounts for 80 per 
cent of total European GDP. 
With respect to monetary policy, the model uses short-term nominal interest rates as 
monetary policy instnurients for reaction functions which are consistent with either money 
targets, inflation targets, exchange rate targets, nominal income targets or combinations of 
other macroeconomic objectives, such as inflation, output and unemployment. In order to 
evaluate asymmetric policy impacts under different monetary policy regimes for Europe, we 
modify the relevant interest rate and exchange rate equations as follows. 
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TheERMregime 
The core version of MM3 assumes that France and Italy adjust their short-term interest rates 
in -response to movements in their exchange rates vis-d-vis the Deutsche Mark, whereas 
Germany and the United Kingdom target their money stock. The fixed exchange rate 
targeting featuring both French and Italian monetary policy rule is implemented by choosing 
an extremely large weight on deviations of their nominal exchange rate from parity, and 
setting feedback parameters for all other possible targets to zero. Nonetheless, current levels 
of national exchange rates are identically explained in terms of their expected future levels 
and the differential between domestic and US interest rates. Simulation results obtained with 
this version of the model describe country-specific macroeconomic responses under the pre- 
existing ERM an-angement, though excluding the UK. 
Uncoordinated national monetarypolicies 
The interest rate equations for France and Italy are firstly modified as to mimick independent 
(i. e. uncoordinated) national monetary policies pursuing a money target. Under this 
monetary set-up, France and Italy are also assumed to respond to deviation from their desired 
path for money balances with the same strength as Germany and the UK (by setting the 
relevant feedback parameter to 0.333). Their corresponding exchange rate equations are, 
instead, unchanged and still determined as forward-looking uncovered interest parity 
conditions against the US dollar. 
The EMU regime 
Finally, to incorporate an EMU-3 into MM3, we need to model the exchange rate equations 
for France and Italy as to maintain a fixed parity against the DM (standing in for the Euro, 
against which the DM has, in turn, a fixed value since January 1999). Thus, there are no risk 
premia and no possibility on reneging on the parities chosen. Employed conversion rates, 
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besides being the central parities of the old ERM, are also the official entry rates to EMU 
agreed in May 1998, at the York summit. 
Furthermore, to introduce an ECB in charge of a common monetary policy, we replace the 
German interest rate with a common rate driven by a reaction function containing the same 
parameters as the old German reaction function (i. e. with a feedback parameter on deviations 
from money target equals to 0.333 and zero weight on any other target), but with European 
level variables for money supply and target money supply. These are given by the sums of 
their three national counterparts. Hence, short-term interest rate adjusts to accommodate 
deviations of the European money stock from its supply target, according to the following 
monetary rule: 
wFm! mu 1 rst = rst-, - lool -I I 92 OLOWI'mu)l (6.4) 
where w is the feedback parameter and U2 is the (identical) interest elasticity of money 
demand in each of the EMU-3 economies. 
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6.3 SWULATION RESULTS 
0.1 Asymmetric policy responses under different monetary regimesfor Europe 
The existence of a non-linear Phillips curve in IýM3 implies that the relative magnitude of 
real and nominal effects of shocks to aggregate demand depend on the sign of the shock as 
well as on, the initial position of the economy. An increase in nominal aggregate demand 
induced, for example, by a change in money surplus will generate smaller short-run effects 
on real variables and larger Short-run effects on prices, while the opposite holds in case of a 
deflationary shock. Such uneven response in the face of opposite shocks of the same 
magnitude will become even more evident if the shocks hit the economy while this is away 
from its steady state. Thus, if for instance the economy is already operating at potential, then 
a further inflationary shock would only result in higher inflation with no effect on real 
activity. Macroeconomic responses are also unlikely to remain unchanged under different 
monetary policy regimes, especially if the change in policy involves a shift from national 
(i. e. uncoordinated) monetary policies to a Monetary Union. To illustrate how different 
degrees of convexity in the short-run inflation-output trade-off interact with the choice of the 
monetary regime in affecting macroeconomic responses, next we contrast the effects of 
positive and negative money supply shocks in the four European economies under 
alternative monetary policy regime for Europe. 
Uncoordinated national moneta? ypolicies 
Table 6.2 refers to the hypothesis of uncoordinated national monetary policies. Simulations 
are performed in a multi-country context, thereby taldng into account cross-border spillovers 
and second-round effects. In each country, the monetary authority targets the national money 
aggregate and, in the absence of any international co-ordination, decides to change 
permanently and unanticipatedly the target. The new target is assumed to be fully credible so 
that, in equilibrium, national money aggregates and prices would adjust one for one with it. 
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The shocks represent positive (+) and negative (-) pennanent 5 percent changes in country- 
specific money targets starting from conditions of full-employment equilibrium. Shocks are 
hence applied (and the relevant model correspondingly simulated) from 2020, so that 
divergences across countries in policy impacts are only due to structural differences in the 
economies, rather than by their initial position in the business cycle. The model is further 
solved sufficiently far ahead, up to 2100, as to remove any influence of terminal conditions 
on our results. 
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Tables report deviations from baseline for a selection of macroeconomic indicators for the 
fu-st five years of the simulation. Deviations are expressed in percentage points for GNP and 
effective exchange rate and in peicentage'points for nominal interest rates, inflation and 
unemployment rates. Consumption and current account balance are given in difference in 
proportion to baseline GNP. For all countries, the positive shocks have smaller short-run 
effects on real variables and larger short-run effects on nominal variables than the negative 
shocks. As excess demand is more inflationary than excess supply is deflationary, 
adjustments in the policy rates are also asymmetric: overall, in the long-run, the level of 
nominal interest rates is likely to be higher, as contractionary monetary responses must be 
stronger than expansionary policy to maintain a stable target. 
Cross-country comparison shows that the effects of shocks in MM3 depend crucially on (i) 
the relative degrees of nominal and real rigidities existing in each country, (ii) the 
mechanism of expectation formation (iii) the relative size of national debt stocks. Recalling 
NM3 short-run inflation-output trade-off as described by the equation system (6.1)-(6.2) and 
its country-specific parameter estimates given in table 6.1, we note that, among European 
countries, the UK exhibits the highest degree of nominal and real flexibility (A, =1 and y 
2.364, respectively). At the other extreme of the spectrum, Germany is characterised by the 
lowest degree of nominal flexibility (A, 0.744) and the highest degree of downward real 
wage resistance (y = 0.819), closely followed by France (A, = 0.753 and y 1.137). As a 
consequence, table 6.2 shows that in Germany and France monetary shocks can have large 
and persistent effects on real GNP and unemployment, especially if the shocks are moving 
the economy above their NAIRU. On the contrary, in the UK, real short-run adjustments 
have, ceteris paribus, smaller size and are fastly reversed. Hypotheses about the process of 
expectation formation also matter. In Italy, for instance, the low credibility of the monetary 
authority and the hysterical track of inflationary episodes, are assumed to have increased 
forward-lookingness in labour market to the maximum (6, = 1). As agents learn immediately 
about future policy changes, price stickiness is thereby reduced and inflation responses 
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enhanced. Nominal interest rate adjustments, on the contrary, are the weakest in Italy, 
particularly in the face of deflationary shocks. High nominal flexibility coupled with timid 
interest rate movements imply that variations in real competitiveness are milder in Italy than 
in any other European economy, given an identical monetary policy change. On the opposite 
side is Germany, characterised by high monetary credibility and high nominal rigidities and, 
therefore, featuring the strongest reaction in both nominal interest rate and effective 
exchange rate (the latter is around 4 percent in the first year, whereas in Italy is just 1.7 
percent). 
Estimates of the cumulative changes in GNP and unemployment over the entire simulation 
horizon are also of interest, as they make visible the implications of employing a convex 
Phillips curve model. According to these measures, Germany features the highest degree of 
non-linearity, as the long-run cumulative reduction in unemployment is only 0.4 percentage 
points with the inflationary shock, whereas the cumulative long-run increase in the 
unemployment rate is over 1.7 percentage points with deflation. Non-linearities are even 
more evident if one considers long-run cumulative changes in GNP: a slight fall under 
monetary expansion versus a 4.3 percentage points reduction under monetary contraction. In 
any other European country, cumulative changes in real variables induced by monetary 
shocks of opposite sign look much more similar in magnitude, with Italy featuring the 
smallest degree of non-linearity. It should also be noticed that the "absolute permanent cost" 
of a deflation and, especially, the 'long-run benefit' of a surge in money supply, is much 
higher in France than in Germany. This is due to the slower adjustment characterising the 
dynamics of the unemployment gap in France (P2 `ý 0.44 vs. 0.18 for Germany). As a 
consequence, shocks inducing persistent changes in the output gap result in correlated 
changes in the unemployment gap over time. 
The highest impact and cumulated responses in consumption and current account balance are 
instead acknowledged in Italy. These are about three times as large as those in Germany and 
France. Explanation of such responsiveness can be found in the size of Italian government 
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liabilities: in an open economy where consumers excessively discount the future and count 
debt as net wealth, a higher level of debt stock induces, other things being equal, larger 
movements in disposable income, current consumption and net foreign assets in the face of 
an identical shock to the nominal interest rate. Yet, such large swings in GNP components 
are not mirrored by correspondingly large fluctuations in unemployment gap. This is because 
Italian labour market seems to be extremely sheltered by changes in real activity, given the 
low parameter estimate on the output gap featuring the Okun's law (p, = -0.09). 
The ERM regime 
Under the second scenario, France and Italy are assumed to target their exchange rates vis-a- 
vis the DM, as under the old ERM regime. Corresponding results are reported in table 6.3. 
With respect to these two countries, comparison between tables 2 and 3 highlights the degree 
to which monetary policy impacts are sensitive to the nature of the monetary policy reaction 
function itself. Germany and UK, instead, are largely unaffected by the switch in monetary 
regime, as they keep targeting their own national money stock. For these countries, 
discrepancies in macroeconomic responses under the first and the second monetary regime 
are hence only due to larger spillover effects characterising the ERM regime. 
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Under uncoordinated and independent national monetary policy, where France and Italy 
were assumed to target money supply, the short-run effects of the shock are considerably 
smaller and the economy returns to potential much faster. The ERM regime is characterised 
by the fact that the Bundesbank (i. e. Germany) acts as a Stackelberg leader in Euroland, with 
France and Italy acting as followers. An exchange rate targeting implies that nominal interest 
rates in these two countries are moving in line with the German policy rate which, in turn, is 
adjusting to accommodate national monetary unbalances. French and Italian domestic 
economic circumstances, instead, do not matter. Yet, since Germany is characterised by a 
higher degree of nominal rigidities than other ERM members, it also requires comparatively 
higher interest rate movements in the face of an identical monetary shock. Under exchange 
rate targeting, these larger policy changes translate into the Italian and French economies, 
irrespective of their labour market/economy structures or fiscal stances. As a result, short- 
and long-run policy impacts on nominal variables appear to be marginally greater under 
ERM than under uncoordinated money targeting regimes for both France and Italy. On the 
other hand, however, real effects differ quite significantly in the two countries. Whereas in 
Italy greater nominal responses translate into larger fluctuations in GNP components, in 
France these are smaller. Once again, explanation is likely to be found in the dissimilar 
budgetary positions characterising the two economies. On the ground of these results, we can 
hence conclude that a switch to an exchange rate targeting is liable of enhancement not only 
in the magnitude of monetary responses, but also in the degree of asymmetry across 
European economies. 
The EMU regime 
Finally, table 6.4 illustrates c0untry-specific responses to a common shock to the European 
monetary aggregate, under the assumption of existence of a Monetary Union among 
Germany, France and Italy. This is certainly the most interesting scenario, as it allows us to 
evaluate whether the presence of a Monetary Union will exacerbate or lessen cross-country 
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spillovers and divergences in policy responses. As far as the former are concerned, as 
European economies will no longer be exposed to the whims of (intra-EMU) nominal 
exchange rate fluctuations. As Europe becomes more similar to a closed economy, cross- 
border spillovers, are then likely to be internalised in monetary policy-making. At the same 
time, the advent of EMU implies a different institutional setting in the field of monetary 
policy. As NCB's now collectively determine monetary policy for Euroland in the 
Governing Council of the ECB as a unique authority, a Monetary Union automatically 
induces international monetary policy co-ordination. This means that also monetary policy 
externalities in the face of symmetric nominal shocks are eliminated. As a consequence, the 
effects of identical monetary shocks on both interest rate and effective exchange rate are 
likely to be reduced under EMU. This can be verified by juxtaposing the corresponding 
responses in Germany, France and Italy under EMU and under ERM (table 6.3 vs. table 6.4). 
This seems to confirm the findings according to which the creation of EMU mitigates the 
reaction of central bank to economic shocks, as a result of policy co-ordination (Cavelaars, 
1999). Furthermore, one should note that, under the new monetary regime, not only 
macroeconomic responses are found to be smaller but also cross-country asymmetries look 
reduced. With respect to the old ERM, the creation of a Economic and Monetary Union 
should then be viewed as an improvement for the Euro-zone as a whole. Comparison with 
the outcomes obtained under uncoordinated monetary policies (table 6.4 vs. table 6.2) is, 
instead, less clear-cut. EMU can certainly still be regarded as the most desirable monetary 
arrangement for France and (even more) for Germany, also when compared with shocks' 
responses under individual national monetary stances. For these two countries, policy 
adjustments are likely to be smaller and more homogeneous under a Monetary Union than 
under uncoordinated monetary policies. Ceteris paribus, EMU happens to reduce long-term 
costs of both inflationary and deflationary policies in terms of cumulated unemployment and 
output responses with respect to these economies. In this way, the degree of cross-country 
heterogeneity becomes less evident even in the absence of any labour market reform. 
However, this is not the case for Italy. Italy appears to be better off under an independent 
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national monetary policy, given the implicit assumption of perfect credibility of its monetary 
authority. This is because, for Italy, the internalisation. of cross-border spillover due to the 
advent of EMU does not compensate for the lack of an independent interest rate adjustment 
mechanism: under EMU responses are too large. To see why, it should be recalled that Italy 
is characterised by a large degree of nominal flexibility (i. e. large responses to inflation 
expectations). Monetary expansions and contractions result here in smaller and less 
persistent business cycle, as prices are less sticky. Consequently, interest rates would need 
not to move as much as elsewhere. Having a common monetary policy implies, for Italy, 
facing monetary responses larger than in the uncoordinated regime. Given the convexity of 
the inflation-output trade-offs, in MM3 stronger policy adjustments are always more costly 
(i. e. undesirable) because of the declining marginal effectiveness of large output gaps in 
reducing inflation, on the one hand, and large inflationary pressures in reducing employment 
slacks, on the other hand. Yet, given the relevance of its public debt stock, these costs are 
further enhanced for Italy. One should then conclude that, as the strength of interest rate 
responses is found to decrease for rigid economies while it is likely to increase where price 
are less sticky, EMU does not appear to favour European convergence. Ultimately, different 
degrees of (nominal) rigidity in country-specific inflation-output relationships are a 
sufficient condition to undermine synchronisation in the business cycle of European 
economies given a common monetary policy. Before questioning whether widespread labour 
market flexibility could on its own ensure convergence across European economies, we 
investigate the effects of engaging in a Monetary Union when initial conditions differ from 
steady state. 
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63.2 Do initial conditions matter? 
While previous results are obtained under the assumption that all economies are starting 
from equilibrium conditions, we now proceed by withdrawing such hypothesis. With respect 
to the EMU scenario, we consider the same permanent positive and negative changes to the 
European aggregate money target as in the previous section, though the model is shocked 
and simulated starting from year 2001. At that date, effects of business cycle variations are 
still relevant, as none of the economies has reached its steady-state position yet. On the basis 
of MM3 baseline forecasts (not reported), we note that in 2001 Euroland is assumed to be 
largely below potential with country-specific unemployment rates around one percentage 
point above their respective natural rates. Monetary conditions are overall loose to foster 
demand recovery, with money growth rates above equilibrium and interest rates well below 
their steady-state values. Despite that, price inflation rates persist in being some 1 percentage 
point below their equilibrium level. Outside Euroland, the UK economy is instead presumed 
to be characterised by excess of demand conditions, with unemployment more than I 
percentage point below its corresponding deterministic NAIRU. British monetary stance, in 
turn, comes close to its steady state already in 200 1. 
Results of the simulation experiment are summarised in table 6.5. As already seen before, the 
convexity characterising the Phillips curve model implies that common monetary shocks of 
the same magnitude but with opposite sign induce uneven macroeconomic responses. These 
nonlinearities become more evident if the shocks hit the economy while this is away from its 
steady state (compare table 6-4). Thus, in the case of the UK economy, which is operating 
close to potential and above its NAIRU, inflationary shocks result in higher inflation with 
smaller effects on unemployment and GNP. Price flexibility, which is an intrinsic feature of 
the UK inflation-output trade-off, is therefore enhanced under fidl employment conditions. 
Conversely, in the case of Germany, France and Italy, all characterised by excess of supply 
conditions, inflation is less sensitive to surges in money surplus than in steady state; short- 
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run effects on unemployment and real output appear, instead, correspondingly larger in the 
face of an identical deflationary shock. Unemployment impact responses in Italy represent, 
once more, an exception, as they hardly vary with demand conditions; however, general 
conclusions remain valid with respect to its cumulated responses. Summarising, real 
rigidities are expected to be reinforced by slumps in demand. 
As rigid labour markets become more rigid, while flexible ones tend to gain further nominal 
responsiveness, extant economic conditions are likely to represent weighty barriers to the 
process towards convergence within Europe as a whole. Limiting our attention within 
Euroland, things do not look much better, as both inflationary and deflationary adjustments 
are magnified, making cross-country asymmetries in monetary responses more visible. 
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6.3.3 Increasingflexibility in European labour markets: %inners and losers 
'Reform' and 'flexibility' for European labour markets are increasingly preached by 
economists as much as by policy-makers. The consensus, in this respect, is generally 
unanimous. The 'dotcom. summit' in Lisbon represents the newest commitment of EUs 
leaders to engage in structural institutional reforms to favour micro-economic flexibility. The 
logic of the recommended approach sounds clear: 'changes in the law and greater mobility 
are crucial to erode unemployment' (Financial Times, March 2000). At aggregate Euro-zone 
level, the picture is indeed bleak, with 12.4m currently unemployed, only 61 percent of the 
working age population in work, 5 percent of workforce out of work for over a year. The 
challenge is hard, as European countries have to struggle with overpricing, severe lack of 
mobility of unskilled labour, limited wage flexibility, high taxation on employment and the 
sheer cost of firing workers, which serves to deter employers from hiring in the first place. 
However, whereas the EU possesses collective instruments for enhancing competition and 
market integration, labour market and welfare policies are and remain national, with striking 
differences across member states. 
In France unemployment fell sharply to 10.2 percent in February 2000 and is at its lowest 
level since 1992. The number of long-term jobless is failing, vacancies are at their highest 
for a decade and service sector employment has grown at an annual rate of 3.9 percent last 
year. These successes can be attributed to practices such as the maximum 35-hour working 
week and retraining programmes for those out of work. The removal of restrictions on the 
use of fixed-term contracts and part-time workers tends to have a significant impact on 
employment rates in the service sector. In the Netherlands, where part-time workers make up 
30 percent of the labour force, the j obless rate is about 3 percent, even lower am in the US - 
In Italy too part-time and temporary jobs are becoming more common. However, 
unemployment remains high (11.4 percent) due to the disencouraging Italian labour 
regulation, which inhibits employers from reducing workforce during slumps. In Germany 
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employment is stifled by the centralisation of wage bargaining. Wages are set in accordance 
with sector-wide agreements between trade-unions and employers' associations. Such 
system deprives company of the ability to pay wages which best suit individual 
circumstances. Outside Euroland, the UK has witnessed much of the change in labour market 
flexibility as a result of changes in legislation in the 1980s. In particular, a number of laws 
were passed that reduced the costs to employers of making wages and employment 
adjustments, such as the abolition of minimum wage, the weakening of the power of trade 
unions, the lowering of both hiring and firing costs, the increase in temporary employment. 
Millard (2000) compares the ex-post effects of such increase in UK labour market flexibility 
with the predictions of a real business cycle model and a search model. He finds that actual 
data 'tentatively support' the models' predictions as for greater output, consumption and 
employment and lower average hours. Nonetheless, volatilities of output, consumption, 
employment and hours have all increased since 1988, contrary to theoretical predictions. 
Among the studies supporting the 'flexible-is-good' position, stands out the chapter on EMU 
in the IMF's World Economic Outlook (1997). According to it, labour nwket reform is 
sufficient to produce the desirable outcomes of lower equilibrium unemployment and higher 
growth, hence favouring fiscal restructuring. This conclusion is drawn from a simulation 
exercise on MM3, where increased labour market flexibility is captured through an increase 
in the parameter on unemployment (y in (6.2)) by around 1/3 of its value, while an increase 
in the weight 11 captures a reduction in the inertia of the inflation process. Further to this, 
labour-market reform is assumed to imply that (i) government expenditures are permanently 
reduced at 2 percentage points below baseline from the fourth year of the simulation, leading 
to lower debt levels and (ii) total factor productivity is pennanently increased by 0.5 percent 
above the baseline from the second year of the simulation. As a result of such shocks, the 
natural rate falls by 2 percentage points, the Phillips curve shifts down and to the left and 
becomes steeper, while the gap between the average and the natural rate of unemployment 
shrinks (see figure 6.2). In our view, the siniulation fails to provide any evidence in favour of 
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labour-market reform, inasmuch as the benign effects are mainly driven by other factors but 
structural changes in the labour market. The causal link seems indeed to work the other way 
round: a sustained shock in productivity coupled with robust fiscal consolidations is 
sufficient, in the presence of departures from Ricardian equivalence, to boost real growth in 
steady-state and to lower interest rate levels. The corresponding fall in the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment will then result in an endogenous gain in flexibility, because of the non- 
linearity of the Phillips curve model employed (see section 6.2.1). 
Below we aim to assess the effects of changes in the degree of nominal and real flexibility in 
European labour markets in the face of a common S percent increase in the aggregate money 
target. This is done by rendering country-specific labour markets' parameterisations all the 
same, while maintaining unchanged any other singularity characterising the monetary 
transmission mechanisn-L. We thus evaluate the contribution made by each parameter 
estimate in the inflation-output nexus (i. e. the degree of nominal and real rigidities, the 
degree of persistence in the Okun's law and the position of the unemployment wall) to the 
degree of divergence in national GNP responses. As a benchmark we take the UK Phillips 
curve model, for it features the highest degree of nominal and real wage flexibility, alongside 
high credibility. in monetary policy (recall parameter estimates in table 6.1). Figure 6.3 
reports the effects on real GNP for Germany and Italy, where differences are more striking. 
Bars indicate GNP responses, under. the original model parameterisation, whereas lines 
denote responses after sequential modifications. 
The top panel only assumes the degree of nominal flexibility to be the same in both countries 
as in the UK, by maldng corresponding %I and k parameters in equation (6.2) identical. The 
second panel, in addition to the previous assumption, also implies an analogous degree of 
real rigidities. This is done by altering the value of y in (6.2) UK-wise. The third panel takes 
into account also the parameterisation of the corresponding Okun's laws, that is it assumes 
p, and P2 in (6.1) to be the same in all countries. Finally, in the bottom panel, the position 
and degree of curvature of the models also become identical through proper modification of 
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the natural rate of unemployment, u*, and corresponding unemployment floor, 0, in (6.2), 
both regarded as exogenous variables in the model. In this way, German and Italian labour 
markets are forced to exhibit the same features as the most flexible European counterpart. 
Comparison of German and Italian GNP responses under original parameterisation shows 
that for a country like Italy, characterised by a weighty stock of public debt, the output 
responsiveness to monetary shocks is greater than elsewhere, ceteris paribus, owing to the 
existence of 'a f6rward-looking closure fiscal Closure rule in the model. Under these 
circumstances, results suggest that allowing for greater (nominal and real) flexibility in the 
labour market may have undesirable consequences. In particular, the first panel of figure 6.3 
shows that an increase in nominalflexibility in Germany (where 11 moves from 0.744 to 1) 
produces the same 'qualitative effects of an overall increase in nominal rigidity in Italy 
(where %I is increased by 0.088 but 8,, is reduced from I to 0.53 owing to the gain in 
credibility under the new monetary authority). In both cases, short-run adjustments to the 
inflationary shock become smaller and smoother (though the beneficial effect is more 
pronounced in Germany). Whatý about real flexibility? Since a higher degree of real 
flexibility n6plies a greater inflatio n resp I onsiveness to output and unemployment conditions, 
the second panel shows that structural reforms of I the labour market which are not preceded 
by fiscal consolidationmay actually have destabilising effects in the Italian economy. With 
res-pe6t to Italy, we he nce find support to I Burda's (1999) conclusion that '[c]alls for 
additional flexibility may be'tlie economic equivalent of whipping a dead horse, and could 
provoke counterproductive reactions'. These results seem also be able to explain Millard's 
(2000) findings, according to which an increase in labour market flexibility is likely to boost 
volatility of real aggregates. However, things are really different for Germany. Here an 
enhancement in real flexibility is found to reduce both the immediate effects on GNP of the 
expansionary monetary shock and their persistence, while bringing about only a tolerable 
amount of cyclicity. 
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Speeding up the dynamics in the translation of output gaps into unemployment gaps is, 
instead, unlikely to be worthwhile to any extent (third panel). It actually brings about a slight 
reduction in the immediate GNP response in Germany, but at the expense of further booms 
and busts. In Italy, such undesirable surge in output volatility is strikingly magnified, as it 
opens up a spiral of output-unemployment gaps fluctuations which was originally closed off. 
Analysis of the bottom panel carries out further implications of great interest for economic 
policy. The only difference between the third and the fourth panel is due to a change in the 
position of the curve and, thereby, in the NAIRU. This is per se able to bring back 
fluctuations to a reasonable amount even in Italy, where the counterproductive effects of 
imposing a higher degree of real flexibility in the inflation-output nexus are manifest. This 
means that both the ordering and the type matter, while talking about labour market 
"reforms". Proceeding to fiscal consolidation seems in fact conditio sine qua non to boost 
real growth in steady-state, lower interest rate levels and curb real short-run adjustments to 
monetary shocks, especially in the presence of departures from Ricardian equivalence. An 
higher level of resources in the economy should in this way favour structural labour market 
reforms aiming at reducing the natural rate of unemployment. They mainly presume cuts in 
tax wedge components as well as retrenchments in other exogenous wage-push factors, like 
the replacement ratio (see appendix). Reductions in the Non- Accelerating Inflation Rate of 
Unemployment, by shifting the Phillips curve down and to the left, are likely to induce 
automatically a surge in flexibility. Whether firrther real and/or nominal flexibility in the 
labour market needs to be enhanced by law remains ultimately a national matter, as no one- 
fits-all formula seems to apply. 
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Figure 6.3 Implications of increasing flexibility in German and Italian labour markets 
GNP responses to a5 percent increase in aggregate money target under EMU* 
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6.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this chapter we examined the interaction between monetary policy regimes and labour 
market structures in European countries. While providing further model-based evidence 
about the effects of embracing a common monetary stance when underlying macroeconomic 
structures still differ across countries, we tried to answer a number of relevant questions. Is 
the choice of which institutional monetary arrangement neutral with respect to cross-country 
divergences in the real economies? Can labour market flexibility correct for asymmetric 
policy responses thereby favouring convergence across European countries? Is labour market 
flexibility always good news? The answer is found to be negative in all cases. 
First of all, we note that natural rate considerations are out of place when the choice of a 
monetary regime is at question. As inertia in the inflation process is substantial, monetary 
policy shapes real aggregates responses in the short-to-medium. run. Moreover, if the 
inflation-output nexus is likely to exhibit non-linearities, then monetary policy can also 
affect the average level of real variables in equilibrium. Sensitivity analysis to alternative 
(uncoordinated vs. co-ordinated) monetary designs for Europe shows that, under EMU, 
cross-border exchange-rate fluctuations are to be internalised and monetary co-operation 
institutionally enforced. On this ground, the overall sensitivity to common monetary shocks 
is found to be weaker under EMU than under any alternative monetary regime for Europe. 
This would render the degree of cross-country heterogeneity less evident, even in the 
absence of any active labour reform. While this is undeniable with respect to those European 
countries exhibiting stronger rigidity in their economic structure, it is not true for countries 
characterised by higher price and real output responsiveness. For these countries, EMU 
remains desirable if compared with the old ERM regime, but still features policy 
overreaction in the face of symmetric monetary shocks. Although conclusions are far from 
being indisputable, our results seem to suggest that a Monetary Union is likely to render 
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rigid economies more similar to one another, while widening the gap between rigid and 
flexible economies within Euroland. Different extant economic conditions are also likely to 
represent weighty barriers to the process towards convergence. 
in the presence of non-linear short-run constraints, different degrees of rigidity in country. 
specific inflation-output relationships are hence found sufficient to generate asymmetries in 
the business cycle under EMU. Conversely, labour market discipline is not able to ensure 
convergence on its own. In particular, responsiveness to monetary changes is significantly 
greater - ceteris paribus - in high-debt countries. The chapter argues that in these cases, 
allowing for greater nominal and real flexibility in the labour market may actually induce 
destabilising effects in the economy. This seems to suggest a clear ordering in the sequence 
of structural reforms these countries need to undertake. 
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APPENDIX 
Extending Clark and Laxton (1997) and Laxton et aL (1998), in this appendix we briefly 
recap how a 'semi-reduced-form' Phillips Curve can be derived from a wage- and price. 
setting framework and which are the features of the labour and good markets that may 
possibly underly its convexity. 
The Phillips curve model can'be thought of as an adjustment mechanism embodied within 
the Layard and Nickell (1985,1986) imperfect competition approachl. Their approach uses 
the wage-price system to determine the core supply side of the economy, which is seen to 
arise as the long-run solution to the wage and price equations. This can then be employed to 
derive an expression for the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU), 
given conditions such as static homogeneity. 
Specifically, workers are assumed to seek a given real consumption wage that satisfies their 
aspirations, whereas firms are seeking to achieve a given mark-up over costs. These 
competing claims may not be consistent. Only when unemployment is at its equilibrium 
level, competing claims are reconciled and inflation is stable. The wage- and price-setting 
can thus be characterised as follows: 
tv= Pe+ pr + ao - alu - a2te - a3ti + a4td + ap + a6z' 
pp =Po-Au+(I-, 82Xw + te'- pr) + 
fl2m (A. 2) 
I An excellent account of the economics of the labour market models, including the Layard-Nickell approach, is 
given in Carlin and Soskice (1990). For an analysis of the core supplyv-side framework in an open-economy 
context see Joyce and Wren-Lewis (1991), Turner (1991), Wren-Lewis (1997). Wallis (1993) provides useful 
discussion on real wage resistance assumptions, whereas Graafland (1992) and Huizinga et aL (1998) investigate 
their empirical relevance for models of the Dutch economy. 
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Equation (A. 1) specifies real consumption wage in terms of expected consumer price (Pe). It 
moves in line with productivity (pr) and is a negative function of unemployment (u), 
employers' payroll (te) and indirect taxes (u); conversely, unions' real-wage claims increase 
with direct taxation (td), real exchange rate (p) and other exogenous; wage-push factors (z), 
such us unemployment benefits and trade union power. The producer price equation (A. 2) is 
a mark-up on real wage costs and import costs, with an allowance that the mark-up rises with 
demand pressure (and falls with demand slack, proxied by u). We can re-write this as: 
(I - P2)pp=po-Au+(I-, 82Xw+te-pr)+, 82(m - pp) 
This yields: , 
pp = 50 -3, u+(w+te - pr)+82p (A. 3) 
Where SO = fiO Al -A)9 
81 = fil /(I - P2 ) and p= (m - pp). Furthermore, given the 
identity linking consumer prices to producer prices, p= pp +a, we can re-write the wage- 
price system (A. l)-(A-2) as follows: 
W-P e -pr ao -alu-a2te-a3ti+a4td+a5p+a6zw (A. 4) 
I p-w+ pr = 50 -8, u+te+ti+82p, (A. 5) 
In expectational, equilibrium. with non-accelerating inflation (i. e. Az = 0), solution of (A. 4)- 
(A. 5) determines the NAIRU as a function of tax variables, real exchange rate and other 
wage-push factors. Changes in the level of productivity, on the contrary, leave 
unemployment unchanged in the long run, under the assumption that permanent shifts in 
productivity are reflected in identical shifs in the equilibrium real wage (that is, under static 
homogeneity). ' 
U* =I 
[(ao +50)+(l-a2ýe+(I-a3*+a4td+(a5+452 
)P+a6Z' (A. 6) 
a, +5, 
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Consider (A. 5) as defting the equilibrium (or target) price level, -p. Using (A. 6), we can 
therefore express the price-wage system (A. 4)-(A. 5) as defining the short-term trade-off 
between deviations of the expected price level from its equilibrium level and the 
unmployment gap, namely: 
ýe 
- 
-P) 
= (a, +, 61 
Xu 
- te) (A. 7) 
(A. 7) represents the 'reconciliation'mechanism' of competing claims. It states that when u is 
above u*9 then fmns are setting 'too low' prices (i. e. real wage costs are too high) so that 
prices are-expected to rise in the future to reconcile firms' and unions' real claims; the 
opposite holds true when U is below its equilibrium'i-ate. Note that in (A. 7) the equilibrium 
rate of unemployment is endogenously determined by the solution of the implicit wage-price 
system described above: as a result, changes in any -of the factors entering (A. 6) are 
implicitly affecting the NAIRU. Yet, under the assumption that the actual price level adjusts 
only gradually to the the target price level, it is possible to introduce 'a dynamic price 
adjustment in an error correction form such that: 
APt = Al 
rP 
- Pt-I 
)+ A2 APt-I (A. 8) 
Allowing for X2 to be different from zero introduces inertia in the inflation process and not 
only in prices. Under the further assumption that ; L, + ; L2 = 1, equation (A. 8) actually 
translates into an error correction for inflation rather than the price level. This becomes clear 
by letting p-pt-, -., -; r and subtracting ; L, 7r,., from both sides of equation (A. 8), such that: 
Art = Al 
rg 
-; rt-i 
) (A. 9) 
Denote pe with few algebraic transformations, the two-equation system (A. 7)- 
(A. 9) can now be solved to derive a linear expectations-augmented Phillips curve model 
which summanses the implicit inflation-unemployment nexus: 
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Yrt e+ ýrt-, + A, (a, + 81 xu - U) 
Note that in equilibrium, the inflation rate is constant and the unemployment rate u coincides 
with the equilibrium unemployment rate u*. 
In equation (A. 10) the responsiveness of a to e, as measured by Al, can be regarded as the 
degree of nominal flexibility. The coefficient on the unemployment reflects both the degree 
of nominal flexibility and the degree of real rigidity, the latter expressed by 11(al+61), as 
discussed in Layard et aL (1991). The degree of real rigidity is high when prices and wages 
are not responding much to variations in demand conditions (i. e. to unemployment level): in 
this case a, and 61 are small while 1/(al+bl) is large. Incidentally, it should be noticed that 
the higher real rigidity, the larger is the NAIRU, other things being equal, as it is evident 
from equation (A. 6). Moreover, the interaction between the degree of nominal and (the 
inverse oo real rigidity determines the slope of the linear Phillips curve, reflecting a constant 
short-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment gap. A higher degree of nominal 
flexibility and a lower degree of real rigidity imply, ceteris paribus, a steeper PHlips curve 
and, thereby, a stronger response of inflation to demand pressures. 
Where does convexity come from? Convexity is introduced into equation (A. 10) when the 
parameters that determine the short-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment are 
variables that change with labour market conditions. For example, if the degree of real wage 
rigidity is a positive function of the unemployment level, then the Phillips curve would 
exhibit convexity. MM3 assumes that such function is of linear form, such that 11(ct1+61) 
j(u) = nu-0. Under these circumstances, equation (A. 10) becomes: 
Irt (A. 11) 
which is exactly the same as equation (6.2) in the text where r=A, /fI and 0= E)/Q. Note 
that both increases in nominal flexibility and falls in real rigidity raises the coefficient y in 
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(6.2). Why should real wage rigidity increase in the face of higher unemployment levels? 
Explanation is provided by several theoretical labour market models. Efficiency-wage 
models a la Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), where unemployment operates as a 'worker 
discipline device',, are just an example. Evans (1985), with a disaggregate model of 
bottlenecks across different labour markets, is also able to derive a non-linear relationship 
between inflation and aggregate demand pressure. 
Chapter Seven 
Conclusions 
In these pages I have shown by a number of examples that macroeconometric models still 
have an important role to play in policy analysis. In particular, they appear to be able to 
provide a consistent quantitative framework in which to test alternative policies. To 
accomplish such duty, macroeconometric models must be based on adequate empirical 
performances and, at the same time, contain a theoretically consistent account of agents' 
behaviour. Yet, these are necessary but not sufficient conditions in policy design and 
evaluation. Especially in cases where the assessment of future policy innovations is at 
question, the Lucas critique bites quite hard and consistency with historical data may then not 
be enough. These are areas where great care has to be taken in interpreting models' results in 
order to judge the role of additional assumptions made off-model. In these cases, 
macromodels should perhaps be viewed as a framework for investigating the macroeconomic 
consequences of a range of alternative scenarios. However, to distinguish among them, a 
further (and unavoidable) discretionary judgement is certainly required. The political element 
of any policy decision should, therefore, never be overlooked and 'policy evaluation with 
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ma'croeconometric models' should never be'regarded as a synonym of 'ready-to-be- 
implemented recipe'. 
A number of cases have been presented throughout this thesis, where macroeconometric 
models are employed as useful tools for evaluation of contemporary policy problems. A range 
of alternative approaches has been proposed to shed light on how macromodels can actually 
contribute to the policy debate. In particular, I have emphasised how different models maybe 
augmented or modified and stress the need for care in the experimental design of policy 
simulations. At the same time, relevant policy implications have been drawn throughout such 
model-based analyses. Let us recap the main findings. 
Small stylised models of the UK economy are estimated in the first part of this thesis. They 
are used to assess the performance of simple monetary policy rules under the current inflation 
targeting monetary regime. In a monetary policy regime of inflation targeting, the objective is 
typically specified as a range of outcomes for future inflation. Since monetary policy affects 
inflation with a lag,, current policy is set in relation to forecasts of future inflation; since 
forecasts are subject to error, point targets will almost always be missed, and an indication of 
the inherent uncertainty is given by a target band. The approach used in chapter 2 to the 
determination of an appropriate band width is, to build a macroeconomic model of the 
economy and then use suitable analytical techniques to assess the variance of inflation under 
alternative policy reactions to shocks. An influential study recently published by the Bank of 
England (Haldane and Salmon, 1995) estimates a 'small semi-structural model' of tile 
inflation process with backward-looking expectations, and uses stochastic simulation 
techniques to calculate the variance of inflation under simple feedback rules for interest rates. 
The study's most striking conclusion is that there exists 'a fairly substantial lump of inflation 
uncertainty' in the United Kingdom. Specifically, their results imply that there is 'on average, 
a no better than one in four probability of hitting a 1%-4% inflation target. Comparing results 
in chapter 2 with the original Haldane and Salmon's results, we see that incorporating the 
exchange-rate transmission channel and an explicit forward-looking treatment of expectations 
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reduces the estimated standard deviation of inflation to' approximately 50 per cent of their 
figures. Calibrating the variances and covariances of random disturbances to the experience of 
only the last decade of their sample achieves a further reduction of a little more than one-half. 
The lump of inflation uncertainty is thus substantially -reduced. One contribution to this 
improvement comes from the recognition that the underlying variance or uncertainty of 
inflation has fallen as the level of inflation has fallen, and further reductions could also be 
appropriate as central bank credibility has increased out-of-sample. Also contributing are tile 
extensions allowed to their model, endogenizing the exchange rate and treating expectations 
in an explicit forward-looking manner. These extensions are kept to a minimum, since tile 
present purpose is to confront, tile 'substantial lump of inflation uncertainty' on its home 
ground of a small stylised model of the inflation process; this also permits to deploy recently- 
developed analytic techniques for linear rational expectations Models. There are, nevertheless, 
other relevant features which are commonplace in leading structural models, of the UK 
economy but are still missing from the small stylised model used in chapter 2: for instance, an 
explicitly forward-looking behaviour in price -and wage determination and a more complete 
integration of steady-state properties and short-run dynamic adjustments, through the use of 
error-correction models. These extensions-are considered in chapter 3 together with a wider 
range of policy rules, including 'inflation forecast targeting' d la Svensson (1997,1999) and 
'Taylor' rules. In this chapter different, degrees of forward-lookingness in both inflation 
targeting horizon and wage bargaining, are also taken into account. Linearity and analytical 
tractability of the empirical model are, however, retained. In this way, the extension of 
Blanchard and Kahn's (1980) solution method for rational expectations models deployed in 
chapter 2 can be used here to calculate the variances of inflation and output. Within the model, 
we give particular relevance to the determination of wages and prices, reflecting. the 
substantial developments in this area in the last decades. Careful attention is granted to both 
statistical and economic issues, by recognising the need to go beyond single-equation 
modelling and the policy implications of the empirical study. The major conclusion of our 
analysis concerns the central role that credibility is found to play when stabilisation goals are 
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at issue. Specifically, forward-lookingness in labour and foreign markets is likely to have a 
crucial impact on the effectiveness of monetary policy, whereas the choice of which inflation 
targeting horizon does not seem to make much difference. Once credibility of the new policy 
regime is taken into account, our estimates indicate about 1% standard error for annual 
inflation, in line, with the findings in the previous chapter. This implies that a tolerance 
interval of plus or minus one percentage point can be achieved approximately two-thirds of 
tile time, compared with Haldane and Salmons' argument for an inflation target band width 
"at least as large as the three percentage points [then] operating in the United Kingdom - and 
possibly much wider". This value also represents a reduction of approximately one-half of tile 
corresponding estimate of inflation volatility provided by Bean (1998) for comparable policy 
objectives in a much simpler model. Our results, however, provide support to Bean's evidence 
of rectangularity of inflation-output standard error trade-offs. The lowest bound for inflation 
variability is in fact found to be couple, over the relevant period, with a ceiling, for output 
volatility. This means that beyond a certain pointJurther tightening of the monetary policy 
cannnot induce any better inflation control. At tile same time, if some weight is to be placed 
on output variability, then stronger signals of inflation control have also to be sent to the 
market, to make an inflation target monetary policy effective. 
The remainder of the thesis concentrates upon monetary transmission mechanisms, though 
from a number of different perspectives. Large-scale country models have the convenience to 
make explicit a complete range of relationships among macroeconomic variables most of 
which, for obvious reasons, are neglected in smaller dynamic models. As a consequence, such 
quantitative framework offers an unique opportunity to evaluate not only the aggregate impact 
of exogenous shocks on the variables of interest, but also to identify the underlying economic 
mechanisms enabling the transmission of such shocks. In the second part of the thesis, I 
undertake simulations of the National Institute's Domestic Econometric Model (NIDEM) to 
analyse the characteristics of the UK monetary transmission mechanism. Chapterý 4 
emphasises that the impact of interest rate movements on real variables is strictly determined 
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by both the monetary regime at work and the underlying assumptions regarding consumption 
behaviour. Specifically, under the model's default consumption specification, based on the so 
called 'disposable funds' approach, UK real output and its components are found to be highly 
sensitive to monetary policy disturbances. Interest rate sensitivity even increases when an 
inflation targeting rule is replaced by a pegged exchange rate regime. However, if households 
are assumed to make their spending decisions within a life-cycle perspective while 
texcessively' discounting the future, then the interest rate sensitivity of consumption falls 
dramatically. Moreover, decomposing GDP responses by transmission channels shows that 
monetary policy exerts a strong influence on spending components via its impact on the fiscal 
stance, particularly under a fixed exchange rate regime. Because of tile sluggish debt 
reabsorbtion characterising the model, its effect appears to be more pronounced in tile 
medium-to-long run. Given the decentralised nature of fiscal policy and fiscal structures 
within EMU, evidence of a quantitatively important fiscal channel of monetary policy is likely 
to weaken the argument for a symmetric policy response to a common change in the policy 
rate. 
Certainly, tile steady integration of the members of the EMU and increasing awareness of tile 
need for closer co-operation in monetary and fiscal policy have stimulated greater interest in 
modelling interdependencies between European countries and the impact and feedbacks from 
the rest of the world economy. Many of the key issues have now an international aspect, so it 
becomes more and more difficult to rely on single-country models to provide necessary 
analysis. International transmission mechanisms can therefore be better tackled with a multi- 
country model. The third and last part of this thesis focuses on cross-country asymmetric 
transmissions in response to a common monetary shock within EMU. In particular, in chapter 
5 an empirical analysis of the links between monetary and fiscal policy within EMU is 
presented. This is done through simulations of a neo-classical multi-country model: the IMFs 
MULTIMOD Mark III (MM3). In MM3 monetary policy has a quasi-fiscal dimension, since 
money both enters the government budget constraint and affects real wealth. Each European 
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economy is characterised - even in steady state - by a different debt/money composition of 
deficit financing and assumed to sustain it by running a different primary surplus. This allows 
to assess the effects of a common monetary policy on country-specific fiscal stances as well as 
the implications of enforcing a Stability and Growth Pact in equilibrium and during transition 
to the new steady state. To investigate asymmetric monetary transmissions within Monetary 
Union among Germany, France and Italy only, I first simulate a permanent fully credible 
reduction in the EMU-3 money supply target under the assumption that an independent ECB 
is adjusting short-term policy rate to reduce aggregate money supply to tile new target. This 
experiment represents the benchmark scenario: under these circumstances asymmetries are 1ýb 
temporary and almost entirely driven by dissimilarities in the structure of national labour 
markets. I thus repeat the experiment under alternative model assumptions, namely: (i) a 
common rate of money financing, as a result of the centralisation of seigniorage revenues 
under EMU; (ii) a strict enforcement of the SGP, ensuring that Maastricht criteria will be met 
by all European countries, at least in steady state; (iii) more efficient credit markets all over 
the Euro, area. Given the static homogeneity characterising MM3, any evidence of long-run 
real effects following a permanent reduction in money supply is namely to be associated with 
the so-called 'fiscal dimension' of monetary policy. Simulation results largely support my a- 
priori. Centralising money suppply seems to induce long-term 'cross-country wealth 
redistribution in response to a common monetary shock, unless accompanied by offsetting 
country-specific corrections in their debt stocks. Although the convergence criteria implicit in 
the Stability Pact are not necessary in MM3 to ensure fiscal sustainability, their strict 
enforcement is shown to be associated with overall ever-lasting benefits. Transition to the new 
steady state appears, however, remarkably costly for high-debt EMU countries. Reducing 
credit market imperfections is not found to-alleviate such transition costs. Besides, different 
degrees of borrowing constraints across Europe are per se unlikely to explain cross-country 
heterogeneity in monetary transmission. 
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Chapter 6 provides further evidence about the effects of embracing a Monetary Union when 
underlying'macrocconomic structures still differ across countries. By use of the same model- 
based quantitative framework, this chapter examines the role of nominal and real rigidities in 
European labour markets for the assessment of alternative monetary regimes. Meanwhile, it 
answers a number of relevant questions. Is the choice of a particular monetary arrangement 
neutral with respect to the degree of asymmetry in policy responses across countries? Can 
labour market discipline favour convergence? Is labour market flexibility always good news? 
I show that under EMU, overall responses to symmetric monetary shocks appear to be 
weaker, as cross-border exchange-rate fluctuations are internalised and monetary cooperation 
is institutionally enforced. This may render the degree of cross-country heterogeneity less 
evident, at least with respect to the more rigid economies, of the Euro-zone. However, for 
countries charactcrised by higher (nominal and real) flexibility 
in their economic, structure, 
EMU is only desirable if compared with the old ERM regime, while - it induces policy 
overreaction with respect to uncoordinated monetary stances. In this way, EMU -could widen 
the gap between rigid and flexible European economics. Secondly, different extant economic 
conditions are liable to represent further barriers to the process towards convergence. Finally, 
although in the presence of 
inflation inertia and non-linear short-run constraints different 
degrees of rigidity in national labour markets are sufficient to undermine synchronisation in 
the business cycle, labour market discipline is not likely to ensure convergence on its own. In 
particular, as responsiveness to monetary changes 
is significantly greater, ceteris paribus, in 
high-debt countries, the chapter argues that allowing for greater nominal and real flexibility in 
these labour markets may boost fluctuations in real aggregates, thereby inducing destabilising 
effects in the economy. 
This seems to suggest a clear ordering in the sequence of structural 
reforms these countries need to undertake, with 
fiscal consolidation being thesine qua non to 
any subsequent labour market reform. 
In this respect, our results provide support to Burda's 
(1999) conclusion that '[c]alls for additional may be the economic equivalent of whipping a 
dead horse, and could provoke counterproductive reactions. 
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it should then be clear that besides providing a quantitative assessment of highly debated up- 
to-date policy issues, the previous discussion emphasises the role of models as a tool of 
thought, rather than as a black box. In order to 're-conquer' policy-makers' trust in 
macromodels, these need in fact to be applied carefully and interpretation of their findings 
require an investment of intellectual effort. Probably the main mistake which has been 
committed in the past decades has been to see them as mechanical devices, able to provide a 
short-cut to answering questions about national or international economic policy. 11-iis is never 
the case. In order to use macromodels properly, it is necessary that they are adequate for the 
desired purposes. If they are not, then they should be modified without forcing results which 
have no supporting evidence. Since each model is constructed a specific purpose, then 
different modelling approaches should be seen as -complements, whereas a rigid obedience to 
a single model is not a sensible strategy. This thesis is an example of such eclectic way of 
using macromodels for policy evaluation. Since flexibility and transparency should be 
reckoned as the ultimate goals of any policy analysis, the tools of such analysis should also be 
flexible and transparent. Opening models up to policy-makers and revealing where judgement 
is needed, may then be likely to encourage their further use. 
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